MASTER  NEGATIVE 

NO.  93-81611- 


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A  UTHOR: 


HUFF,  JOHN  W. 


TITLE: 


EXAMINATION  OF 

MACAU  LAY'S  ESSAY 


PLA  CE: 


PHILADELPHIA 


DA  TE: 


1892 


!  S»*  ' 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

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Huff,  John  W      .'      '■•       '   •■ 

ExaiBination  of  Macaulay's   Essay   on  Renke's 
History   of   the  pcpes .    with  a  few   contributions    to   the 
preBs   on   other  subjects 


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A^  EXAMINATION 


OF 


m:  a  oaulay'S  essay 


on 


RANKE'S  HISTORY  OF  THE  POPES: 


WITH  A  FEW 


OONlllIBUTIONS  TO  THE  PKESS 


ON 


OTHER  SUBJECTS. 


BY 


JOHN    W.    HUFF. 


PRIVATELY  PRINTED. 
1892. 


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V 


AN  EXAMINATION 


OF 


MAC  A  UL  AY'S    ESSAY 


ox 


RANKE'S  HISTORY  OF  THE  POPES: 


WITH  A  FEW 


CONTRIBUTIOXS  TO  THE  PRESS 


ox 


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4 


(' 


\ 


OTHER  SUBJECTS. 


BY 


JOHN    W.    HUFF. 


riilVATELV  PRINTED. 

1892. 


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Si 


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TO  MY 


DEAR     AND     ITOXOHED     FIIIEND, 


HENRY  CAREY  BAIRD, 


iritis  ^*olumr 


COPYHIOIIT    r.v 

J  on  N   \\  .    II  r  FF, 

1802. 


IS 


A  F  F  E  C T I O  X  A  T  E  E  Y     DEDICATED 


IN 


lIKlNIK.MBItANCi:  OK  THK  rOltDFAL  PKHSOXAL  AND  Bl^SIXESS  IJEIATIONS 


WHICH,   FOR    NEARLY    FOKTV    YKAUS,    HAVE 


EXISTED    BETWEEN    IH.M    AND 


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THE  AUTHOR. 


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^  I 


PR  EFACE. 


TiiK  articles  in  tliis  pamphlet  were  written  many  years  ago.  AVliy 
l)nblisli  them  now?  Simply,  to  put  them  into  the  hands  of  a  few  select 
friends,  who,  whetlier  they  do  or  do  not  agree  with  me  in  my  opinions, 
have,  I  feel  quite  assured,  no  doubt  of  my  intellectual  integrity. 


I  consider  it  my  duty  to  render  to  Francis  Hodgson,  D.D.,  the 
kindest  Jind  tenderest  tribute  of  which  I  am  capable.  He  was  a  con- 
troversialist of  exceptional  ability.  If  he  had  been  trained  by  William 
Chillino-worth  or  Jonathan  Edwards,  his  logical  attainments  would 
uiKpH'stionably  have  enabled  him  to  found  a  high  reputation. 


4 


I) 


J 


CONTENTS. 


Macaulay's  Essay  on  Rankk's   Uistouy  of  tiik  Popks 


Ciu'Rcn   AND  State 


The  Basis  of  Suffrage 


Brooks  as  a  Lexicographer 


A  Forgotten  Specification 


An  Aim   in  Life 


Progress 


Verbal  Criticism 


Verbal  Criticism 


Macau  LAY 


Ln   MEMoiaAM— Fillinghast   K.  Collins 


PAGE 

V   the  Popes 

5 

.   39 

.   54 

.   68 

.   71 

.   75 

.   78 

.   81 

.   84 

• 

.   89 

•    •    • 

.   93 

■  JBWBs  v. .   ..^toii.^ 


MACAULAY'S  ESSAY 


ON 


RANKERS  "HISTORY  OF  THE  POPES." 


Though  several  years  have  elapsed  since  Mr.  Macaulay's  essay 
appeared  in  the  *'  Edinburgh  Review,"  we  are  not  aware  that  it 
has  been  carefully  examined  by  any  leading  periodical  in  this  coun- 
try. The  sterling  merit  of  most  of  Mr.  Macaulay's  productions  is 
a  sufficient  reason  for  noticing  at  any  time  whatever  comes  from  his 
pen;  wiiile  the  subject  of  tliis  essay  is  so  profoundly  interesting  to 
the  theologian,  the  historian,  and  the  philosophical  inquirer,  that 
whatever  pretends  to  throw  increased  light  upon  it  deserves,  and 
should  receive,  attentive  examination.  Questions  of  a  theological 
nature  are  unquestionably  among  the  most  difficult  that  the  human 
mind  can  propose  to  itself  for  solution.  None  certainly  require 
so  delicate  a  handling,  whether  we  regard  them  in  relation  to  the 
prejudices  with  which  their  consideration  necessarily  comes  in  con- 
tact, or  in  relation  to  the  high  deductions  which  such  questions  in- 
volve. We  see  no  reason  why  theological  speculations  should  not 
have  as  solid  a  basis  as  speculations  concerning  any  department 
of  secular  knowledge.  We  know  that  tliere  is  a  cant  which  asso- 
ciates such  speculations  with  the  vagueness  and  mysticism  of  the 
scholastic  metaphysicians ;  yet  we  know  that  few  of  those  who  use 
this  cant  have  ever  been  strikingly  distinguished  for  profundity 
of  thought  in  any  branch  of  knowledge  which  cannot  be 
treated  otherwise  than  deductively.  Every  psychologist  knows 
that  the  key  to  progress  in  the  science  of  mind  consists  in  the 
careful  and  methodical  study  of  one's  own  thinking.  Every 
logician  knows  that  no  amount  of  knowledge  of  the  forms  of  logic 
will  be  available  to  one  who  does  not  investigate  for  himself  the 
premises  on  which  the  canons  of  logic  are  founded,  because  such 


1 


6 

knowledge  is  absolutely  requisite  to  make  logic  of  any  use  when 
it  is  applied  to  the  various  arguments  which,  in  disputation,  are  re- 
quired to  be  tlirown   into   logical    formula?.      Therefore,  the  psy- 
chologist   alone  who    has   carefully  performed    those    actions,  the 
methodical  arrangement  of  which  constitutes  the  science  of  mind,  is 
competent    to    analyze    the    complex    phenomena    belonging   to 
the  whole  circle  of  the  moral  sciences.     And  that  logician  alone 
whose    studies    embrace     the     construction    and     reconstruction 
of  logical  science  is  a  competent  exponent  of  the  various  elements 
which    that    science    includes.       Any    amount    of    psychological 
or  logical   knowledge   otherwise   acquired   is   of  little   other  use 
to  th^  student  than  the  miscellaneous  scraps  of  an  ordinary  news- 
paper to  the  indefatigable  memorist  who  stores  them  in  his  mind 
without   connection  or  use.     When  we   come  to  the  analysis   of 
theological    questions,    the    importance    of    cautious    examination 
is    higldy    augmented,  for,  in    addition    to   the  methodical    pur- 
suit of  our  inquiries,  we  are  forced  to  control  and  direct  the  m- 
iensesi  feeli?igs  of  which  the  human  heart  is  susceptible.     Neither 
Natural  Theology  nor  Revealed  Religion  represents  anything  that  is 
tangible.     Our  knowledge  of  Revealed  Religion  rests  on  Testimony. 
Natural  theology  includes  all  those  evidences  of  design  which  we 
have  deduced  in  the  physical,  mental,  and  moral  world  relative  to  a 
Supreme  Intelligence.    It  is  plain,  then,  that  in  acquiring  knowledge 
concerning  either,  all  the  higher  processes  of  thought,  the  most  refined 
deductions  of  the  human  mind,  come  into  requisition.     It  is  also 
evident  that  Theology  cannot  exhibit  a  more  exact  scientific  basis 
than  those  branches  of  knowledge  which  involve  analogous  deduc- 
tions, such  as  psychology  and  its  collateral  branches,  because  the 
deductions  which  such  subjects  involve  are  assumed  to  exist  prior  to 
any  theological  investigation.     Therefore,  the  psychologist  who  has 
fundamentally  examined  his  own  thinking,  who  has  methodized  his 
deductions,  and  extended  these  deductions  carefully  to  those  intri- 
cate questions  whose  sum  is  Theology,  is  alone  competent  to  extend 
the  boundaries  of  theological  knowledge. 

Theological  speculations  have,  it  must  be  admitted,  been  com- 
paratively  barren  of  sound  results.  But,  the  theologian  may  re- 
tort, so  have  those  branches  of  knowledge  with  which  such 
speculations  have  been  inseparably  associated.  Whatever  course  of 
thinking  will  tend  to  improve  the  one  will  tend,  to  the  same  extent, 
to  improve    the   other,  because    each    branch    requires    the   same 


,  t , 


method  of  reasoning,  and  involves  nearly  identical  deductions.  In 
proportion  as  psychological  science  advances,  and  the  laws  of  a 
higher  logic  than  that  of  syllogisms  are  evolved  and  matured,  theo- 
logical speculations  will  perceptibly  approximate  towards  a  highly 
accurate  logical  standard. 

Dearth  of  progress  can  never  be  a  sequence  of  the  methodical 
pursuit  of  any  branch  of  knowledge.  He  that  proceeds  to  a  great 
work  with  scarcely  any  definite  object,  with  no  definite  and  care- 
fully wrought  materials,  will  never  realize  any  desirable  result.  If 
obscurity  is  associated  with  the  first  link  in  a  chain  of  reasoning,  it 
will  augment  with  every  consecutive  link  in  the  chain,  and  the  result 
will  involve  obscurity  accumulated  in  geometrical  progression.  The 
close  sifting  of  [)rt'mises,  the  analysis  of  terms,  always  indispensable 
in  every  argument,  never  appear  so  important  as  when  applied  to 
theological  subjects.  To  no  questions  does  the  language  of  Bacon 
so  strikingly  ap[)ly,  where  he  likens  the  vague  and  inaccurate  use 
of  language,  by  the  unwary  controversialist,  to  the  bounding  back  of 
the  Tartar's  bow,  so  mightily  does  it  entangle  and  pervert  the  judg- 
ment. 

We  think  it  will  not  escape  the  notice  of  the  discerning  reader 
that  most  of  those  points  in  relation  to  which  we  are  com|)elled  to 
differ  from  Mr.  Macaulay  involve  the  vague  and  inaccurate 
use  of  language.  By  analyzing  the  terms  of  the  propositions 
which  he  has  presented  as  the  basis  of  his  reasoning,  the  fallacy  of 
all   his  arguments  and  illustrations  will,  we  think,  be  clearly  seen. 

When  he  undertook  to  analyze  the  complex  phenomena  which 
the  elements  of  the  religious  world  present  to  every  reflecting 
mind,  he  either  mistook  his  powers,  or  he  forgot  that  such  sul)jects 
recpiire  reasoning  different  from  that  which  is  usually  required  in 
relation  to  those  subjects  on  which  he  has  written  so  ably  and 
delightfully. 

Mr.  Macaulay  eminently  combines  the  highest  characteristics 
of  the  best  writers.  He  is  as  much  celebrated  for  the  matter  of 
his  productions  as  for  the  <degant  style  in  which  they  are  written. 
His  style  includes  not  so  much  any  one  distinctive  excellence  as 
a  combination  of  most  of  the  excellences  of  the  purest  writers  of 
the  English  language.  A  style  so  close,  so  methodical,  and  so  ac- 
curate should  indicate  a  close,  methodical,  and  accurate  thinker. 
A  fallacy,  associated  with  much  that  is  true,  when  set  off  with  the 


s- 


attractions  wliicli  the  style  of  such  a  writer  exhibits,  not  unfreqnently 
escapes  detection,  merely  because  of  our  reluctance  to  perceive  it. 

Though  Mr.   Macaulay  rarely  sjicrifices  the  matter  of  iiis  essays 
to  graceful  composition,  we  think  his  essay  on  the  subject  of  Hanke's 
work  will  be  rj^garded  more  as  a  favorable  specimen  of  fin(^  coni|)0- 
sition  than  as  an  elucidation  of  the  proWem  lie  lias  attempted  to  solve.   / 
We  do  not  find  in  it  those  rigid  deductions,  those  weighty  observa- 
tions, and  that  cogent  logic  which  so  abundantly  cliaracteri/.e  liis  re- 
views and  other  essays.  The  essay,  for  convenience,  may  be  divided^ 
into  two  portions  :  Tlie  liistorical  portion  of  the  essay,  like  most  of  Mr.  1 
Macaulay's  liistorical  essays,  is  presented  in  a  style  singularly  lucid  [ 
andsi)lendid,andcastingasideafewwrongdeductions,  which  it  would 
appear   like  jiffectation    to  point  out   where  we  have  not    the  means  , 
to    refute    them,    it   may    be    regarded   as  a    correct    though   brief 
development  of  the  most  striking  events  which  have  convulsed  Cath- 
oVw.    Christendom,  and   brought  about  those  elements  of  oj)p()silioii 
now  generalized  under  the   term  Protesta)tfisi)i.     T\w  pielimiiiary ^ 
paragraphs  which  are  (h^signed  to  introduce   this  historical  portion 
embody  the   attempt   to    prove   that    natural    th<Mdogy  and    reveah'd 
reli<non    are    not    nro<jcressive   sciences,    and     that    therefon^    th.e 
reasoninir  which    deduces    the    ultimate    downfall  of   the    Ciiurch 
of  Rome  from  the    progress  of  knowledge   is  foundcMl   on  an  (entire 
mistake.     The  reasoning  by  which  Mr.    Mjicaulay  end(^avors  to  es- 
tablish this  position    it  is  our  j)ur[)os(3   to  examine.      AVe  think  that 
the  rea<ler  will  agree  with  us  that  almost  ail  the  analogies  which  Mr. 
Macaulay  has  adduc(Ml   to  show  that  natund   theology  an<l  revealfMl 
religion   are   not    progressive   sciences,  ;ire   not     only   ine()iielusiv(% 
but  ina[)plicable  to  the  pur[)ose  for  which  they  have  been  em[»loyed. 
"  Tiiere  is  not,"  says  ^Ir.   Macaulay,  "and  there  nev(M*  was,  on 
this  earth,  a  work  of  human  policy  so  well   deserving  examination 
as  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  " 

The  passage  from  which  this  is  taken  is  exceedingly  line,  but,  like 
many  other  fine  passages,  the  effect  of  its  rhetoric  is  vitiatefl  |)y  its 
unsound  logic.  Such  passages  tingle  upon  the  ear, and  are  the  especial 
delight  of  lifth-rate  thinkers.  iMr.  Macaulay  assumes  the  Church  of 
Koine  to  be  a  work  of  hunmn  policy.  Tiie  term  Church  is  vaguely 
used,  but  in  no  one  of  its  varied  applications  will  Mi-.  Macaulay's 
reasoning  prove  to  be  correct.  If  the  term  Ix^  applied  to  the  ecch\<ias- 
tical  orijanization  of  the  Chiu'ch  of  Rome  to  distinsxuish  it  fiom 
other  ecclesiastical  organizations,  then  may  tiie  Church  of  Rome  be 


>?t 


considered  a  work  of  human  policy.     But  Mr.   Macaulay's  reason- 
ing and  illustrations  would  not  apply  to  this  restricted  application  of 
the  term.     The  ecclesiastical  organization  of  the  Roman   Catholic 
Church   is  but  an   integral,  though   a   very   important,   part  of  the 
chundi.      If  the  term  be  applied  to  include  those  fundamental  doc- 
trines of  Ciiristianity  which  are  held  in  common  by  the  Church  of 
Rome  and  by  all  orthodox  Protestant  churches,  the  Church  of  Rome 
cannot  be  spoken  of  as  wholly  a  work  of  human  policy,  because  to  the 
precise  extent  that  she  embodies  scrij)tural  truths  does  she  exhibit 
the  residt  of  Divine  policy.     Plainly,  then,  if  the  Roman  Catholic 
Chiu-ch    be   solely  a  work    of   human   policy,  Mr.    Macaulay  has 
drawn   conclusions  favorable  to  that  church   not  recognized   in  the 
premises,  because  he  attributes  to  a  work  of  human   policy  the  re- 
sults of  the  operation  of  those  living  truths  which  have,  and  which 
ever  will  have,  an  energy  in   themselves  deeply  to  affect  the  human 
mind.    But,  if  the  term  Church  be  used  in  its  generic  sense,  so  as  to  in- 
clude as  well  some  of  the  doctrines  of  Ciiristianity  as  the  ecclesiastical 
organization   of     the    Roman    Catholic    Church,    Mr.   Macaulay's 
splendid  illustrations  relative  to  the  antiquity  of  the  church  lose  most 
of  their  force,  unless  they  be  assumed  to  refer  to  the  antiquity  of  the 
truths  whieh   the  Church  of  Rome  embodies.      The  distinction  is  a 
very  important  one,  and   Protestant  writers  have  rarely  borne  it 
in  mind.     In  the  early  age  of  the  Christian  era,  the  doctrines  of 
Christianity  were  associated  with  a   t)eculiar  ecclesiastical  or<Tani- 
zation.      This  early  organization  under  a  combination  of  moral  and 
political  ciiuses,  has  been  extended  into  the  presentorganizationof  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church.    This  has  always  appeared  to  us  the  one  great 
secret  of  the  extraordinary  perpetuity  of  that  church.   A  profound 
governmental  scheme  lias  been  indissolubly  associated  with  a  theo- 
logical scheme  that  bears  the  impress  of  Divinity.     Both  of  tliese 
elements  have  been   interwoven  with  forms  and  ceremonies  which 
liighly   imi)ress   the  senses  and  lead  the  imaginations  of   common 
minds  ca{)tive.   With  this  ceremonial  [)ara[)hernalia,  so  irresistible  to 
the  unthinking  mind,  were  bound  up  awful  mysteries,  which  hi'^hlv 
augmented  the  impressiveness  of  the  ritual  by  which  the  devotee  is 
influenced.    In  time  all    these   various  elements  became  popularly 
blended  under  that  vague  embodiment,  the  Church.     It  will   thus 
be  see  that  tiiere  is  not  one  element  of  power  which  the   Catholic 
church  has  not  made  subservient  to  tiie  government  of  the   human 
mind.     But  one  more  element  was  required,  not  only  to  give  coher- 


10 

ence  and  practical  vigor  to  this  vast  system,  but  to  give  it  a  sta- 
bility wliicli  it  could  not  else  enjoy.  A  system  like  this  could  not 
hel[)  coming  in  contact  with  antagonistic  elements,  which  tiie  cease- 
less activity  of  the  human  mind  was  ever  producing;  and  to 
evade  these  adverse  elements,  or  to  modify  them,  or  at  least  to  secure 
immunity  itself  from  their  modifying  tendency,  some  bulwark  was 
necessary  to  preserve  its  integrity.  What  was  that  bulwark?  It 
cannot  be  expected  that  the  keen-sighted  statesmen  of  the  Catholic 
Church  could  be  blind  to  a  power  whieii  all  the  social  and  political 
systems  of  humanity  developed  in  so  liigh  a  (h^gree.  By  no  means. 
These  statesmen  took  hold  of  this  principle,  methodized  it,  and 
applied  it  to  the  government  of  large  and  varied  masses  of"  men  with 
an  ability  thjit  has  never  been  sur[)assed — no,  not  even  by  the  priest- 
hood whose  terrible  theology  is  recorded  in  mysterious  hieroglypliics 
upon  the  time-honored  monuments  of  ancient  Egypt.  Thjit  prin- 
ci|)le  is  Authority.  This  is  the  corner-stone  in  the  temple  of  Catho- 
licism. It  is  the  keystone  in  the  arch  of  ecclesiastical  despotism.  Re- 
move it,  and  the  building  crumbles  in  ruinvS — not  the  trutlis  wliich  the 
system  may  embrace  certJiinly,  for  these  are  the  inheritance  of  every 
people  and  of  all  time;  but  these  truths  will  be  absorbed  by  a  system 
more  congenial  to  the  human  mind  in  its  jirogress  towards  the  per- 
fection of  thouglit,  feeling,  and  action.  If  tiiese  views  be  correct,  tlie 
Church  of  Rome — that  tremendous  intermixture  of  truth  and  er- 
ror, that  im[)Osing  ramitication  of  Christianity  and  paganism,  that 
singular  blending  of  democracy  and  despotism — will,  to  use 
a  homely  but  significant  phrase,  die  out.  It  will  either  sink  into  ob- 
livion for  want  of  that  sustaining  energy  so  essential  to  an  op<M-ative 
system  of  faith,  or  it  will  be  insensibly  overwlielmed  by  a  sys- 
tem which  will  absorb  all  the  elements  of  strength  tliat  a  religious 
people  can  furnish. 

But  our  business  now  is  with  INIr.  jNIacaulay.  "We  often  hear  it 
said,"  says  INIr.  Macaulay,  "  that  tlie  world  is  becoming  more 
enlightened,  and  that  this  enlightening  must  be  favorable  to  Prot- 
estantism and  unfavorable  to  Catholicism.  We  wish  that  we  could 
think  so.  But  we  see  great  reason  to  doubt  whether  this  be  a  well- 
founded  expectation.  We  see  that,  during  tlie  last  two  hundred  and 
fifty  years,  the  human  mind  has  been  in  the  highest  degree  active 
— that  it  has  made  great  advances  in  every  branch  of  natural  {)hiIos- 
ophy — that  it  has  made  innumerable  inventions  tending  to  promote 
the    conveniences    of     life — that    medicine,    surgery,    engineering 


11 

have  been  very  greatly  improved—that  police,  government,  and  law 
have  been  improved,   though   not  quite  to  the  same  extent.    Yet 
we  see  that,  during  these  two  hundred  and  fifty  years,  Protestantism 
has  made  no  conquests  worth  speaking  of.      Nay,  we  believe  that, 
as  far  as  there  has  been  a  change,  that  change  has  been  in  favor  of 
the  Church  of  Rome.    We  cannot,  therefore,  feel  confident  tlmt  tlie 
progress  of  knowledge  will  necessarily  be  fatal   to  a  system  which 
has,  to  say  the  least,  stood  its  ground  in  spite  of  tlie  immense  pro- 
gress which  knowledge  has  made  since  the  days  of  Queen  Elizabetii." 
Thougli  it  be  granted  that  Protestantism  has  made  no  advance- 
ment worth  speaking   of  since  the  days  of  Queen  Elizabeth,  we 
cannot  admit   that   Mr.  Macaulay's  reasoning  in  this  quotation  has 
any  relation  whatever  to  the  question  really  at  issue.  The  activity  of 
the  human  mind  concerning  the  departments  of  knowledge  to  which 
he  has  referred  will  never  evolve  a  truth  on   theologicarquestions  ; 
and  inasmuch  as  this  is  not  the  case,  his  allusionsare  neither  pertinent 
nor  conclusive.  The  enlightening  which  is  assumed  to  be  favorable  to 
Protestantism,  and  adverse  to  Catholicism,  requires  other  elements 
than  those  that  are  involved  in  the  improvement  of  government  and 
law,  and  of  those  branches  of  knowledge  which  are  included  within 
the  domain  of  physical  science.     It  is  true  that  the  cultivation  of 
these  subjects  may  exert  a  collateral  influence  in  advancing  a  the- 
ological system   by  generating  a  state  of  n.ind  favorable  for  dis- 
crimination.    But  in  no  other  way.     Nevertheless,  is  it  a  fact  that  \ 
Protestantism  has  not  progressed  since  the  days  of  Queen  Elizabeth? 
We  believe  it  is  not  a  fact:  the  reverse  is  the  truth.     England  is  far 
more  decidedly  Protestant  now  than  it  was  in  Queen  Elizabeth's  time. 
France  is  far  less  decidedly  Catholic  now  than  it  was  at  tliat  period. 
There  is  not  a  nation  on  the  Continent  of  Europe  which  has  not 
exhibited  a  change  adverse  to  the  hierarchical  pretensions  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church.  That freedomandindependenceofthinking, 
which  are  the  characteristic  elements  of  Protestantism,  have  ex- 
erted a  modifying  influence  upon  all  the  institutions  of  every  nation 
of  Catholic   Christendom.   Let  us  bear  in  mind  several  facts.   The 
popes  of  Queen  Elizabeth's  days  exerted  a  weighty  influence  on 
the  policy  of  all  the  cabinets  of  every  Catholic  nation  on  the  Con- 
tinent of  Europe.  Not  even  the  hereditary  right,  the  military  genius, 
the  consummate  policy  of  Henry  IV.  of  France  could  avaifin  se- 
curing a  throne  against  that  power  of  which  the  Pope  of  Rome 
was  the  natural  head.     Since  then  a  genius  of  that  same  France  has 


If 


12 


tnimpled  upon  the  ininimiities  of  the  pontiff,  has  hurhnl  defiance  at 
his  authority,  lias  desecrated  his  holy  city,  has  sus[)ended  the  func- 
tions of  his  high  oflice,  and  hanished  him  tVoni  the  scene  of  his  la- 
bors to  end  his  days  in  mournful  captivity.     And  Pius  YII.   was 
enabled  to  exercise  his  legitimate  functions  only  through  the  domi- 
nancy  of  tlie  powerful  Anti-Catholic  nations  of  the  north.     This  is  a 
fact  pregnant  with  meaning.      The  Jesuits,  at  the  time  of  Pius  IV., 
were  in  the  full  tide  of  successful  operation.      Tin^ir  indefatigable 
energy  overcame  every  obstacle  thrown  in  tlunr  way.   Their  restless 
activity  is  even  now  scarcely  credible.  In  Asiji,in  Africa,  in  America, 
wherever  the  maritime  discoveries  of  the  age  had  offered  them  fa- 
cilities   for  establishing    missions,   vv<^re    the  bold-hearted   sons  of 
Loyola  to  be  found,  planting  the  standard  of  the  cross.  Their  machi- 
nations, their  intrigues,  their  abominabh^  policy  infected  every  court 
of  Europe.    Their  colleges  and  seminaries,  filhul  with  students,  were 
established   in    nearly    every    city    of  Europe,    whence  they   were 
ceaselessly  sending  forth  enthusiastic  sons  of  the  church  ibr  th<i  work 
of  consolidating  and  extending    the   dominion    of   the   Ciiui-ch   of 
Rome.    Their    Machiavellian  [)olicy   grossly  tainted    the    Church. 
A  powerful  reaction   came.   Their  order  was  suppressed,  and   the 
vigor  with   which    their  policy  was    assailed,  and    the   chui-ch   for 
which  that  policy  was  chiefly  exerted,  only  proved  the  powerful  an- 
tagonistic elements  which  such  a  system  will  ever  encounter.     The 
Church  of  Rome  never  em[)loys  power  without  abusing  it;  it  never 
abuses  it  without  creating  a  contrariety  of  in){)ulse  which  tiireat- 
ens  to  destroy  its  sway,  and  dissolve  its  unity.   These  adverse  ten- 
dencies have  become  so  {)owerful    of   hitti  years  that   the  illusion 
respecting  her  perpetuity  and  the  dominancy  of  the  church  has  little 
or  no  [)ractical  influence  upon   the  gi-(?at  proportion  of  mankind. 
One  thing  is  certain.    Protestant  nations,  since  the  days  of  (^ueen 
P^lizabeth,  have  held   their  own.     Catholic  nations  have  been   torn 
by  dissensions,    and    agitated    by    intestine    commotions     bearing 
against  the  Church  of  Rome;  and  in   those  natioris  has  been  gen- 
erated a  widely-extended  pliilosophical  skepticism — fju-  more  antag- 
onistic to  Romanism  than  to  Protestantism — from  which  most  Protcis- 
tant  nations  have  been  comparatively  exempt,    in  Protestant  nations 
extensive  changes  have  taken  phice,  but  none  of  these  changes  have 
tended  in    the  slightest   degree  to  retard  the   progress   of   Protes- 
tantism. 

Violent  changes  are  ever  followed  by  powerful  reactions.     The 


13 


reaction  in  favor  of  Catholicism  against  the  mighty  movements  of 
the  Reformers,  it  must  be  recollected,  were  not  consummated  till 
nearly  thirty  years  after  Elizabeth's  death.  The  great  causes  of  this 
reaction  were,  as  Mr.  Macaulay  says,  the  renovation  of  the  church, 
the  reformation  of  the  orders,  and  the  founding  of  the  Society  of 
Jesus. 

Besides  ,  the  Church  of  Rome  possessed  what  Ranke  signifi- 
cantly calls  the"  habit  of  obedience  and  the  externals  of  the  past." 
The  o{)ei-ation  of  these  elements,  apart  from  other  causes,  would  nat- 
urally create  a  revulsion  in  favor  of  the  church,  when  the  novelty 
of  the  reformed  doctrines  had  lost  somewhat  of  its  dazzliuij  effect. 
At  least  such  has  always  been  the  law  which  has  governed  every 
mighty  revolution  that  has  stirred  the  depths  of  the  human 
heart  in  society.  Now  the  reaction  in  favor  of  the  Church  of 
Rome  was  |)ushed  too  far,  and  it  developed  more  powerful  an- 
tagonistic elements  than  any  against  which  the  Church  had 
contended.  The  eighteenth  century  presents  an  overwhelming 
reaction  against  that  principle  which  the  Jesuits  so  enthusiastically 
proclaimed  ;  and  though  Protestantism  cannot  be  said  to  have  real- 
ized much  from  this  reaction — that  is,  if  we  limit  the  apjdication 
of  the  term  Protestantism  to  a  positive  system  of  faith — yet,  inas- 
much as  the  distinctive  principle  of  the  philosophical  school  is  iden- 
tical with  the  distinctive  characteristic  of  Protestantism,  it  maybe 
regarded  as  a  collateral  element  favorable  to  the  advancement  of 
Protestantism.  Whatever  weakens  Catholicism  relatively  strength- 
ens Protestantism.  The  Church  of  Rome  has  never  rei^ained  that 
power  over  mankind  which  she  enjoyed  previously  to  the  mighty 
assaults  of  the  Philosophical  school  against  her  prerogatives.  The 
fact  that  France — that  hotbed  of  Romanism  in  the  time  of  Louis 
XIV — does  not  now  recognize  exclusively  any  particular  system  of 
faith  is  a  j»roof  that  powerful  changes  have  taken  j)lace  in  a  coun- 
try where  Catholicism  was  once  so  decidedly  dominant.  The  po- 
litical tendencies  of  the  age  are  unfavorable  to  any  hierarchical 
system.  The  law  of  the  world  is  progress.  Government  is  admitted 
by  all  intelligent  men  to  be  an  experimental  science.  Therefore, 
inasmuch  as  religion  is  inseparably  blended  with  all  the  political  and 
social  institutions  of  the  world,  we  may  rationally  infer  that  it  will 
exhibit  a  higher  development  coetaneous  with  the  progress  of  these 
social  and  political  institutions.  The  course  of  thinking  that  will 
suggest  the  improvement  of  these  social  and  political  institutions 
will  equally  suggest  a  corresponding  improvement  of  the  religious 


;,mmi^mAmmm^^^^^P&^ 


14 

systems  among  men.  That  is,  this  course  of  thinking  will  suggest 
to  the  enlightened  religionist  the  necessity  of  resolving  these  systems 
into  the  highest  forms  which  they  may  possibly  be  made  to  assume. 
If  this  be  so,  it  is  only  necessary  to  assume  its  indefinite  exten- 
sion to  be  able  to  assert  confidently,  that  every  religious  system  will 
approximate  to  a  correct  standard  till  all  are  resolved  into  a  har- 
monious one.  This  would  be  a  moral,  intellectual,  and  religious  Mil- 
lennium indeed. 

But  Mr.  Macaulay's  reasoning  leads  to  a  very  different  result. 
It  may  be  com{)ressed  into  these  two  propositions:  Natural  theo- 
logy and  revealed  religion  are  not  progressive  sciences  ;  therefore 
the  progress  of  knowledge  cannot  be  assumed  to  be  unfavorable  to 
Romanism.  Now,  whether  natural  theology  and  revealed  religion  be 
progressive  sciences  or  not,  does  not  concern  the  question  whether 
the  progress  of  knowledge  will  be  favorable  or  unfavorable  to  Ro- 
manism. We  atfirm,  and  trust  that  we  shall  prove,  that  natural  the- 
ology is  a  progressive  science.  Tliat  revealed  religion,  in  the  strict 
sense  in  wliicli  Mr.  Macaulay  uses  the  term,  is  not  a  progressive  sci- 
ence, is  true;  but  to  assume  that,  because  revealed  religion  is 
not  a  progressive  science,  the  progi'ess  of  knowledge,  or  the 
enlightening  of  mankind,  will  not  be  unfavorable  to  Romanism, 
is  quite  another  question.  Tiie  truth  of  this  conclusion  depends 
altogether  upon  the  question  what  ehmients  Romanism  may 
embody  that  are  not  strictly  derived  from  Scripture,  and  yet 
are  likely  to  be  influenced,  either  favorably  or  adversely,  by 
the  i)rogress  of  knowledge.  A  false  religion  may  include  ele- 
ments which  the  enlightening  of  the  world  may  dissipate,  even  though 
nothing  should  be  added  to  the  stock  of  revealed  truth.  Suppose 
that  many  of  the  characteristics  of  Romanism  are  not  based  upon 
Scri[)ture.  If  they  are  not  so  based,  they  form  a  part  of  know- 
ledge with  which  the  progressiveness  or  non-progressiveness  of  re- 
vealed religion  has  nothing  to  do.  Causes  independent  of  Divine 
truth  having  occasioned  these  peculiarities,  why  should  not  causes 
independent  of  Divine  truth  assist  in  their  correction?  What  is  Ro- 
manism*^ All  Protestants  agree  that  it  includes  many  elements  not 
contained  in  the  Script un\s,  aud  that  even  those  fundamental  doc- 
trines of  Scripture  which  it  embodies  are  more  or  less  perverted. 
If  this  be  so,  why  should  the  non-progressiveness  of  revealed  re- 
ligion be  assumed  as  a  reason  why  Romanism  will  not  be  adversely 
affected  by  the  progi-essof  knowledge?  Such  an  assumption  is  grossly 


i 


15 

absurd,  because  perpetuity  would  thus  be  affirmed  of  a  system  based 
on  premises  with  which  Scripture  has  nothing  to  do.  As  a  proof  of 
our  correctness,  we  will  refer  to  one  significant  fact.  The  fundamen- 
tal distinction  between  Protestantism  and  Catholicism  does  not  con- 
sist in  a  difference  of  doctrine,  though  in  this  respect  the  divergence 
is  irreconcilable.  It  is  this:  The  characteristic  element  of  Pro- 
testantism is  Pnva^e  Interpretation;  that  of  C'dihoWcism  \s  C/mrch 
Authority/.  These  elements  are  antagonistic.  If  we  embrace  the 
one,  we  must  abandon  the  other.  J^ot  only  is  this  a  peculiarity  that 
contradistinguishes  Catholicism  from  Protestantism, but,  mark,  it  is 
a  peculiarity  which  no  appeal  to  the  Bible  can  ever  solve.  Let  it  be 
granted  that  revealed  truth  should  progress ;  still,  so  long  as  men  can- 
not agree  concerning  the  right  and  authority  of  interpretation,  dis- 
putes would  be  interminable,  and  the  progressiveness  of  revealed  truth 

would  leave  such  differences  precisely  where  it  found  them.  We  will 
refer  to  one  fact  as  an  experimentum  cruets.  Mr.  Macaulay  has  as- 
sumed, from  the  very  nature  of  his  argument,  the  truth  of  the  Old  and 
New  Testament  Scriptures.  There  was  a  time  when  revealed  religion 
was  certainly  progressive.  Revealed  religion  is  contained  in  certain 
books.  All  of  these  books  were  not  written  at  the  same  time.  Yet  the 
New  Testament  Scriptures  did  not  reconcile  the  Pharisees  and 
Sadducees.  Both  sects  rejected  Christianity;  and  the  Jews  remain, 
at  the  present  time,  as  distinct  a  class  as  when,  in  the  time  of  Christ, 
they  were  contradistinguished  from  Gentiles.  Now,  if  revealed  re- 
li<rion  was  not  unfavorable  to  the  Jews  when  it  was  unquestionably 
progressive,  we  certainly  have  no  reason  to  infer  that  the  progress 
of  revealed  religion,  at  the  present  time,  would  be  any  more  favor- 
able to  Catholicism.  Why?  Because,  if  men  cannot  agree  concern- 
ing what  the  Scripture  teaches,  the  progress  of  revealed  religion 
cannot  possibly  reconcile  their  differences. 

"  Indeed,"  continues  Mr.  Macaulay,  "  the  argument  we  are 
considering  appears  to  us  to  be  founded  on  an  entire  mistake. 
There  are  branches  of  knowledge  with  respect  to  which  the  law  of 
the  human  mind  is  progress.  In  mathematics,  when  once  a  propo- 
sition is  demonstrated,  it  is  never  afterwards  contested." 

This  reasoning  detracts  from  the  merits  of  that  brilliant  writer, 
and  exhibits  a  vagueness  somewhat  remarkable  in  one  so  strikingly 
distinguished  for  closeness  and  precision.  We  opine  that  when  any 
proposition  is  demonstrated,  it  is  never  afterwards  contested.  Only 
prove  a  proposition  to  be  demonstrated,  whether  in  relation  to  morals 


Wmgti 


...Lm^ 


16 

or  tlieolojzY,  and  it  will  be  as  incontestable  as  any  proposition  in 
matlicniatics.  AVe  assume,  of  course,  that  the  reasoning  relative  to 
each  proposition  is  understood.  Tiie  great  desideratum  is  simply  to 
induce  men  to  agree  concerning  the  fact  of  a  demonstration.  Un- 
fortunately, this  desideratum  exists  as  well  in  relation  to  some  of  the 
purely  experimental  sciences  as  in  relation  to  theology.  What 
Mr.  Macaulay  means,  doubtless,  is  that  mathematical  science  is  in 
a  state  so  akin  to  perfection  that  no  two  persons  ever  think  of  hold- 
ing a  dispute  concerning  the  accuracy  of  a  given  proposition.  Hut 
a  demonstrated  [)roposition  is  the  same,  whether  applied  to  natural 
theology  or  mathematics. 

*'  There  is  no  chance,"  says  he,  "  that  either  in  the  purely  demon- 
strative, or  in  the  purely  ex[)erimental  sciences,  the  world  will  ctq 
back  or  even  remain  stationary." 

It  makes  no  ditference.  in  relation  to  the  present  argument, 
whether  or  not  it  does  either. 

"  But  with  theology,"  he  tells  us,  "the  case  is  different.  As  re- 
spects natural  religion,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  that  a  [)hiloso})her  of  the 
present  day  is  more  favorably  situated  than  Thales  or  Simonides. 
lie  has  before  him  just  the  same  evidences  of  design  the  early 
Greeks  had.  We  say  just  the  same,  for  the  discoveries  of  modern 
astronomers  have  added  really  nothing  to  the  force  of  the  argument 
which  a  reflecting  mind  finds  in  every  beast,  bird,  insect,  fish,  leaf, 
flower,  and  shell." 

This  reasoning  proves  nothing  at  all.  It  is  unworthy  of  Mr. 
Macaulay.  It  includes  a  fallacy  which  cannot  easily  be  perceived  by 
an  incautious  reader.  He  does  not  tell  us  whom  he  means  by  a  "  re- 
flecting mind"_whether  an  early  Greek,  or  a  modern  natural 
theologiati.  He  does  not  tell  us  whether  he  refers  to  what  was 
known  of  the  bird,  insect,  and  fish  by  the  early  Greek,  or  what  is 
known  of  them  by  the  modern  student  of  natural  theology.  If  he 
refers  to  the  modern,  his  illustration  is  worthless,  for  the 
question  stands  precisely  where  it  stood  before.  Even  in  this  re- 
spect, we  think,  the  cpiestion  disputable,  because  any  information  we 
derive  in  relation  to  the  nature  of  anything  we  examine  adds  to 
the  force  of  an  argument  which  is  [)OstuIated  on  the  design  exhibited 
in  its  construction.  But,  if  Mr.  Macaulay  refers  to  the  early  Greek, 
he  is  drawing  a  conclusion  favorable  to  the  ancients  from  the  ex- 
perience of  a  modern  reflecting  mind,  which  is  assuming  the  pro- 
position to  be  proved. 


17 

If  we  take  the  literal  meaning  of  Mr.  Macaulay's  sentence,  that 
ice — the  moderns — possess  the  same  evidences  of  design  the  early 
Greeks  possessed,  the  truism  requii'es  no  comment.  But  if  the  re- 
verse be  implied,  not  only  is  the  statement  grossly  absurd,  but 
it  depreciates  the  importance  of  that  refined  study  which  seeks  to 
find  God  in  the  universe — a  branch  of  knowledge  rich  in  materials 
of  reflection  to  the  poet,  the  philosopher,  and  the  humble  lover  of 
whatever    sujrfrests    the  wisdom  and  beneficence    of  an    All-wise 

Beinj;. 

The  construction  of  our  solar  system — all  those  wonderful  dis- 
coveries  which  modern  [)hilosophers  have  made  in  every  department 
of  natural  science,  in  which  the  indications  of  design  are  so  ample 
and  so  striking,  were  wholly  unknown  to  the  early  Greeks.  In  nei- 
ther of  the  senses  in  which  the  word  same  can  be  applied  will  Mr. 
Macaulay's  reasoning  prove  correct.  He  evidently  means  that  the 
argument  drawn  from  the  objects  of  contemplation  in  the  natural 
world,  whether  by  an  early  Greek,  or  by  the  modern  natural  tlieolo- 
o^ian,  is  identical.  But  it  would  not  follow  that  the  ar<T^umentof  the 
one  would  not  embrace  more  elements  than  that  of  the  other.  The 
argument  would  be  the  same  in  kind,  but,  inasmuch  as  the  one  in- 
clud(^s  a  more  extensive  induction  than  the  other,  it  would  involve 
the  progress  of  the  science  of  natural  theology.  What  is  meant 
by  an  evidence  of  design  ?  Undoubtedly  an  indication  of  intel- 
ligence we  have  deduced  from  comparing  any  given  result  with 
the  means  employed  to  accomplish  it.  Now,  Mr.  Macaulay's 
hypothesis  would  be  sufficiently  refuted  by  showing  any  con- 
struction in  nature  in  which  intelligence  is  indicated,  of  wliich 
the  early  (ireek  was  ignorant;  in  other  words,  by  showing 
that  the  early  Greeks  did  not  possess  the  aggregate  evidences  of 
design  we  possess.  But  his  argument  deserves  further  examina- 
tion. 

The  basis  whence  we  have  inferred  design  has  been  the  result, 
in  many  instances,  of  the  induction  of  centuries.  In  astronomy, 
especially,  this  is  true.  Many  anomalies  have  been  thougiit  to  exist 
in  nature  which  extended  investigations  of  natural  philosophers 
have  explained.  Many  doubts  as  to  the  wisdom  and  beneficence 
exhibired  in  a  given  construction,  which  have  occupied  the  minds 
of  the  wisest  of  mankind,  have  been  dispelled  by  the  results  of  fur- 
ther investigation,  as  the  field  of  analogy  has  been  extended. 
Mr.  Macaulay  says,  ''  Nothing  adds  to  the  force  of  that  argument 


I 


18 

wliich  a  reflecting  mind  finds  in  every  fish,  leaf,  and  sliell."    In  what 
docs  the  argument  consist,  let  us  first  ascertain,  and  tiien  we  may 
more  easily  see  whether  or  not  any  thing  adds  to  its  force.   Wiience 
is  the  argument  drawn  ?    In  an  insect  or  flower  we  observe  indications 
of  design,  from  which   we  infer  the  existence  of  an    IntelliLrence. 
If    the    basis    of    our    deductions    is     the     design     exhibited     in 
its   construction,   it    is    evident    that    our    conclusions    relative  to 
the  existence  of  a  Designer  will  be  forcible  in  proportion  as  these 
are  multiplied  and  clearly  appreciated.      The  natural  tlieolo'^ian  ex- 
amines  an  insect.     He  observes  the  nice  ada[)tation  of  its  parts  to 
perform  a  given  function.     He  perceives  an  organization  admirably 
according  with   the   instincts   it  exhibits,  and   indispensably  neces- 
sary to  maintain    its  existence.     He  who   is   best  accpiainted  with 
the  anatomy  and  physiology  of   this  insect,  and  the  relations  of 
these   to  its  instincts,  is    uncpiestionably  most   compc^tent   to  infer 
design.      It  cannot  be  assumed   that   the   early  Greeks  understood 
entomology,  or  any  branch   of  knowhulge  applied  to  natural  the- 
ology, ar;  well  as  the  modern  natural  theologian.     The  earlv  Greeks 
coidd  only  reflect  upon  an  insect  as   they  had  a  basis  for  reflection. 
This  basis  must  be  com[)osed  of  a  knowledge  of  its  habits  and  in- 
stincts.     Now  the  strength  of  the  inference  in  favor  of  a  Designer 
must  be  in  exact  proportion  to  the  appreciation  of  these  habits  and 
instincts.     How  can  they  be  appreciated  if  not   known?    How  can 
they  be  supposed  known  by  those  who  had  not  the  means  to  acquire 
information  concerning  them?    That    the    early  Greek    had     only 
very  partial   means    to    ac(piire    this   information,  it  would  be  al- 
together superfluous  to  prove.      It  is,  then,  clearly  evidiMit  that  nat- 
ural theology  is  a  progressive  science,  and  that  it  has  advanced  since 
the  time  of  the  early  Greek.      The  Aggregate  Evidences  of   Design 
exhibited  in  the  natural  world  constitute  natural  theology  a  science, 
and  just   in  pro[)ortion  as  these  are  multi[)lied    does   the  science 
progress.      It  does  not  progress  in  the  same  manner  that  the  math- 
ematical sciences   progress.     But  neither  in  this  sense  do  jurispru- 
dence and  political  economy  progress. 

The  term  science  has  several  meanings.  In  one  of  its  meaninrrs 
it  represents  any  given  branch  of  knowledge  systematized.  In  an- 
other of  its  meanings,  it  represents  any  branch  of  knowledge  which  is 
clearly  contradistinguished  from  another  branch.  In  the  first  in- 
stance, the  science  may  be  said  to  advance  according  as  the  ele- 
ments it  embraces  are  more  and  more  methodically  presented.      In 


\ 


^/ 


i 


19 

the  second,  the    science   advances  in  proportion  as  new  facts  are 
added  to  an  ajriireojate  already  assumed  to  exist.     In  the  latter  sense 

COO  •/ 

is  natural  theology  a  science.     In  the  other  sense,  neither  natural 
relifT^ion  nor  revealed  relisrion  is  a  science  at  all. 

O  *^ 

"  As  to  the  other  great  question" — says  Mr.  Macaulay — "  the 
question  what  becomes  of  man  after  death — we  do  not  see  that  a 
highly  educated  European,  left  to  his  unassisted  reason,  is  more  likely 
to  be  in  the  right  than  a  Blackfoot  Indian.  Not  a  single  one  of  the 
many  sciences  in  which  we  surpass  the  Blackfoot  Indian  throws 
the  smallest  light  on  the  state  of  the  soul  after  the  animal  life  is 
extinct.  In  truth,  all  the  philosophers,  ancient  and  modern, 
who  have  attempted,  without  the  help  of  Revelation,  to  prove  the 
immortality  of  man,  from  Plato  down  to  Franklin,  appear  to  us  to 
have  failed  deplorably." 

Whether  the  immortality  of  the  soul  can  be  demonstrated  inde- 
pendently of  Revelation  it  is  not  our  purpose  to  inquire.  And 
indeed  it  would  be  useless  to  offer  any  proof  on  the  subject,  con- 
sidering that  Mr.  Macaulay  has  offered  none  negatively  or  affirm- 
atively. Nevertheless,  we  consider  his  reasoning,  if  such  it  may  be 
called,  extremely  unsound.  We  are  not  quite  certain  that  Chris- 
tianity may  not  be  necessary  to  originate  those  conditions  which  are 
essential  to  form  a  highly  educated  European.  If  such  an  edu- 
cated being  is  not  more  likely  to  be  in  the  right  than  a  Black- 
foot Indian,  what  is  the  reason  that  no  Blackfoot  Indian — what  is 
the  reason  that  no  people  whose  intellectual  cultivation  is  not  be- 
yond that  of  the  Blackfoot  Indian — has  approximated  so  nigh  that 
standard  wdiich  is  considered  infallible?  Not  only  did  Plato  |)lace 
the  immortality  of  the  soul  upon  a  rational  basis,  but  the  fundamental 
principle  which  he  put  forth  is  in  many  respects  identical  with 
that  recognized  by  Christianity.  Christianity  brought  life  and 
"  immortality"  to  light.  It  gave  form,  and  distinctness,  and  positive- 
ness  to  the  sentiment  which  has,  under  a  variety  of  manifestations, 
influenced,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  all  thinking  minds  in  all 
ages  of  the  world.  The  immortality  of  the  soul  is  a  deduction  of 
the  human  mind.  Now,  he  who  is  best  acquainted  with  deductive 
reasoning — he  who  has  most  carefully  examined  the  premises  on 
which  his  deductions  are  based,  will  be  most  likely  to  draw  accu- 
rate conclusions  on  any  subject  in  which  they  are  involved.  Scarcely 
any  but  the  most  refined  minds  are  capable  of  comprehending  the 
exceedingly    complex    relations  which    the    examination  of    this 


20 

subject  involves.  Consequently,  the  great  proportion  of  man- 
kind have  been  taught  what  they  are  said  to  know  on  the  subject 
authoritatively.  It  apj)ears  to  us  to  be  the  height  of  absurdity 
to  assume  that  a  Blackfoot  Indian — in  whom  what  Cole- 
ridge calls  the  "  inner  sense"  is  not  born — is  as  likely  to  be 
ill  the  right  concerning  so  refined  a  question  as  the  highly 
educated  European  who  has,  to  the  best  of  his  ability,  investi- 
gated the  relations  on  which  the  truth  of  the  doctrine  is  postulated. 
Unless  we  assume  that  a  Blackfoot  Indian  is  as  conversant  with 
the  legitimate  premises  wiience  these  deductions  are  drawn,  the 
likelihood  of  his  being  as  much  in  the  right  concerning  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul  is  as  little  probable  as  his  likelihood  of  his  being 
as  much  in  the  right  on  any  other  subject  which  involves  purely 
deductive  reason  in":. 

A  great  portion  of  the  truths  of  astronomy,  in  fact,  of  every 
branch  of  physical  science,  are  as  clearly  deductive  as  the  reason- 
ing by  which  we  attempt  to  demonstrate  the  immortality  of  the 
soul.  To  be  sure,  in  the  one  case  we  have  physical  data  upon 
which  our  deductions  are  based.  But  tlie  doctrine  of  the  soul's  im- 
mortality is  so  purely  deductive  that  no  basis  of  a  tangible  nature 
can  be  assumed.  The  course  of  thinking  by  which  we  proceed 
from  tlie  known  to  the  unknown  relative  to  the  laws  of  our  beinfi' 
is  identical  with  that  employed  in  every  branch  of  knowledge  in 
which  deductive  reasoning  can  be  made  available. 

The  inference  from  this  is  obvious.  Tliat  man,  or  tliat  nation 
which  has  most  cultivated  deductive  reasoning  is  most  likely  to 
understand  and  appreciate  the  objects  its  study  embraces.  If  it  be 
proved  tliat  uncivilized  nations  cultivate  deductive  reasoninjr  with 
as  much  ability  as  a  nation  celebrated  for  its  civilization  and  refine- 
ment, the  chances  of  coming  to  correct  conclusions  on  such  doc- 
trines as  that  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  are  of  course  equal. 
What  so  pre-eminently  distinguishes  a  refined  from  an  unen- 
lightened nation  as  the  difference  of  degree  in  which  this  intellectual 
process  is  reg{)ectively  understood  ?  Familiarity  with  this  process 
would  include  the  ability  to  apply  it  to  every  branch  of  knowledge 
— to  jurisprudence,  to  government,  to  political  economy.  But  its  ap- 
plication to  these  subjects  would  indicate  an  advanced  state  of  civiliza- 
tion. Therefore,  if  uncivilized  nations  have  yet  scarcely  understood 
the  alphabet  of  deductive  reasoning  in  relation  to  tliose  subjects 
with  which  it  is  generally  and  most  likely  to  be  associated,  we  have 


\ 


u 


\ 


21 

certainly  no  reason  to  infer  that  the  views  which  they  entertain  on 
a  subject  which  involves  still  higher  deductions  are  likely  to  beany 
more  profound  and  ingenious.  Jf  travellers  have  not  misled  us 
with  respect  to  the  views  and  habits  of  thinking:  anions:  barba- 
rous  and  uncivilized  nations,  we  should  be  forced  to  conclude  that 
purely  deductive  reasoning  scarcely  exists  among  them,  much  less 
made  an  object  of  specific  cultivation. 

''  Then  again,"  he  continues,  "all  the  great  enigmas  which  per- 
plex the  natural  theoloiijian  are  the  same  in  all  ages.  The  inire- 
nuity  of  a  people  just  emerging  from  barbarism  is  quite  sufficient  to 
})ro[)Ound  them.  'J'he  wisdom  of  Locke  or  Clarke  is  (piite  unable  to 
solve  them." 

If  IMr.  Macauhiy  had  told  us  what  these  enigmas  are,  though  he 
should  not  have  told  us  what  is  necessary  to  constitute  their  solution, 
his  argument  would  have  been  more  to  the  purpose,  if  it  would  not 
have  been  more  sound. 

P^nigmas identical  with  those  which  perjdex  the  natural  theologian 
meet  the  inquiring  mind  in  every  branch  of  science;  and  if  any- 
thing relative  either  to  our  present  orfuture  ha[)piness  was  postulated 
upon  them,  their  perplexity  would  appear  augmented.  In  tracing 
effects  to  causes,  we  arrive  at  a  point  beyond  which  we  cannot  go — 
in  other  words,  we  arrive  at  a  cause  which  we  denominate  final.  If 
we  call  this  an  enigma,  then  we  may  truly  say  that  these  enigmas 
are  the  same  in  every  branch  of  knowledge — that  is,  as  far  as  our 
abliily  to  solve  them  is  concerned.  But  such  reasoning  as  this  is 
puerile. 

"  It  is  a  mistake,"  Mr.  Macaulay  says,  "  to  imagine  that  subtile 
speculations  touching  the  Divine  attributes,  the  origin  of  evil,  the 
necessity  of  human  actions,  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation,  imply 
any  high  degree  of  intellectual  culture.  Such  speculations,  on  the 
contrary,  are  in  a  peculiar  manner  the  delight  of  intelligent  chil- 
dren and  of  half-civilized  men." 

In  a  very  peculiar  manner,  we  think.  It  depends  altogether  upon 
the  question  what  these  speculations  embrace  whether  or  not  they 
imply  a  high  degree  of  intellectual  culture.  If  they  embrace  the 
attem[)t  to  solve  ultimate  causes,  the  energy  expended  in  their 
attempted  solution  will  be  productive  of  no  useful  result,  whether 
the  investigator  be  cultivated  or  illiterate,  because  such  an  attempt 
betokens  a  gross  ignorance  of  what  is  the  scope  and  boundary  of 
our  investiojations.  So  lon«;  as  there  are  Divine  attributes,  so  lonjr 
3 


\ 


22 

as  evil  exists,  so  long  as  actions  are  considered  necessitated  or 
voluntary,  so  long  as  mankind  is  subject  to  moral  obligations, — so 
long  may  speculations  concerning  them — tlie  more  so  as  tliey  are 
subtile — betoken  high  intellectual  culture  as  truly  as  speculatioTis 
concerning  government  an<l  political  economy.  Investigators  in 
either  department  are  necessitated  to  di-aw  conclusions  from  given 
premises;  and  though  the  subj<H*ts  of  investigation  mjiy  be  included 
in  distinct  categories,  there  is  no  more  reason  why  o»ie  incpiirei" 
shouhl  fail  than  the  other,  provided  each  is  cautious  in  siftiu"-  his 
premises  ;ind  weighing  liis  deduetions.  Each  inquirer,  if  he  chooses, 
may  easily  get  beyond  his  tether.  Tiiere  is  no  necessity  that  eitiier 
should  go  beyond  it.  The  lact  is,  we  cannot  be  said  to  speak  cor- 
rectly concerning  any  subject  which  involves  reasoning  unless  that 
subject  is  approximately  capable  of  elucidation.  If  metaphysicians 
and  moral  })hilosophers  have  f[ii!e»l  in  ex[)hiining  such  sul)jects,  their 
failure  is  owing  to  the  incorrect  methods  which  they  have  applied  to 
their  solution — not  to  the  peculiarity  in  the  nafun^  of  the  thiufrs 
themselves.  Inasmuch  as  they  represent  deductions  of  the  human 
mind,  the  process  of  thinking  from  which  they  have  been  evolved 
can  be  traced  and  correctly  presented. 

*'The  number  of  boys  is  not  smjdl,"  he  continues,  "  who,  at  foui'- 
teen,  have  thought  enougli  on  these  (|uestions  to  b(^  fully  entitled  to 
the  praise  which  Voltaire  gives  to  Zadig,  '  II  en  savait  c<'  (pi'on 
en  a  su  dans  tons  les  ages,  c'est-a  dire,  fort  jxmi  de  ciiose.'  " — (He 
knows  as  much  about  it  as  any  one  else  has  ever  known,  that  is  to 
say,  scarcely  anything  at  all.) 

Mr.  Macaulay  never  made  a  greater  mistake.  The  fallacy  of  the 
illustration  is  so  striking  that  \\v,  cannot  think  it  would  for  a  mo- 
ment have  imposedu[)on  hismind  had  it  been  employed  against  Iiim 
by  an  antagonist.  The  word  know,  like  knowledge,  is  a  generic 
term.  It  is  consequently  liable  to  be  vaguely  used.  If  by  the 
word  "know"  JMr.  INIacaulay  intends  to  represent  the  certainty 
we  are  conscious  of  when  we  declare  tiiat  we  have  seen  a  familiar 
face;  or  when  we  declare  that  the  sun  is  risen  ;  or  wlien  we  declare 
that  the  wind  blows — then  he  has  assuredly  proved  his  [)oint. 
But  the  subjects  to  which  he  has  referred  are  not  knowti  in  this 
way.  ]Men  know  nothing,  in  this  strict  sense  of  the  term,  relative 
to  a  Supreme  Intelligence.  The}'  merely  ^'///^r  something,  and  in 
proportion  to  the  strength  of  the  premises  upon  which  these  in- 
ferences are  founded  may  they  be  said  approximately  to  know. 


t 


t 


23 

Arguments  employed  with  reference  to  the  existence  of  a 
Su[)reme  Being  merely  embody  these  inferences.  But  in  the  only 
sense  in  which  we  can  apply  the  term  know  relative  to  the  Divine 
attributes  and  to  the  origin  of  evil,  '-'  boys  of  fourteen"  know 
little  or  nothing  concerning  them.  Tliey  may  be  taught,  we  grant, 
?r///(?/iaretlie  Divine  attributes, but  we  will  venture  to  assertthatnot 
one  in  a  thousand  of  the  most  intelligent  boys  of  fourteen  knows  what 
a  Divine  attribute  means,  whence  this  attribute  is  deduced,  and 
wliy  it  is  predicated  of  (iod.  Such  subjects  are  beyond  the  ran^^e 
of  their  knowledge.  Tiieir  minds  are  not  sufficiently  develo[)ed  to 
eniible  them  to  discriminate  relations  of  which  that  constitutes 
only  a  part.  But  Mr.  Macaulay  has  assumed  still  more — that  they 
are  not  only  caj)able  of  comprehending  the  reasoning  applicable 
to  such  questions,  but  that  they  are  capable  of  drawing  conclusions 
in  relation  to  them  equal  in  profundity  to  those  of  the  highe  st  class 
of  philosophers  that  ever  lived.  We  do  not  see  why  the  capacity  to 
rcjflect  so  profoundly  on  these  subjects  should  not  include  the  ca- 
pacity to  reflect  as  profoundly  on  other  subjects  which  have  occupied 
the  attention  of  the  wise  men  of  the  world.  Tliey  ought  tiius  to  be 
e(pial  to  a  Locke,  to  a  Kant,  or  to  a  Coleridge.  If  they  so  well 
understand  these  questions,  why  has  no  boy  of  fourteen  ever  o-iven  a 
dissertation  which  has  impressed  the  thinking  world,  and  served  to 
change,  to  form,  or  to  modify  impressions  long  existing.^  An  an- 
swer to  that  question  would  reduce  the  argument  to  a  nutshell. 

'•Natural  theology,  then,"  says  Mr.  Macaulay,  "is  not  a  pro- 
gressive science."  Whether  it  be  or  be  not  a  progressive  science, 
Mr.  Macaulay  has  certainly  failed  to  show  that  it  is  not  a  pro- 
gressive science. 

AVith  respect  to  revealed  religion,  we  have  previously  admitted 
that  it  is  not  a  progressive  science  in  the  strict  sense  in  which  he 
lias  employed  the  term.  Nevertheless,  though  we  admit  his  premise, 
we  are  forced  to  dissent  from  his  conclusions.  The  illustrations  which 
he  has  brought  to  bear  upon  his  attempted  demonstration  are  in- 
apposite, his  analogies  are  irrelative,  and  his  reasoning  is  unsound. 

"All  divine  truth  is,"  he  says,  "according  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
Protestant  churches,  recorded  in  certain  books.  It  is  equally  open 
to  all  who  in  any  age  can  read  those  books  ;  nor  can  all  the  discov- 
eries of  all  the  philosophers  in  the  world  add  a  single  verse  to  any 
of  these  books.  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  in  divinity  there  can- 
not be  a  progress  analogous  to  that  which  is  constantly  taking  place 
in  pharmacy  and  navigation." 


iMH 


24 

Here  we  have  anotlier  sample  of  tliat  iiK^ager  analogical  reasoning 
to  vvliicli  we  have  before  adverted.  Why  does  Mr.  Macaulay 
always  adduce,  in  illustration  of  these  subjects,  such  sciences  as 
pharmacy,  geology,  atid  navigation?  Every  one  of  these  con- 
cerns tangibilities.  Mr.  INIaeaulay  would  scarcely  contend  that 
ethics  is  not  a  progressive  sciences.  We  think  that  he  would 
even  admit  that  Sir  James  Mackintosh  has  advanced,  to  some  ex- 
tent at  least,  tiiat  science.  J^ut  it  is  plain  that,  on  su(di  subjects, 
there  cannot  take  j)lace  a  progress  analogous  to  that  which  is  con- 
stantly taking  place  in  phartnacy,  geology,  and  navigation.  Such  a 
progress  has  not  taken  |)lace.  Though  it  be  granted  that  all  Divine 
truth  is  recorded  in  certain  books,  and  that  nothing  will  ever  be 
added  to  those  books,  yet  iVIr.  Macaulay's  argument  is  worth- 
less because  no  addition  to  those  books  could  possibly  be  fatal 
to  a  system  which,  according  to  Mr.  INIacaulay's  own  showiiig,  is 
unaffected  by  the  truths  which  are  already  assumcnl  to  be  contained  in 
them.  If  Ciitholicism  be  a  false  system,  as  he  admits,  and  if  it 
maintains  its  present  exalted  position  in  spite  of  its  antagonism  to 
revealed  truth,  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  any  accession  of  ele- 
ments to  the  stock  of  revealed  truth  will  impair  its  integrity.  We 
see  no  reason  why  its  [)ros{)erity  would  be  afft'cted  any  more  by 
whatisadded  to  than  by  what  now  belongs  tothecanonof  Scripture, 
if  divergence  to  either  portion  be  assumed  to  exist  in  an  eijual 
degree.  He  says  it  seems  to  him  that  we  have  no  security  for  the 
future  against  the  prevalence  of  any  theological  error  whicdi  has  pi-e- 
vailed  in  time  past  jimong  Christian  men.  Why?  B(H*ause  non<'  of 
the  discoveries  and  inventions  of  motlern  times — such  as  gun- 
powder, gas,  and  vaccination,  which  he  strangtdy  assumes  to  consti- 
tute thesum  of  knowledge — have  the  smallest  bearing  on  the  (juestion 
whether  man  is  justified  by  faith  alone,  or  whetlu'r  the  invocation 
of  saints  is  an  orthodox  practice.  Any  writer  who  would  assume 
that  the  progress  of  any  of  these  branches  of  knowledge  is  connec- 
ted, except  collaterally — and  that  in  a  very  limited  degree — with 
the  progress  or  decline  of  theological  truth,  would  obtain  xt^ry  little 
credit,  indeed,  for  sagacity.  But  we  would  remark  that  one  who 
has  a  pure  love  of  scientific  truth — one  whose  mind  has  been 
untrammelled  by  early  associations  and  educational  bias — would  be 
likely  to  investigate  theological  questions  with  far  more  candor  than 
one  who  has  been  tjiught  from  infancy  that  to  examine  these  ques- 
tions  for    himself  is  a  grievous    error.     We    think   few  thinking 


25 

minds  will  for  a  moment  doubt  that  candor  is  a  touchstone  that 
would  iro  far  to  reconcile  many  discordant  sects.  He  says  a  Chris- 
tian  of  the  fifth  century  with  a  Bible  is  on  a  par  with  a 
Christian  of  the  nineteenth  century,  candor  and  natural  acuteness 
su|)posed  equal.  Granted — the  illustration  proves  nothing  at  all. 
There  is  not  that  unanimity  of  opinion  concerning  what  is  contained 
in  the  Bible  which  exists  in  relation  to  pharmacy  and  navigation, 
and  the  thousand  discoveries  and  inventions  of  modern  times.  To 
sum  up  the  whole  matter,  the  security  in  the  future  against  the  pre- 
valence of  any  theological  error  would  depend  on  an  agreement 
among  men  on  what  is  contained  in  the  Scriptures,  not  on  the  addi- 
tion of  new  truths  to  the  stock  of  revealed  religion,  if  the  same 
discrepancy  of  opinion  which  now  exists  should  still  be  assumed  to 
exist  in  relation  to  the  added  truths. 

What  influence  will  the  progress  of  knowledge  exert  as  a  col- 
lateral means  in  producing  that  cultivation  of  mind,  that  indepen- 
dence of  thought  without  which  theological  and  all  analogous  ques- 
tions can  neither  be  und(^rstood  nor  appreciated  ?  This  is  the  question 
we  should  ask  ourselves  when  we  wish  to  estimate  the  influence 
which  the  [)rogress  of  knowledge  would  have  upon  a  system  equally 
contrary  to  reason  and  Scripture.  If  the  progress  of  knowledge 
will  have  any  influence  in  producing  that  thoughtful,  unprejudiced 
state  of  mind  which  will  induce  a  seeking  of  ti-uth  for  its  own  sake 
wherever  it  may  be  found,  and  in  whatever  system  it  may  be  bound 
up,  we  may,  from  these  conditions,  deduce  the  eventual  downfall  of 
a  radically  false  theological  system  as  conclusively  as  we  deduce 
from  the  same  conditions  the  final  triumph  of  truth  and  wisdom. 

Mr.  Macaulay  says,  he  is  confident  that  the  world  will  never  go 
back  to  the  solar  system  of  Ptolemy.  Why?  An  answer  to  this 
question  would  suggest  the  answer  to  a  question  equally  important 
— whether  the  world  will  ever  go  back  to  a  system  of  religion  less 
pure  than  the  one  we  now  hold.  No  fact  is  more  evident  than  that 
Christianity  exhibits  a  purer  phase  now  than  it  exhibited  during  the 
Mi<ldle  Ages.  If  we  argue  from  the  past  relative  to  the  future,  we 
may  un(iuestionably  assume  that  Christianity  will  present  a  still 
higher  development.  The  causes  assumed  to  have  produced  these 
results  in  the  past  must  equally  be  assumed  to  produce  the  same  re- 
sults in  the  future.  If  this  be  so,  the  world  must  thus  gradually  ap- 
proximate towards  perfection.  Now  the  question  is.  Will  the  progress 
of  science  contribute  to  produce  this  result?     We    answer  with 


26 

confidence,    it   will,  either    indirectly    or  collaterally.      The    pro- 
gress of  science  involves  continued  cautious  thinking.     It  neces- 
sitates the  habit  of  thinkino^.     This  habit  once  formed,  the  steps  are 
short  which  lead  the  iiKpiiring  mind    to  examine   its  own  thinkin*^. 
The  mind  is  thus  turned  back   on   itself.      The  thinker  then  care- 
fully traces  the  processes  from  which  histhoiiglitsare  evolved.   Every 
law  which  forms  the  groundwork  of  science,   axi^ry  deduction   in- 
cluded in   theology,    psychology,    or   morals,   he   resolves  into   its 
proximate  elements.     Therefore,  whatever  is  a  result  of  thinkin<r 
IS  embraced   within   his   reflections.      Now,  inasnnich  as  the   prog- 
ress of  knowledge   tends  to  produce  a  habit  of  thinking,  and  inas- 
much as  thinking  is  limited  to  no  one  field — whether  one's  own  mind, 
or  the  laws  of  the  sciences — it  follows  that  it  may  be  extended  to 
theological  (piestions,  and  thus  be  the  indirect  m<'ans  of  advancin<^ 
theology — that   is,  as  far  as  a  correct  form  of  theology  can   be  ar- 
rived at  by  the   humjin  mind.      W  our  views  be  correct,  tlu^  exten- 
sion of  scientific  education  to  all  classes  of  mankind  will  include 
an  approximation,  however  slight,  towards  this  result. 

Mr.    Maca:ilay    says   that    Sir  Thomas    More    was  a   man     of 
eminent     talents,     and     that      inasmuch     as      no     prof^ress      that 
science    has    made    or  will   make  can  add   to    the    force  of  what 
seems  to  him  the  overwhelming  argument  against  the  real  presence, 
he  is   unable   to   understand  why  what    Sir   Thomas   Moie  believed 
respecting  transubstantiation  may  not  be  believed  to  the  end  of  time 
by  men  erpml  in  abilities  and   honesty  to  Sir  Thomas  Mon\      l^lie 
inference  is  unjust.      A  fairer  statement   of    the   (piestion    would 
be:   What  opinion  would   an    eminent    man  be  most   likely  to  form 
respecting   the    tiiith    of   this    doctrine?       A    man    of    '' eminent 
talents"  is  a  vague  expression.     A  man   so  profoundly  acipiainted 
with  one  branch  of  knowh'dge  as   to  be  entitled  to  the  appellation 
maynothaveaschoolboy'sknowledge,  either  in  extent oraccuraey, of 
subjectsof  equ[d  or  of  fargreater  importanc(\  If  a  man  be  presumed  to 
grow  up  underassociations  of  birth  and  education  similar  to  those  of 
Sir  Thomas  More,  if  his  investigations  are  included  within  the  same 
range,  we  expect  he  would  become  precisely  such  an  eminent  [)erson 
as  Sir  Thomas  Mora.      But   for  what  would  he  become  emiiuMit  ? 
Not  certainly  for  profound   views  relative    to  those  laws  of  think- 
ing which  govern  our  belief  on    theological  questions  and  all  (pies- 
tions   of   a   i)urely   deductive   nature.      In    this    field    Sir  Thomas 
More  was    not   eminent.      His  fame,  apart  from  his  reputation  for 


. 


^^'  '  -^ 


>  ^  . 


27 

integrity,  depends  on  his  acquaintance  with  very  different  elementsof 
knowledge.  He  cannot  be  said  to  have  been  ready  to  die  for  the 
doctrine  of  transubstantiation,  as  Mr.  Macaulay  asserts, — but  rather 
for  that  system  of  which  transubstantiation  is  only  a  part. 

With  a  choice  specimen  of  human  virtue  like  Sir  Thomas  IMore, 
Mr.  Macaulay  considers  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation  a  kind 
of  proof  charge.  "  A  faith,"  says  he,  "•  which  stands  that  test 
will  stand  any  test."  Now,  it  should  be  recollected  that  transub- 
stantiation is  not  presented,  as  a  test  of  our  faith,  exclusively  on  its 
own  merits.  It  is  associated  with  a  creed  which  is  regarded  by 
Roman  Catholics  with  far  more  reverence  than  the  Bible.  It  is 
considered  a  })rofound  and  incompiehensible  mystery. 

Therefore  it  would  be  very  unwise  to  assume  that  Romanists 
analyze  the  doctrine  with  that  vigorous  closeness  they  would  analyze 
any  dogma  not  embodied  in  the  Roman  Catholic  creed.  Mr.  Ma- 
caulay has  erred  in  relation  to  this  doctrine  in  the  same  way  most 
Protestant  writers  have  erred.  Protestants  may  present  the  over- 
whelming argument  against  the  real  presence  to  the  Catholic,  and 
exhaust  their  })Owers  of  reasoning  to  drive  it  home  to  his  mind. 
They  may  point  out  to  him  that  it  contradicts  the  evidence  of  our 
senses.  They  may  show  him  that,  by  discarding  that  evidence,  he 
<lestroys  the  basis  whence  all  his  knowledge  is  derived.  They  may 
show  him  that  what  conti'adicts  the  unequivocal  testimony  of  sense 
is  as  inconsistent  as  to  believe  a  contradiction  in  terms, — that  it  is  as 
absur<l  as  to  believe  a  thing  is,  and  is  not,  at  the  same  point  of  time. 
They  may  explain  to  him  that  the  only  means  we  can  possibly  pos- 
sess to  test  the  truth  of  the  doctrine  are  our  senses;  that  from  the 
exercise  of  these  senses  all  our  ideas  are  produced  ;  that  by  the 
revolvingof  these  ideas  in  our  minds,  we  are  able  to  possessthoughts — 
the  one  consecutively  depending  on  theother:  andthat,  by  rejecting 
what  these  senses  so  positively,  so  unmistakably  declare  to  us,  we 
plaiidy  assume  that  our  knowing  nothing — that  is,  by  rejecting  that 
basis  by  which  alone  we  are  enabled  to  know  anything — isa  postulate 
of  our  knowing  something.  But  all  your  reasoning  will  most  likely  be 
only  as  sounding  brass  and  a  tinkling  cymbal.  Your  arguments  will 
be  as  ineffectual  in  producing  conviction  u[)on  his  mind  as  the  prayers 
of  the  prophets  of  Baal  in  evoking  the  assistance  of  their  god. 

This  striking  anomaly  can  only  be  explained  upon  this  hypothe- 
sis: All  that  the  Catholic  believes  concerning  matters  of  faith  he 
believes  upon  Authority.    If  authority  to  declare  what  we  shall  and 


t 


28 

what  we  shall  not  bolieve  be  conceded  as  the  undoubted  prerog- 
ative of'apriesthood,  it  is  of  no  possible  consequence  to  us  what  do«r- 
mas  we  believe,  so  long  as  these  dogmas  are  enjoined  l)y  theauthority 
which  we  have  assumed  to  be  our  unerring  giiid.'.  Authority  first 
assumed,  all  the  possible  vjigaries  of  bclieflogieally  follow.  AVhethcr 
we  are  recpiired  to  believe  transubstantiation  or  consubstantiation, 
neither  of  these  can  be  appealed  to  as  a  test  of  faith,  so  long  as 

that  testof  faith  which  enjoins  them — that  All-powerful  authority. 

is  left  untouched.  Unsettle  a  Romanist's  mind  resp<'cting  the  au- 
thority of  the  Roman  Catholic- Church — induce  him  carefully  toexam- 
ine  what  that  authority  means,  whence  it  is  deduced,  and  why,  and  how 

far  consistently  it  can  be  predicated  of  any  class  of  men induce 

him  to  examine  these  questions  with  all  candor  and  honesty  of  heart, 
and  then,  if  his  faith  stands  that  test,  we  may  confidently  assert  it 
will  stand  any  test. 

"  One  reservation,"  says  Mr.  :Maraulay,    "  must  umIvvA  be  made. 
The  books  and  traditions  of  a  sect  may  contain,  mingled  with  pro- 
positions strictly  theological,  other  ju'opositions  [)urp()rting  to  rest  on 
the  same  authority,   which   relate   to  physics.      If  new  discoveries 
should  throw  discrediton  the  physical  pro[)ositions, the  t heologieal  pro- 
positions, unless  they  can  be  separated  from  the  j)hysical  pro[)ositions, 
must  share  in  theirdiscredit.  In  this  way  undoubtedly  the  [)rogress  of 
science  may  indirectly  serve  thecaus(^,  of  religious  truth.    The  Hindoo 
mythology,  for  exanq)le,  is  bound  u[)  with  a  most  absurd  geography. 
Every   young    Brahmin,   therefore,  who    learns  jjjeojrranhv   in  our 
colleges  learns  to  smile  at  the  Hindoo  mythology.      If  Catholicism 
has  not  suffered  to  an  ecpial   degree  by  the  pajud  decision  that  the 
sun  goes  around  the  earth,  this  is  because   all   intelligent  Catholics 
now  hold,  with  Pascal,  that  in  deciding  the  point  atjill,  the  church 
exceeded  her  powers,  and  was  therefore  justly  left  destitute  of  that 
supernatural   assistance  which,  in    the    exercise   of    her    legitimate 
functions,  the  {)romise  of  her  Founder  jiulhorized  her  to  expect." 

Now  what  does  this  "reservation"  concern?  Simply  that  the 
cause  of  religious  truth  may  be  indin»ctly  served  by  the  pro<Tess  of 
science.  Science,  by  exposing  the  absurd  geography  with  which 
the  Hindoo  mythology  is  insepanibly  blended,  leaves  tlie  way  open 
— partially,  it  is  true — to  the  legitimate  operation  of  the  truths  of 
Christianity.  Rut  the  fact  must  be  assumed  that  the  Hindoo  be- 
lieves a  correct  geography.  If  he  should  believe  nothing  that  con- 
travejies  the  Hindoo  mythology,  the  illustration  is  of  course  worthless 


V. 


5 


^   \  ^ 


29 

But  on  what  evidence  does  he  believe  that  the  geography  which  he  has 
been  taught  is  absurd  ?    Assuredly,  by  the  evidence  of  sense.    If  he 
trusted  not   this  evidence,   he  would   never  learn   to  smile  at  the 
Hindoo  mythology.     Now,  the  geography  of  the  Hindoos,  and  the 
transubstantiation  of  Romanists,  belong,  in  this  respect,  to  the  same 
category.    Therefore,  INIr.  Macaulay  cannot  logically  exclude  transub- 
stantiation from  the  same  reservation  he  makes  in  favor  of  the  Hindoo 
mythology.     But  he  does  exclude  it  on  the  ground  that  revealed 
religion  is  not  a  progressive  science.      Now  it   is  not  the  progress  of 
revealed  religion  that  he  assumes  to  be  unfavorable  to  Brahminism, 
but  a  correct    geogra|)hy,    with  which    the    progress    of   revealed 
religion    has    nothing  to  do.         Therefore,    on    his  own   premises, 
what  should  exclude   Romanism  from    those  influences    adverse   to 
Brahminism,  if  the  objection   to  each  system  embodies,  except   in 
degree,  the  same  elements?  In  plain  terms,  if  the  progress  of  know- 
ledge cannot  be  assumed  to  be  unfavorable  to  one  false  theolofncal 
system,  even  though  that  system  should  embody  a  dogma  contrary  to 
the  evidence  of  sense,  why,  upon  the  same  premises,  should  this 
progress  be  declared  unfavorable  to  any  other  theological  system, 
when  the  ground  of  this  adverse  influence  is  the  fact  that  the  system  em- 
braces  elements  contradicted  by  the  senses?     On  Mr.  Macaulay's 
hypothesis,  we  conceive  this  to  be  an  inextricable  dilemma.     Phys- 
ical testimony  bears  not  more  conclusively  against  the  truth   of  the 
Hindoo  geography  than  against  that    of   transubstantiation.      But, 
as  far  as  this  testimony  tends  to  create  an  entire  chanixe  of  thinkincr, 
why  is  it  so  much  more  unfavorable  to  Brahminism  than   to   Cath- 
olicism ?     Because  transubstantiation  is  but  a  part  of  a  vast  theo- 
logical scheme  with  which  physical  science  has  no  concern. 

Transubstantiation  is  associated  with  much  that  is  acknowledged 
to  be  true  by  the  great  body  of  the  Christian  world,  while  the 
greater  {)ortion  of  the  Catholic  creed,  which  Protestants  reject  as 
absurd,  has  no  relation  to  physics.  The  reason  why  Catholicism 
has  not  suffered  as  much  by  the  papal  decision  that  the  sun  goes 
round  the  earth,  as  the  Brahmin  mythology  has  suffered  by  the 
light  of  science,  is  not,  as  INIr.  Macaulay  asserts,  because  all  intel- 
ligent Catholics  now  hold,  with  Pascal,  that,  in  deciding  the  point 
at  all,  the  church  exceeded  her  powers;  it  is  because  Catholicism 
presents  no  such  incongruous  combination  of  mythological  and 
geographical  absurdities.     Besides,  papal  decisions  do  not  constitute 


i 


30 


CatlioHcism;    else   tlie   rejection    of    these   decisions  by  inte]lijj:ent 
Catliolics  would  be,  totliiit  extent,  the  renunciation  of  Catholicism. 

"This  reservation,"  continues  Mr.  Macaulay,  "affects  not  at 
all  the  trutli  of  the  })roi)Osition,  that  divinity,  properly  so  called,  is 
not  a  [)r()gressive  science.  A  very  common  knowledge  of  history, 
a  very  little  observation  of  life,  will  sutHce  to  prove  that  no  learning, 
no  sagacity,  jitfords  a  security  against  the  greatest  errors  on  subjects 
relating  to  the  invisible  world.  IJayle  and  Ciiillingworth,  two  of 
the  most  skej)tical  of  mankind,  turned  Catholics  from  sincere  con- 
viction. Johnson,  incredulous  on  all  other  points,  was  a  ready  be- 
liever in  miracles  and  aj)paritions.  He  would  not  believe  in  Ossian, 
but  he  believed  in  the  second  sight.  lie  would  not  believe  in  the 
earthcpiake  of  Lisbon,  but  he  believed  in  the  Co(!k  Liwc  ghost." 

It  is  of  little  conse(pience  wheth(,*r  this  reservation  atlects  or  does 
not  affect  the  truth  of  the  proposition  that  divinity  is  not  a  progres- 
sive science.  jMr.  Macaulay  has  not  advanced  a  single  argument  to 
prove  that  divinity,  proper/ f/  so  c((Jled^  is  not  a  progressive  science. 
The  term  divinity,  correctly  apj)lied,  is  not  synonymous  with  revealed 
truth,  but  it  includes  rather  the  arraaijement  or  clossificafion  of  the 
{)rinciples  of  revealed  truth.  But  these  [)riju;iples  n^present  de- 
ductions of  the  human  mind.  They  are  among  the  most  complex 
and  intricate  of  all  deductions.  Now  he  who  assumes  that  these  d(  duc- 
tions  have  been  accurately  analyzed,  and  have  been  methodically  pre- 
sented by  most  theologians,  in  their  published  systems  of  divinity, 
has  evidently  paid  little  or  no  attention  to  this  Held  of  intellectual 
research.  It  could  very  easily  be  proved  that  if  divinity,  in  this 
sense  of  the  term,  cannot  progress,  no  branch  of  metaphysical 
science  can  possibly  progress,  for  these  branches  of  knowh^lge 
are  far  more  intimjitely  related  than  mo>t  writers  appear  to  think. 
But  if  this  reservation  does  not  affect  the  truth  of  his  proposition 
concerning  divinity,  it  very  materijilly  affects  the  correctness  of  his 
reasoning  concerning  the  progress  of  knowledge  upon  a  false  theo- 
logical system,  because  the  reasoning  that  would  induce  th(^  I>rah- 
min  to  examine  the  truth  of  the  geography  bound  uj)  with  the 
mythology  of  his  rtdigion  may  induce  the  Catholic  to  examine  the 
premises  on  which  he  is  re(]uired  to  believe  the  doctrine  of  tran- 
substantiation,  and  thus  lead  him  to  f|uestion  the  truth  of  a  sys- 
tem which  embodies  such  an  element  in  its  creed.  No  learning'', 
no  sagacity  jiffbrds  security  against  the  greatest  errors  relating  to 
the  invisible  world.     But  on  what  ^jremises  are  we  to  know  what  are 


>1. 


31 

errors  relating  to  the  invisible  world  ?     Not  on  Scripture  certainly, 
for  Scripture  reveals  nothing  definite  concerning  it.      But  we  can- 
not be  cognizant   of  errors  without    being  to  the  same  extent  coo-- 
nizant  of  truths  relative  to  that  world.     Now,  if  revelation  teaches 
us  nothing  definite  on  the  subject,  and  if  no   learning,  no  sagacity 
affords  any  security  against  errors  relating  to  it,  what   is   the  stan- 
dard by  which  opinions  relative  to  the  invisible  world  are  declared  to  be 
erroneous  or  true  ?     If  Scripture  is  not   that  standard,  our  learning 
and  sagacity  must  be  that  standard,  for,  independent  of  a  natural 
and  a  supernatural,  it  can  have  no  other  basis.      If  our  learning  and 
sagacity  constitute   that   basis,  it  is  a  contradiction   in  terms  to  say 
that  learning  and  sagacity  cannot  decide  what  are  errors  and  what 
are  truths  relative  to  the  spiritual  world, — that  is,  of  course,  if  we 
s{)eak  of  errors  and  truths  concerning  that  world  on  any  other  hy- 
[)othesisthan  thatopinions  which  are  irreconcilable  with  oneanother 
cannot  all   possibly  be  true.     All  that  the  Scripture  teaches  us  con- 
cerning   futurity   is    embodied    in    general    terms.      Happiness    or 
misery,  dependent  on    virtuous  and  vicious  conduct  in  this  world, 
sums  up  what   has  been  revealed    to    us.     Much    that   may  be  in- 
cluded in  the  term  fanaticism  may  not  be  inconsistent    either  with 
the  reward  of  the  righteous,  or  with   the   punishment  of  the  wicked; 
and  yet  we  may  declare  what  is  fanatical,  and  what  is  not  fanatical, 
upon  premises  as  indisputable  as  any  which  can  be  produced  to  sub- 
stantijite  any  axiom  in  political  science.    Bayle  and  Ciiillingworth, 
says  Mr.  Macaulay,  two  of  the  most   skeptical  of  mankind,  turned 
Catholics   from    sincere   conviction.      The  illustration  would  have 
been  more  to  the   purpose  if    it  had  included  a  reference  to  their 
learning  or  sagacity.      The  question  arises  in  our  mind,  skepticism 
relative  to  what  things  ?      Unless  the  term  be  used  with  reference  to 
some  specific  conditions,  it  is  without  meaning.     A  man  may  doubt 
on  one  point,  and  believe  on  anotherpoint.    He  might,  with  reason, 
be  skeptical   concerning  the  Cock  Lane  ghost,  and  very  reasonably 
believe  in  the  earthquake  of  Lisbon.     Jefferson  and  Paine  were  two 
of  the  most  skeptical  of  men  ;  so  were  Ilobbes    and  Hume.      Yet 
Jefferson  and  Paine  abhorred,  in  their  inmost  hearts,  a  monarchical 
government.     Hume  and  Ilobbes,  with  equal  sincerity,  doubted  the 
beneficial  tendency  of  any  other  kind  of  government.     Besides,  Mr. 
Macaulay  should  have  stated  that,  though  Bayle  and  Chillingworth 
became  Catholics  in  youth,  neither  was  a  Catholic  in  mature  age. 
Chillingworth   not  only   again   became  a   Protestant,   but  he  was 


32 


unciiK^stionably  the  ablest  defender  of  Protestantism  that  ever  ap- 
peared. It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  tliat  Bayle's  system  of  free 
thinkinjij  was  more  antagonistic  to  Catholicism  than  to  Protestant- 
ism. If  Johnson  had  applicnl  the  same  powers  of  mind  to  the  in- 
vestigation of  the  second  sig]it,the  Cock  Lane  ghost,  and  llieeartli- 
qjiake  of  Lisbon,  which  he  made  to  bejir  upon  tlie  investigation  of 
the  authenticity  of  Ossian,  Mr.  Macaulay's  ilhistration  would  have 
been  more  to  the  purj)ose.  With  res[)ect  to  Ossian,  Johnson  analyzed 
and  doubted;  the  absurdities  of  tlie  Cock  Lane  ghost  ajul  the  second 
sight  he  believed,  but  did  not  analyze. 

For  tliese  reasons  ]Mr.  Macaulay  has  ceased  to  wonder  at  any  va- 
garies of  superstition.  But  if  tliey  are  reasons  why  he  sliouhl  cease 
to  wonder,  tliey  are  equally  reasons  why  lie  sliould  never 
have  begun  to  wonder.  The  fact  is,  they  are  not  reasons  at  all 
either  why  we  should  wonder,  or  why  we  should  cease  to  wonder, 
at  the  vagaries  of  superstition,  because^  they  are  not  the  premises 
on  which  alone  we  are  enabled  to  decide  whether  any  given  notion 
is  or  is  not  superstitious.  lie  has  seen  men,  he  says,  not  of  mean 
talents,  or  neglected  education,  w(dl-read  scholars,  exjX'rt  logi- 
cians, keen  observers  of  life  and  manners,  [)ro[)hesying,  interpre- 
ting, talking  unknown  totigues,  working  miraculous  cures,  coming 
down  with  messages  from  God  to  the  I  louse  of  Conmions.  lie  has 
seen  an  old  woman,  with  no  tah^its  beyond  the  cunning  of  a  for- 
tune-teller, and  with  the  education  of  a  scullion,  exalted  into  a 
prophetess,  and  surrounded  by  tens  of  thousands  of  devoted  fol- 
lowers, many  of  whom  were,  in  station  and  knowledge,  immeas- 
urably her  suj)eriors  ;  and  all  this  in  th(^  nineteenth  century,  and  all 
this  in  London.  "  Yet  why  not?"  he  asks;  '' for  of  the  dejilings  of 
God  with  man  no  more  has  been  revealed  to  the  nineteenth  century 
than  to  the  first,  or  to  London  than  to  the  wildest  parish  in  the 
Hebrides." 

We  also  have  ceased  to  "  wonder  at  any  vagaries  of  superstition." 
Yet  not  because  "'no  more  of  the  d(^alings  of  God  with  man  has 
been  revealed  to  the  nineteenth  centurv  tlum  to  the  first" — for,  if  that 
were  our  rule  of  judging,  we  should  be  unable  to  know  what  sup(M-- 
stition  is,  much  less  its  vagaries.  Our  reason  for  not  wondering  at 
these  superstitions  is  that  the  great  mass  of  mankind,  among  whom 
superstitions  are  prevalent,  never  investigate  the  laws  which  govern 
their  belief  relative  to  the  invisible  world,  or  to  any  subject  which 
is  not  susceptible  of  direct  proof. 


. 


33 

The  love  of  the  tangible,  the  love   of  the  real,  always  has  pre- 
vented the  great  proportion  of  mankind  from  examining  the  premi- 
ses upon  which  the  purely  deductive  notions  of  mankind  are   based. 
Some    may    be     '^expert    logicians"     on    a  given    subject,    while 
their  lucubrations  on  an  equally  plain    subject  may  well  claim  fel- 
lowship  with   the  haziest  lucubrations  of  the  veriest  scullion.      A 
well-read  scholar  may  fail  as  egregiously  concerning  subjects  which 
do  not  lie  in  the  line  of  his  investigations  as  the  tradesman  in  the 
pursuit  of  an    avocation  he  has  not  learned.     Else  how  can  we  ac- 
count for  the  vagaries  of  opinion  on  questions  which  do  not  concern 
either  a  higher  power  or  a  future  state?       We    have   known    a 
"  well-educated"  man,  skilled   in  many  branches  of    science,  spend 
many  years   of  an  active   life   in   attempting    to  refute  Sir  Isaac 
Newton's   liypothesis  of  gravitation.      We  have  known  a  man  pro- 
foundly skilled  in  prominent  departments  of  physical  science  reply  to 
one  who  asked  his  opinion  concerning  a  theological  dogma,  that  he  did 
not   presume   to  settle  such  questions  for  himself,   but   confidently 
left   such  matters    to  the   care   of  his  religious  advisers.      Yet   the 
world  generally  is  not  disagreed  concerning  the  accuracy  of  Newton's 
hypothesis.      And  the  world,  we  believe,  would  attach  little  import- 
ance to  the   oi)inions  of  one   on  matters  which  he  had  never  inves- 
tigated,   even    though    he    that    offered    such  opinions    should    be 
eminent  in  various  branches  of  science.     Many  well-educated  men 
have   embraced   the    vagaries    of  superstition  ;    but   so  have  many 
insane    men    reasoned   profoundly    on      questions    which   do     not 
belong  to  that  category.    Yet  educated  men  are  not  generally  prone 
to   superstition,  and    insane    men    are    usually  considered    incom- 
petent judges   of  any  subject  which   involves  cautious  observation 
and  accurate  ratiocination.      Mental   pathology  furnishes  many  in- 
stances where  a  morbid   state  of   feeling  concerning  subjects  which 
have  not  been  carefully  investigated    has    produced    monomania. 
Ilence  the  anomaly.    The  belief  in  crude  supei-stitions  is  quite  as  often 
the  result  of  morbid  feeling  -as  of   incautious  thinking;    and  that 
the  feelings  of  reputed  wise  men  are  often  asill-regulatedas  those  of  the 
vulgar  portion  of  mankind  experience  amply  testifies.     The  fact  is, 
though  an  educated  man  may  embrace  vulgar  superstitions,  he  fur- 
nishes merely  an  exception  to  the  rule  that  educated  men  are  not 
su[)erstitious.     lie  is  but  the  exception    to   a  great    general   fact. 
The  wise,  the  educated  portion   of  mankind   alone  furnish  us  with 
the  standard  by  which  we  are   competent  to  declare  notions  super- 


.SM^JK 


34 

stitions,  and  they  alone  present   us  with  tlie  premises  by  wliicli  we 
are  enabled  to  combat  these  superstitions. 

*' The  liistory  of  Catholicism  strikingly  iUustrates  these  obser- 
vations. Durinor  the  last  seven  centuries  the  i)ublic  mind  of  Europe 
has  made  constant  progress  in  every  department  of  secidar  know- 
ledge. But  in  religion  we  can  trace  no  constant  i)r()gress.  The 
ecclesiastical  history  of  that  long  period  is  the  history  of  movement 
to  and  fro.  Four  times  since  the  authority  of  the  Church  of 
Rome  was  established  in  Western  Christendom  has  the  human  intel- 
lect risen  ui)  against  her  yoke.  Twice  she  remained  completely  vic- 
torious. Twice  she  came  forth  frou)  the  conflict  bearing  th(,»  marks 
of  cruel  wounds,  but  with  the  principleof  life  still  strong  williin  her. 
When  we  reflect  on  the  tremendous  assaults  which  she  has  survived, 
we  And  it  difficult  to  conceive  in  what  way  she  is  to  perish." 

We  submit  that  tlie  history  of  Catholicism  does  not  illustrate  ^Ir. 
INIacaulay's   observations.     These  observations,  except   in  a    xn-y 
meager  sense,  are   not  true;  and  even  in    this  meager   sense   they 
furnish   no   support   whatever   to  the   hypothesis  which  he  has  en- 
deavored  to   establish.       His    observations    concern  the  non-pro- 
gressiveness  of  revealed  religion.      Yet  he  draws  conclusions  from 
these  observations  to  support  an  hypothesis  which  involves  a  very 
different  meaning  of    the  term   religion—a   meaning    to  whieh  his 
observations  are   not  a{)plicable.      The  tei-m   religion  is  us«m1    in  at 
least  three  very  distinct  senses.      In  the  Hrst  sense, it  means  an  em- 
bodied stock  of  truths,  as  in  the  phrase  Revealed  Religion.      In  the 
second  sense,  it  may  be  said  to  represent  the  aggregate  of  all  those 
relations  denoted  by  such  terms  as  righteousness  and  holiness.      In 
the  third  sense,  the  term  isa[)plied  to  any  given  system  of  religious 
belief.     The  adjective  religions  includes  no  meaning  which  is  not  in- 
volved in  one  or  the  other  of  the  deflnitions  we  have  given.     When 
we  speak  of  a  religious   movement,  the  word   movement  expresses 
all   the   action    which    the   term    denot-es,    while    tiie    adjective    is 
merely  the  relation  we  haveatlirmed  of  the  movement.     Hence  the 
phrase  denotes  merely  the  movc^nentof  religionists,  or  movements 
which  involve  the  progress  or  decline  of  any  given  system  of  faith; 
or  of  those  changes  in  society  which  modify  the  influence  of  any 
particular  system   upon  the  mind   of  man.      But  the  term  progress 
may  mislead.      We  use  the  term  in   this  connection  to  include  the 
greater  degree  in  which  a  given  theological  system  may  impress  the 
mind  compared  with  the  degree  in  which  it  has  heretofore  impressed  it. 


{ 


-,'' 


K 


{ 


\ 


35 

'V 

Now  tlie  observations  of  IVIr.  Macaulay  apjdy  to   revealed  religion 
alone. 

When  he  refers  to  a  swaying  to  and  fro  of  the  religious  move- 
ments of  the  last  seven  centuries,  he  cannot  refer  to  a  swaying  to  and 
fro  of  revealed  truths,  because  such  an  expression  is  as  crude  as  it  is 
absurd;  and  besides,  according  to  his  own  showing,  this  stock  of 
truth  is  susce[)tible  neither  of  diminution  nor  of  augmentation. 
Therefore  there  is  no  connection  between  his  observations  and  the 
history  of  those  movements  which  he  assumed  to  illustrate  his  ob- 
servations; and  this  want  of  connection  furnishes  a  striking  proof 
that  all  his  observations  on  the  subject  are  worthless  relative  to 
the  hypothesis  which  they  are  assumed  to  establish.  Mr.  Macaulay 
states  his  premises  with  great  care;  but  he  fails  in  the  first  instance 
in  which  he  attempts  to  apply  them.  But  the  paragraph  which  we 
have  (pioted  not  only  furnishes  no  support  to  his  hypothesis,  but  it  is 

contradictoryand  inconsistent.  The  history  ofthelastseven  centuries, 
he  says,  is  the   history  of  movement  to  and  fro.       But   it  does  not 
follow  that   the   impulse  forward  would   not  include  more  elements 
of  power  than  the  reaction  of  that  impulse.     The  rise  of  the  tide 
of  the  ocean  presents  the  phenomenon  of  a  swaying  to  and  fro,  yet 
it  does  not  follow  that  the  tide  is  not  constantly  advancing,  notwith- 
standing  the    petty    wave-reactions    that    apparently  prevent  this 
movement.     He  says  that  in  religion  we  can  trace  no  constant  pro- 
gress.    The  word  constant,  on  his  hypothesis,  is  clearly  an  expletive. 
If    we   can   trace  progress  in   the    least   degree,  his    liyjjothesis  is 
as  clearly  disproved  as  thougli  this  progress  was  exhibited  with  un- 
varying constancy.   The  progress  of  religion,  of  which  Mr.  Macaulay 
S[)e{jks,  must  evidently  refer  to  the  progress  of  Protestantism.     His 
allusions  concern  this  a|)plication  of  the  term  ;  and  if  we  can  show, 
from   his  own   words,   that  Protestantism  has  progressed,  we  shall 
have   presented  a  refutation    of    his    entire  argument.      Now,     if 
no  progress  has  taken  place,  if  that  spirit  which  is  the  strength  as 
well   as  the   characteristic  element  of  Protestantism,  has  not  more 
powerfully  and  extensively  developed  itself  during  the  lapse  of  time, 
then  Mr.   Macaulay  should  have  represented  the  Church  of  Rome 
as  remaining  com[)letely  victorious  after  the  last  two  of  her  four  mem- 
orable  conflicts   with    those  who   had   risen   up  against   her   yoke 
instead   of  coming  forth  from  the   conflict    "bearing  the  marks  of 
cruel  wounds,  but  with  the  principle  of  life  still  strong  within  her." 
The  result  of  the  last  two  conflicts  proves  that  the  Church  of  Rome 


■igm-ttmmmatrJXMm^^ 


36 

lost  much  of  her  strength.     The  strengtli,  thus  lost,  Protestantism 
gained. 

The  revolt  of  the  Ljinguedocian  provinces,  and  tlie  deep  stirring 
of  the  human  mind  by  the  higli-souled  Wi(dif,  thougli  unsuccessful, 
proved  that  niiglity  forces  were  maturing  whicli  would  ultimately 
burst  forth  vvitii  terrible  effect  on  Catholic  Christendom.  The  first 
insurrection  against  the  Churcli  of  Rome  scarcely  arose  when  it  was 
quelled.  An  insurrection  still  more  powerful  arose;  it  was  crushed, 
though  with  far  greater  difhculty  than  the  first  insurrection. 
Slowly,  but  surely,  did  the  elements  of  opposition  gather  in- 
creased force,  until  they  burst  forth  witli  a  momentum  tliat  was 
irresistible.  The  time-honored  boundaries  of  the  Church,  though 
ably  and  des[)erately  defended,  were  irreparably  broken.  Then 
came  the  reaction.  ]>ut  Protestantism  had  aecpiired  a  positive  na- 
tional basis — a  basis  from  which  she  lias  not  been  shaken.  Thus 
oriofinated  new  conditions  in  the  relijiious  world.  In  the  last  me- 
morable  conflict  with  the  Church  of  Rome,  new  elements  were 
involved  in  the  result.  This  contest  originated  in  ji  Catholic 
country,  and  was  occasioned  as  much  by  the  corruptions  of  the 
Catholic  Chiu'ch  as  by  the  {)olitical  grievances  with  which  these  cor- 
ruptions were  associated.  Unfortunately,  the  corruptions  of  the 
church  were  identified  with  Christianity.  This  association,  indepen- 
dent of  other  causes,  necessitated  a  reaction.  The  reaction  came — a 
revulsion  in  favor  of  a  somewhat  modified  form  of  that  system 
with  which  the  revolutionists  of  Fnince  had  been  taught  to  con- 
sider Christianity  indissolubly  blended.  This  modification  was  a 
step  towards  Protestantism,  for  on  the  Catholic  Church  alone  was 
the  energy  of  the  skeptics  expended. 

But  we  must  close.  We  might,  we  think,  have  shown  that  the 
historical  djita  which  Mr.  ^Iiicaulay  has  furnished  us  are  fatal 
to  his  own  hvpothesis.  We  mifj^ht  have  alluded  to  the  cir(;umstance 
that  those  nations  of  Europe  which  were  most  powerful  at  the  period 
of  the  Reformation,  and  for  fifty  years  subse(juently  to  the  time  of 
Luther,  luive  either  exhibited  immistakable  symptoms  of  decline, 
or  chan":es  adverse  to  Catholicism.  We  mijiht  have  shown  the  de- 
cadence  of  Spain,  of  Portugal,  of  Italy.  We  might  have  alluded 
to  the  circumstance  that  France,  at  one  time  the  very  hotbed  of 
Catholicism,  drove  a  pope  from  the  Holy  City  to  end  his  days  in 
mournful  exile,  a  pope  whose  successor  was  restored  to  his  domin- 
ions  only   through  the   dominancy  of  the   powerful  anti-Catholic 


' 


37 

nations  of  Northern  Europe.  We  might  have  exhibited  the  growth 
of  these  nations,  and  shown  how  they  have  absorbed  the  power 
once  wielded  by  the  despotisms  of  Southern  Europe.  We  might 
have  referred  to  our  own  vast  continent — a  continent  discovered  by 
a  Catholic  and  consecrated  to  Catholicism — where  Protestantism 
has  realized  its  fairest  fruits,  the  first-offering  of  still  fairer  fruits 
yet  to  come.  But  our  article  is  already  extended  beyond  reasonable 
limits.  The  vitality  of  Protestantism  is  the  history  of  the  last 
three  hundred  years.  Conditions  more  unfavorable  than  those  un- 
der which  it  has  won  its  way  to  its  present  exalted  position  almost 
exceed  the  range  of  possibility. 

The  Church  of  Rome  is  a  relic  of  bygone  times.  Though  still 
powerful,  the  day  of  her  ascendency  has  long  since  passed.  Every 
page  of  her  history  since  the  Reformation,  rightly  read,  exhibits  the 
proof  of  this  very  important  fact — that  the  state  of  mind  which  at 
one  time  afforded  her  the  means  of  existence  has  been  constantly 
undergoing  transformation  into  a  state  of  mind  uncongenial  to  the 
dominancy  of  any  exclusive  hierarchical  system.  Though  she  may 
never  be  directly  overcome  by  an  outward  pressure,  yet  by  coming  in 
contact  with  thosedestructiveforcesconstantly  evolved  by  the  restless 
activity  of  the  human  mind,  she  will  so  dwindle  away  that  the  sem- 
blance of  her  former  self  will  scarcely  be  recognized.  The  elements 
of  decay  are  bound  up  in  her  very  constitution.  P^very  system  has 
an  inevitable  tendency  to  become  modified  by  the  lapse  of  time. 
But  where,  in  a  given  system,  radical  defects  are  inseparable 
from  its  very  framework — where  a  cankerous  disease  ramifies 
tiiroughout  its  entire  economy — where  rottenness  andsoundness,  bar- 
renness and  fruit,  truth  and  error,  are  embraced  in  one  common 
intertexture,  the  result  must  be  more  than  modification.  Time 
cannot  fail  to  dissolve  so  incongruous  an  association.  Whatever  is 
sound,  whatever  is  fruitful,  whatever  is  true,  can  never  lose  its  health- 
ful vigor.  But  that  which  is  barren,  false,  and  therefore  unprofit- 
able, cannot,  in  the  nature  of  things,  enchain  the  reverence  of 
mankind  in  an  advanced  state  of  religious,  social,  and  political 
progress. 

Protestantism  imposes  no  trammels  on  this  high  development,  and 
therefore  it  contains  within  itself  the  elements  of  progression. 
No  amount  of  force  can  shake  its  deep  foundations,  because 
no  force  can  be  assumed  which  can  alter  the  structure  of  the  hu- 
man mind.    Hence  it  is  the  inseparable  accompaniment  of  intellec- 


.^,-  ■•■m^^, ■■■■>■  '9i^m'mfiimi''^'f'.>''^0'>*'>^^^'''*^'^'*  "^ 


38 

tutil  activity.  Hence  its  characteristic  principle,  freedom  of  tliink- 
ing,  has  withstood  the  desperate  assaults  of  the  tyrannical  systems 
of  all  time.  With  the  progress  of  civilization,  with  refinement  of 
morals,  with  purity  of  religion,  it  is  inseparably  identified.  It  is 
adapted  to  all  states  of  society,  to  all  conditions  of  mankind,  to 
every  system  of  positive  belief.  What  the  waves  of  the  ocean  can- 
not dash  to  pieces,  they  wear  away.  What  Protestantism  cannot 
immediately  subdue  it  will  irreparably  undermine.  It  is  bound  up 
in  the  very  heart's  core  of  civilized  society.  Its  development  lias 
been  coetaneous  with  every  great  step  of  liuman  progress.  Its 
strenfT^th  lies  in  the  unfettered  exercise  of  the  mind.  And  it  will, 
we  have  no  doubt,  flourish  with  augmented  vigor  when  the  despot- 
isms of  Southern  Europe  shall  have  been  chronicled  only  as  the  dark 
phases  of  society  in  man's  pilgrimage  towards  the  goal  of  religious 
and  political  perfection.  We  feel  confident  that  it  will  be  infused 
into  all  our  elements  of  being  when  some  remote  ancestorof  the  "trav- 
eller who  shall  take  his  stand  on  London  Bridge  to  sketch  the  ruins 
of  St.  Paul's,"  may,  with  a  feeling  akin  to  that  which,  on  a  memorable 
occasion,  heaved  the  breast  of  England's  stateliest  historijin,  stand 
beneath  the  lofty  dome  of  St.  Peter's,  and  muse  on  The  Decline  and 
Fall  of  the  Second  Roman  Empire:. 


CHURCH  AND  STATE. 


No.  I. 

Dr.  Hodgson  is  a  patient  and  unwearied  writer.  It  would  require  a 
bold  eye  to  sweep  the  orbit  in  which  he  has  proposed  to  move.  To  as- 
sume that  the  arguments  which  are  spread  throughout  his  communi- 
cations are  inconclusive,  without  making  any  attempt  to  show  in 
what  respect  they  are  so,  would  be  begging  the  question  in  controversy. 
Yet  to  follow  a  long-winded  opponent  through  the  minute  sinuosities 
of  his  reasoning — even  though  a  plentiful  crop  of  fallacies,  which  would 
vitiate  every  fundamental  position  he  has  assumed,  should  await  the 
gathering — is  no  slight  task.  Had  I  the  ability,  I  have  not  the  time,  to 
accomplish  it  with  any  degree  of  satisfaction  to  myself.  Still,  I  may  be 
permitted,  I  trust,  to  state  my  conviction,  after  having  read  Dr.  Hodgson's 
articles  with  much  care  and  attention,  and  with  an  honest  endeavor  to  un- 
derrate the  importance  of  nothing  that  he  has  advanced,  that  no  really 
sound  argument  can  be  urged  against  the  propriety  of  introducing  a  lay 
delegation  into  the  supreme  councils  of  our  Church.  The  few  lingering 
doubts  I  had  entertained  on  the  subject  he  has  done  me  the  favor  to  remove. 
True,  this  opinion  may  be  prematurely  expressed,  for  the  Doctor  may 
not  be  half  done.  We  may  not  be  permitted  for  a  year  or  two  to  gaze 
on  the  matured  fruit  of  so  marvellously  protracted  a  gestation.  By  way 
of  apology  for  the  liberty  I  have  taken  to  express  this  conviction,  I 
propose  to  examine  an  argument  to  which  Dr.  Hodgson  appears  to 
attach  much  importance — an  argument  to  which  he  repeatedly  and 
confidently  alludes — an  argument  which,  if  unsound,  will  render  worth- 
less a  large  portion  of  his  elaborately  wordy  communications. 

This  argument,  I  conceive,  involves  one  of  the  most  blundering  and 
naked  fallacies  I  have  ever  seen  in  print. 

Dr.  Hodgson  considers  the  assumption,  that  our  system  of  church 
government  is  inimical  to  civil  and  religious  liberty,  to  be  wholly 
chimerical.  Whether  this  assumption  be  well  or  ill-founded,  it  is  not  my 
purpose  to  inquire.  Every  candid  and  reflecting  mind  must  at  least 
acknowledge  that,  whatever  may  be  assumed  to  be  the  ultimate  tenden- 
5  (39) 


■n^imsi^XOm-i.is^ 


40 

cies  of  this  system,  there  is  no  ground  for  immediate  apprehension,  in 
view  of  the  ov(M-wludming  influence  of  public  sentiment — a  sentiment 
whicli  is  reflected,  to  a  certain  extent,  in  the  practical  conduct  of  every 
reli<rious  denomination  in  tlie  United  States — a  sentiment  which  ope- 
rates in  no  sli<j:ht  measure  on  the  minds  of  the  most  bij^oted  of  the  devo- 
tees  of  the  most  despotic  chui'cii  in  Cliristendom.  I  liave  no  reason 
to  l)elieve  that  the  ministers  of  our  Church  are  less  attached  to  civil 
liberty,  as  such,  than  the  most  enliglitened  and  [)rogressive  of  our  lay- 
men. But  tliat  those  who  cherish  the  views  advocated  by  Dr.  Hodgson 
cling  to  a  principle  of  church  goverimient  wiiich  tends,  collaterally,  to 
weaken  the  basis  on  which  true  civil  liberty  rests,  I  firmly  believe. 

Let  us  now  trace. the  course  of  reasoning  by  which  Dr.  Hodgson 
attempts  to  prove  that  the  introduction  of  a  lay  delegation  into  the 
supreme  councils  of  our  Church  tends  to  a  union  of  Ciiurch  and  State. 

"The  great  source  of  danger  to  our  civil  liberties,"  he  remarks,  "is  in 
uniting,  in  the  same  persons,  the  highest  ecclesiastical  and  the  civil 
authority.  This  mjiy  be  done  in  diflerent  ways.  It  tnjiy  be  done  by 
})lacing  both  in  the  liands  of  ecclesiastics  only,  as  in  the  governments  of 
the  papal  denominations." 

Here,  the  reader  will  perceive,  th«^  Church  and  State  are  already 
united. 

"  Or,"  he  remarks,  "in  the  hands  of  both  laymen  and  ecclesiastics,  as 
in  England." 

Here,  also,  are  the  Ciiurch  and  State  united. 

"Or,"  he  continues,  "in  the  hands  of  laymen  only,  as  in  the  early 
jrovernments  of  the  New  Ennjland  States." 

Here,  too,  the  reader  will  observe,  the  Church  is  united  with  the 
State. 

"  Or,"  he  finally  remarks,  "  in  those  church  governments  which  admit 
laymen  in  the  supreme  councils,  as  the  Presbyterian,  the  Protestant 
Episcopalian,  the  Congregationalist,  and  other  forms  of  church  govern- 
ment. This  tends  directly  and  powerfully,  if  not  infallibly,  to  the  union 
of  the  Churcii  and  the  State  where  tliey  are  not  already  united." 

Here  the  clause,  "  where  they  are  not  already  united,"  is  clearly  re- 
dundant ;  for  it  is  absurd  to  affirm  a  tendency  to  the  union  of  Church 
and  State  where  the  Church  and  State  are  united.  It  is  contradictory 
if  it  is  applied  to  the  first  three  in  the  category  of  instances  in  which 
"  the  highest  ecclesiastical"  and  the  "  civil  authority"  are  assumed  to  be 
united  in  the  same  persons;  for  in  these  the  union  of  the  Church  and 
the  State  actually  exists.  That  the  Church  and  State  nicnj  be  united 
where  the  "highest  ecclesiastical"  and  the  "civil  authority"  are  in  the 
same  hands  is  so  indisputable  that  it  only  re(piires  to  be  stated  to  be 


' 


' 


41 

accepted.  But  the  assumption  that  the  possession,  by  the  same  persons, 
of  the  "highest  ecclesiastical  power"  and  the  "civil  authority"  neces- 
sarily includes  union  of  the  Church  and  the  State  is  a  very  diflerent 
proposition,  and  one  which  has  not  yet  been  proved.  Now  to  afllirm 
that  the  "  highest  ecclesiastical"  and  "  the  civil  authority"  are  united 
in  the  hands  of  the  same  persons  in  any  religious  denomination   in   the 

United  States  would  be  to  assert  what   is   notoriously  not  the  fact an 

assumj)tion  which  Dr.  Hodgson  has  not  even  attempted  to  prove. 

AVhat  tendency^  then,  do  these  forms  of  government  exhibit  towards 
a  union  of  Ciiurch  and  State? 

"  It  is  reasonable  to  suppose,"  says  Dr.  Hodgson,  "  tliat  the  laity  will 
elect  their  most  gifted  and  influential  men  to  tlie  suoreme  svnods ;  es- 
pecially  those  best  acquainted  with  the  science  of  government.  To  send 
inferior  men  in  these  respects  would  be  to  trifle  with  the  right  and 
privilege  of  lay  delegation."  Again:  '*To  leave  out  Congressmen 
and  Governors  and  eminent  professional  men  would  be  to  leave  out  the 
wisdom  and  experience  supposed  to  be  most  needed.  Hence,  there 
would  be  men  from  the  legislative,  and  judicial,  and  executive  depart- 
ments of  civil  government  grasping  and  wielding,  at  the  same  time, 
the  supreme  power  of  the  Church.  This  would  give  leading  and  ambi- 
tious men  a  fine  chance  to  concoct  and  put  into  operation  schemes  by 
which  the  ministry  could  combine  their  influence  for  tlie  aggrandizement 
of  the  civilian,  and  the  civilian  give  his  in  return  to  promote  the  undue 
elevation  of  the  ministry." 

Are  there  no  eminent  "  [)rofessional  men"  but  Congressmen,  Gover- 
nors, and  Jugdes?  And  might  we  not  leave  out  Congressmen,  Governors, 
and  Judges,  and  yet  retain  a  suflRcient  number  of  gifted  men  to  delibe- 
rate, with  judgment  and  attention,  on  all  the  questions  which  might 
come  before  the  supreme  councils  of  any  given  church?  There  are  two 
great  political  parties  in  the  United  States.  Each  of  them  is  capable  of 
furnishing  a  j)lurality  of  men  thoroughly  competent  to  discharge  all  the 
functions  of  government,  administrative,  executive,  and  judicial.  Eor 
each  person  who  fills  the  office  first  in  the  gift  of  the  peo{)le,  each  State 
could  probably  furnish  at  least  two  men,  on  t!ie  average,  thoroughly  com- 
petent to  discharge  the  duties  which  appertain  to  it.  Thus,  there  would 
be  a  wide  margin  for  the  selection  of  eminent  and  gifted  men  without 
choosing  one  legislator.  State  or  national;  one  judge;  or  o?ie  governor. 
Some  of  the  ablest  statesmen  our  country  has  produced  never  belonged 
to  any  church.  How  many  of  our  Congressmen  are  connected  with  one, 
I  have  not  the  means  of  knowin"-.  But  I  am  confident  that  we  mifyijt 
safely  pass  by  a  large  number  of  them  in  selecting  church  representatives 
without  "  trifling  with    the  right  and   privilege  of  lay  delegation."     In 


.:,Mr:jNi|i»»aMeAiM|[^ 


42 

fact,  tlie  *'  trifling,"  in  my  o[)inion,  wonld  be  exhibited  in  manifesting 
an  unwillingness  not  to  pass  them  by.  Polities  is  a  wily  game;  and  it 
is  by  no  means  clear  that  a  readiness  to  employ  the  tactics  which  most 
generally  enable  a  candidate  for  civil  honors  to  rise  in  tiie  State,  is  pre- 
cisely that  quality  which  would  indicate  the  possession  of"  the  "wisdom 
jind  experience  supposed  to  \w  most  needed"  in  our  chui'ch  councils. 

But,  granting  that  we  should  send  Congressmen, Governors,  and  Judges 
to  the  supreme  synods.  Dr.  Hodgson  has  merely  asserted — he  has  not  Jit- 
tem[)ted  to  prove — that  we  should  thus  have  **  men  from  the  legislative, 
and  judicial,  and  executive  departments  of"  civil  governmtMit,  grasping 
and  wielding  at  the  same  time  the  supreme  power  of  the  Church." 
These  men  would  wield  only  a  part  of  the  supreme  [)Ower  of  the 
Church. 

But,  where  is  the  tendency  to  a  union  of  Church  and  State?  'Y\w 
only  affirmation  which  meets  the  eye  is  the  jissumption  that  a  lay  dele- 
iration  wouhl  afford  "  leadinji:  and  ambitious  men"  a  "fine  c/tance'^  io 
combine  their  influence  for  the  reciprocal  aggrandizement  of  the  civilian 
and  the  ministry.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  inform  so  astute  a  logician 
as  Dr.  Hodgson  that  an  "  o[)portunity"  to  do  evil,  and  a  "  t(^ndency"  to 
do  evil,  express  very  different  ideas.  Dr.  Hodgson  has  a  tine  chance, 
in  passing  up  the  aisle  to  ascend  his  pul[)it,  to  crush  the  bonnet  over 
the  head  of  any  lady  mem.ber  of  his  congregation.  Would  he  consider 
me  justified  in  inferring  thence  that  he  has  a  tendenrij  to  insult  the 
ladies  of  his  congregation,  and  thus  to  desecrate  the  Churcii  of  God? 
Ou^ht  he  therefore  to  abstain  from  entering  the  aisles  of  his  church?  Is 
it  thence  ivrong  to  enter  them  ?  Our  National  and  State  assemblies 
afford  "leading  and  ambitious"  men  a  fine  "  chance"  to  "  concoct  aiul 
put  in  o{)eration"  schemes  which  are  detrimental  to  the  public  weltan". 
Our  General  and  Annual  Conferences  afford  "  leading  and  ambitious" 
clergymen  a  tine  chance  "  to  concoct  and  put  in  operation  schemes" 
pernicious  to  the  Church.  Should  we  therefore  dis[)ense  with  our  civil 
and  ecclesiastical  assemblies?  Is  it  possible,  in  fact,  to  conceive  of  a 
state  of  society,  except  that  in  which  all  mankind  are  assumed  to  be 
morally  and  intellectually  perfect,  which  would  ru)t  afford  a  fine  chance 
tor  the  "concoction"  of  schemes  detrimental  to  the  public  weal? 

Is  it  altogether  inconceivable  that  a  lay  delegation  would  afford  lay- 
men a  fine  chance  to  prevent  the  execution  of  schemes  which  ambitious 
clergymen  may  concoct?  Would  not  leading  men,  clerical  aiul  lay, 
gif"ted  with  sufficient  sagacity  to  detect  the  machinations  of  the  evil- 
minded,  and  stimulated  by  regard  for  the  welfare  of  the  Church, 
have  a  glorious  "  chance"  to  counteract  all  the  schemes  which  "  leading 
and  ambitious"  laymen  and  clergymen  can  concoct  ? 


J 


ii 


I 


4t 


'    ' 


43 

The  argument,  then,  may  be  thus  summarily  presented: — 

Whatever  association  or  system  affords  a  chance  to  do  evil  has  neces- 
sarily a  tendency  to  do  evil; 

The  General  Conference  is  an  association  which  affords  a  chance  to  do 
evil ; 

Therefore,  the  General  Conference  is  an  association  which  necessarily 
tends  to  do  evil. 

Dr.  Hodgson  appears  to  have  felt  a  latent  misgiving  that  liis  illustra- 
tion is  inconclusive  ;  that  he  had  no  tangible  basis  on  which  to  hypothe- 
cate any  conclusion  which  would  establish  the  validity  of  his  assumptions, 
for  he  at  once  proceeds  to  give  us  an  illustration,  which,  for  its  originality, 
is  certainly  deserving  the  attention  of  the  in(piisitive  layman.  The  quiet 
and  happy  manner  in  which  he  attempts,  by  means  of  it,  to  dispose  of  the 
proposition  which  it  was  his  duty  to  prove,  is  beyond  all  })raise.  To  this 
illustration  I  shall  allude  in  my  next  article. 


No.  II. 

"  To  estimate  fairly  and  fully  the  tendency  of  any  system,"  Dr.  Hodg- 
son remarks,  "  we  must  place  it  in  the  most  prosperous  circumstances 
— in  circumstances  most  favorable  to  its  producing  its  natural  results. 
At  present,  all  tendencies  to  the  union  of  Church  and  State  are  held  in 
abeyance  by  the  multi[)licity  and  jealousy  of  sects." 

Therefore,  it  follows  that  the  illustration  to  which  the  attention  of  the 
reader  has  already  been  directed,  is  absurd,  inasmuch  as  it  is  based  on  a 
condition  of  things  which  involves  the  existence  of  this  "multiplicity 
nn<l  jealousy  of  sects."  It  also  follows  that,  so  long  as  this  "  multi[)li- 
city  ;ind  jealousy  of  sects"  shall  exist,  all  tendencies  to  a  union  of 
Chui'ch  and  State  will  remain  in  abeyjmce.  It  also  follows  that,  so  long 
as  Dr.  Hodgson  is  unable  to  indicate,  even  by  approximation,  the 
period  when  sects  shall  cease  to  be  numerous,  and  to  be  jealous  of  one 
another,  he  is  unable  to  affirm  that  a  hiy  delegation  in  the  supreme  coun- 
cils of  any  church  tends  to  a  union  of  Church  and  State.  Accordingly, 
a  lay  delegation  in  the  supreme  councils  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal 
Church  would  not  tend  to  produce  a  union  of  Church  aiul  State,  inas- 
mu(;h  as  it  would  neither  augment  nor  diminish  the  number  of  existing 

sects. 

Thus,  Dr.  Hodgson  has  cleverly  disposed  of  his  own  argument;  but  he 
makes  a  bold,  desperate,  and  exceedingly  unique  effort  to  show  that  a 
lay  delegation  must  tend  to  unite  the  Church  and  the  State. 


.  ,«»,  t,3m,r^  ■,^m-tr- 


44 

"  Stfppost','''  lie  says,  "  that  any  one  of  the  churches  which  a<linit 
laymen  in  their  highest  councils — the  Protestant  Episcopal,  for  exatnple 
— should  be  favored  with  the  hi;j:hest  prosperity.  Sffp/josc  that  Pres- 
byterians, IMethodists,  Baptists,  Congregationalisis,  Lutherans,  German 
Reformed,  Dutch  Reformed,  Methodist  Protestants,  and  Quakers,  should 
be  finally  merged  in  its  ministry  and  membership.  Sff/>/)osp  that  they 
should  acknowledge  practically  the  obligation  to  elect  good  m(^n  to  civil 
office,  and  also,  what  would  (in  Dr.  Hodgson's  opinion)  be  very  natuial, 
that  they  should  elect  the  same  men  to  the  church  legislature."  Sttp- 
pose  that  these  men  shoubl  complain  of  the  inconvenience,  after  having 
spent  the  winter  at  Washington  or  Ilarrisburg,  of  leaving  their  homes 
and  travelling  to  distant  places,  to  attend  the  General  or  Dioc(»san  Con- 
ventions, and  should  suggest  the  pro[)riety  of  holding  tlH\se  conventions 
at  the  close  of  the  sessions  of  Congress,  and  at  the  State  Capitals 
during  the  sessions  of  the  State  Legislatures.  Sftppose  that  they  should 
advocate  the  new  aiTangement  on  the  score  of  economy,  inasmuch  as 
*'lhe  mileage  paid  by  the  Stjite  government  would  serve  for  the  Church 
as  well  as  the  State.  This  consideration,"  Dr.  Hodgson  thinks,  "-could 
not  fail  to  have  its  influence,  inasmuch  as  many  delegates  to  ecclesias- 
tical bodies  are  deterred  from  attending  them  in  consequence  of  the  ex- 
pense." Here  closes  the  concatenation  of  suppositions;  and  the  Doctor 
boldly,  brojully,  and  dogmatically  affirms.  •  "The  next  [)roposition,"  he 
says,  ''  a/id  it  would  very  soon  he  made,  would  be  that,  as  the  lay  ukmu- 
bers  of  the  civil  legislature  and  of  the  church  are  the  same,  and  all 
good  and  true  men  having  the  good  of  the  Church  and  of  th»^  State 
equally  at  heart,  the  business  of  church  legislation  could  easily  be  at- 
tended to  in  the  national  councils,  allowing  the  clergy  ji  distinct  n^prt^- 
seniation.  A/id  every  principle  whicfi  can,  with  any  plansihilit y^  he 
urged  in  favor  of  lay  delegation  in  supreme  church  councils,  ar'jues 
as  forcihly  in  faror  of  clerical  delegates  in  the  national  councils.*' 

The  Doctor  should  have  gone  a  stej)  farther.  He  should  have  sup. 
posed  that  this  proposition  would  be  acce{)ted.  He  should  have  sup- 
posed that  the  Church  and  State  would  be  united.  AVhat  then  ?  Why, 
the  Church  and  State  would  be  united.  He  would  thus  have  ])roved 
that  a  lay  delegjition  not  only  tends  to  produce,  but  that  it  infallibly  pro- 
duces, a  union  of  Church  and  State.  He  would  thus  luive  augmented 
the  force  of  his  manifold  suppositions.  But,  in  fact,  why  suppose  that 
we  should  add  so  im[)ortant  a  link  to  so  magnificent  a  chain?  How  does 
Dr.  Hodgson  know  that  the  proposition  to  unite  the  Church  and  the 
Slate  would  be  made?  Why  not  know  that  it  would  be  accej)ted?  Why 
not  know  that  the  Church  and  State  would  be   united?    Whv  not  know 


L 


45 

that  a  lay  delegation  infallibly  produces  a  union   of  Church   and  State?. 
AV'hy  suppose  any  thing  at  all  ? 

In  the  first  illustration,  Dr.  Hodgson  attempts  to  work  out  his  conclu- 
sions by  means  of  a  dark  picture  in  which  "leading  and  ambitious  men" 
occupy  the  foreground.  In  the  present  illustration,  the  picture  is  reversed. 
The  "leading  and  ambitious  men"  have  disappeared;  and,  in  their  stead, 
we  have  "good  men  and  true  ;  men  who  have  the  good  of  the  Church 
and  of  the  State  equally  at  heart."  To  estimate  "fairly  and  fully"  the 
tendency  of  any  system  we  must,  "  in  our  reasoning,"  place  it  in  circum- 
stances of  the  highest  prosperity,  and  then  suppose  all  the  conditions  to 
be  [)resent  which  will  enable  us  to  work  out  the  conclusion  at  which  we 
wish  to  arrive  relative  to  what  we  have  affirmed  to  be  its  "  natural 
results,"  and  covertly  assume  the  absence  of  all  those  elements  which  it 
might  prove  highly  inconvenient  for  us  to  take  into  consideration. 
Tliis  method  is  [)rofoundly  and  strikingly  suggestive.  It  is  also 
highly  convenient,  for  it  will  enable  us  to  prove  the  existence  of  any- 
thing simply  by  supposing  it  to  exist.  If  that  method  of  proof  will 
not  enable  us  to  silence  a  sturdy  opponent,  we  can  prove  our  proposition 
to  be  true  by  affirming  that  we  knoio  it  to  be  so.  Our  opponent  must 
then  perforce  make  his  best  bow,  and  retire  from  the  field. 

In  the  first  illustration,  I  repeat,  the  tendency  to  the  result  so  ardently 
deprecated  is  deduced  from  the  chance  which  is  afforded  to  work  out  ambi- 
tious schemes.  In  the  second,  the  conclusion  is  conveniently  arrived  at 
by  supposing  the  existence  of  the  very  tendencies  required  to  be  proved  ; 
in  other  words,  the  tendency  of  a  lay  delegation  to  produce  a  union  of 
Church  and  State  is  deduced  from  its  supposed  tendency  to  produce  the 
result  in  (question.  Dr.  Hodgson  thus  reasons  in  a  complete  circle.  He 
arrives  at  his  conclusion  that  a  lay  delegation  tends  to  unite  the  Church 
and  the  State  by  supposing  certain  conditions  to  exist  which,  in  his 
opinion,  are  competent  to  produce  this  union  ;  and  he  then  infers  these 
conditions  to  exist  because  they  are  what  he  assumes  to  be  the  "  natural 
results"  of  a  lay  delegation.  That  is  to  say,  he  proves  his  conclusion  by 
his  premises,  and  his  premises  by  his  conclusion.  He  seems  to  be  totally 
forgetful  of  the  fact  that  his  conclusion  is  hypothecated  on  the  assump- 
tion that  the  "  natural  results"  of  a  lay  delegation  include  a  tendency  to 
the  union  of  Church  and  State,  which  is  begging  the  proposition  to  be 
proved. 

1.  We  thus  see  that,  in  the  first  illustration.  Dr.  Hodgson  undertakes 
to  prove  that  a  lay  delegation  tends  to  do  what,  by  his  own  distinct  ad- 
mission, it  does  not  tend  to  do,  inasmuch  as  all  tendencies  to  the  union  of 
Church  and  State  are  at  present  held  in  abeyance. 

2.  In  the  second  illustration,  his  modes  of  proving  the  said  tendency 


46 


47 


may  be  generalized  by  stating  tbat  he  covertly  assumes  two  propositions 
as  true  which  are  clearly  absurd  :  1.  That  a  result  will  necessarily  haf)- 
pen  where  conditions  can  be  imagined  by  which  it  might  probjibly 
happen.  2.  That  no  conditions  adequate  to  prevent  the  said  result  can 
be  logically  assumed  to  exist.  With  respect  to  the  first,  I  re})ly  thus  : 
AVater  and  other  fluids  exist,  by  which  Dr.  Hodgson  may  be  drowned. 
Ergo^  Dr.  Hodgson  must  necessarily  be  drowned.  With  resj)ect  to  the 
second,  I  reply  thus:  But  Dr.  Hodgson  is  a  cautious  man,  and  avoids 
deep  water  ;  accordingly,  he  may  not  be  drowned.  And  with  respect  to 
his  side  of  the  argument,  he  wisely  retrains  from  und<M-taking  to  prove 
that  the  absence  of  lay  delegates  in  our  su[)reme  church  councils  in- 
cludes all  conceivable  securities  against  a  union  of  Church  and  State. 

Dr.  Hodgson's  illustration  affords  a  fine  subject  for  a  running  commen- 
tary; but  want  of  space  coni[)els  me  to  waive  its  introduction.  Never- 
theless, I  carniot  dismiss  it  without  making  a  few  observations  which  its 
consideration  has  suororested. 

The  Church  must  be  separate  from  the  State  before  the  two  can  be 
united.  With  or  without  a  lay  delegation,  it  is  conceivable  tliat  any 
church  may  absorb  every  person  in  the  State.  Success,  then,  is  an  in- 
dispensable condition  of  its  union  with  the  State.  AVhat,  now,  is  that 
specific  condition  without  which  the  union  cannot  take  place?  Evidently, 
that  those  who  are  interested  in  the  result  shall  icUl  to  bring  it  about. 
The  result  cannot  be  otherwise  accomplished.  This  specitic  condition 
may  be  present  or  absent  in  a  church  with    or  without  a   lay  delegation. 

If,  now,  the  ministry  of  a  church  which  does  not  admit  laymen  in  its 
supreme  councils  are  not  assumed  to  be  willing  to  consent  to  so  organic  a 
modification  in  their  ecclesiastical  constitution  as  the  sup[)osed  change 
would  recpiire,  the  ministry  of  a  church  which  has  lay  delegates  in  its 
supreme  councils  can  be  assumed  to  be  equally  unwilling  that  the  same 
result  shall  be  accom[)lished.  If  the  laity  are  assumed  forcibly  to  con- 
summate the  unholy  alliance  in  the  one  case,  they  may  be  assumed  to 
consummate  the  alliance  forcibly  in  the  other  case.  Th<^  fundamental 
question  which  remains  to  be  solved  is  :  What  absolute  security  is  there 
that  this  exercise  of  the  will  shall  be  manifested  by  the  members  of  a  church 
wliich  admits  laymen  in  its  supreme  assemblies,  and  that  it  shall  remain 
in  intermiriable  abeyance  among  the  members  of  a  church  in  which  su- 
preme power  is  held  by  the  clergy  alone?  Will  Dr.  Hodgson  be  so  kind 
as  to  inform  us?  Will  he  aver  that  the  restriction  of  supreme  ecclesias- 
tical power  to  the  ministry  would  afford  that  security?  I  reply  that 
the  diffusion  of  supreme  ecclesiastical  j)ower  among  the  lay  members  of 
the  church  would  afford  a  security  eipially  efficient.  In  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church,  supreme  power  is  restricted  to  the  pastorate.     Yet  is 


1\ 


\ 
K 


I 


*• 


not  this  very  church  united  to  the  Austrian  and  Spanish  States?  But 
<n-antin'T^,  for  the  sake  of  the  aro^ument,  that  the  restriction  of  supreme 
power  to  the  clergy  would  be  an  adequate  preventive  of  the  unholy 
alliance,  what  security  have  we  that  this  power  will  continue  to  he  re- 
stricted to  the  clergy  in  a  *'  highly  prosperous  state  of  the  church  ?"  If 
a  church  with  lay  delegates  in  its  supreme  councils  is  assumed  to  be 
powerless  under  the  seductive  blandishments  of  the  State,  why  may  not 
a  church,  which  has  no  lay  delegation,  listen  to  the  voice  of  the 
charmer,  partake  of  the  forbidden  fruit,  and  fall  from  its  high  estate? 

Estimating,  then,  the  relative  tendencies,  other  things  being  equal, 
of  a  church  without  a  lay  delegation,  and  of  a  church  with  a  lay  dele- 
o-ation,  to  become  united  with  the  State,  I  should  be  inclined,  for  the 
following  reasons,  to  assign  the  higher  degree  of  elective  affmity  to  the 

former  : — 

If  a  purely  clerical  body  were  to  propose  to  a  purely  civil  body  a  re- 
ciprocation of  legislative  prerogatives,  the  parties  would  meet  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  on  equal  terms.  But  the  case  would  be  very  different  with 
a  body  of  ministers  forming  a  part  of  a  laico-clerical  body,  and  a  body 
of  men  who,  as  in  Dr.  Hodgson's  illustration,  are  assumed  to  wield  solely 
the  supreme  power  of  the  State.  The  ministry  could  not  consistently 
say  to  these  men  :  Grant  us,  as  ministers,  a  share  in  the  supreme  power 
of  the  State,  and  we  will  grant  you  a  share  in  the  supreme  power  of  the 
Church.  Why?  Because,  by  the  terms  of  the  illustration,  the  laymen 
referred  to  are  assumed  to  share  co-ordinately  in  the  ecclesiastical  power. 
The  ministry  would  have  nothing  to  grant ;  the  laity  would  obtain  no 
equivalent  for  what  they  would  surrender. 

Hence  any  motive,  inclining  the  laity  to  unite  the  Church  and  the 
State,  which  is  based  on  covetousness  of  a  share  in  the  supreme  power 
of  the  Church  could  not  rationally,  in  this  case,  be  affirmed  of  them  ; 
whereas,  in  a  Church  without  lay  representation,  the  laity  might  covet  a 
share  in  this  ecclesiastical  power  to  a  degree  which  would  induce  them  to 
unite  the  Church  with  the  State  in  order  to  obtain  it.  Accordingly,  all 
rational  securities  against  the  union  of  the  Church  and  State  are,  it  ap- 
pears to  me,  based,  other  things  being  equal,  on  the  constitution  of 
those  churches  which  admit  laymen  to  a  joint  participation  of  legislative 
prerogatives  in  their  supreme  councils. 

Moreover,  Dr.  Hodgson  cannot  logically  restrict  his  argument  to  any 
one  church  in  our  country,  because  the  very  phrase  one  church  implies 
that  other  churches  exist  which  may  establish  his  conclusion  as  well  as 
the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church.  Neither  can  he  assume  any  one  church 
to  become  all-powerful  while  other  churches  exist.  Consequently,  an  all- 
powerful  church  implies  the  subjugation  of  all  other  churches;  and  since 


I 


, 


48 

this  all-{)ovvei  ful  cliurch  may  be  the  Roman  Catholic  quite  as  plausibly  as 
the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church,  it  follows  that,  to  establish  his  grand 
conclusion  a<j;ainst  lay  delegation,  Dr.  Hodgson  renders  himself  liable  to 
abandon  his  faith  as  a  Wesleyan,  to  yield  up  his  share  of  supreme  gov- 
erning power  as  a  INIethodist  minister,  and  to  become  a  very  priest. 

In  fact,  the  whole  argument  maybe  presented  within  the  compass  of  a 
nutshell.  Should  any  one  church  become  all-powerful,  and  should  the 
lay  members  of  that  church  choose  to  unite  the  Church  and  the  State, 
they  could  and  doubtless  would  do  so,  whether  the  church  had  or  had 
not  a  lay  delegation  in  its  supreme  councils.  If  the  ministry  should  not 
like  the  [)roposed  change,  they  might  receive  very  significant  hitits  to 
-'go  elsewhere."  If  the  laity,  as  in  Dr.  Hodgson's  illustration,  are  not 
assumed  to  be  too  good  to  change  the  constitutions  both  of  their  Church 
and  State  so  as  to  unite  the  one  to  the  other,  I  do  not  see  why  the  min- 
istry should  be  assumed  to  be  too  good  to  feel  willing  to  sacrifice  their 
church  constitution  for  the  same  purpose.  If  a  lay  deh'gation  affords  no 
security  against  the  union  of  Church  and  State,  assuredly  no  security  is 
afforded  by  a  church  which  forbids  laymen  to  participate  in  its  legisla- 
tive councils. 


No.   III. 


"Any  principle,"  says  Di'.  Hodgson,  "which  can,  with  any  plausi- 
bility, be  urged  in  favor  of  lay  delegation  in  liie  su[)reme  councils  of  the 
church,  argues  quite  as  strongly  in  favor  of  clerical  delegates  in  the 
councils  of  the  State." 

This  extract  may  be  selected  as  a  favonible  example  to  expose  a  fal- 
lacy which  runs  through  many  of  Dr.  Hodgson's  essays  on  lay  delegation. 
The  plain  English  of  the  sentence  is,  simi)ly,  wlien  divested  of  all  re- 
dundancy, that  any  argument  which  would  justify  the  introduction  of  a 
lay  delegjition  in  the  supreme  councils  of  the  INI.  E.  Chui-ch  would  justify 
a  union  of  the  Church  and  the  State. 

Tills  arjzument  deserves  a  careful  examiiuition. 

The  word  hiy,  as  well  as  its  cognates,  laic,  laymen^  and  hiity^  denotes 
different  meanings.  It  may  be  applied,  1.  To  any  member  of  the  State 
who  is  not  a  clergyman  ;  2.  To  any  member  of  the  Church  who  is  not  ji 
clero^vman.  The  first  is  its  En<>;lish  sense.  The  second  is  its  strict  and 
le'Titimate  American  sense.  In  England  the  Church  is  co  extensive 
with  the  State;  and  hence  an  infidel  is  there  as  much  a  laynum  as  the 
most  upright  religionist  when  (Compelled  by  law  to  pay  tithes  tovvai-d 
the  sup[)ort  of  the  Established  Church.      In  the  United   States,  there  is 


II 


\ 


*  K 


49 

no  Established  Church.  Hence,  in  relation  to  the  State,  or  in  relation  to 
a  Church  supported  by  statute  law,  there  are  no  laymen.  Accordingly,  to 
obtain  laymen,  we  must  enter  within  the  precincts  of  the  various  re- 
licrious  sects  in  our  land.  Consequently,  in  the  United  States  a  layman 
is'one  who  is  so  correlative  to  a  clergyman  that  both  are  members  of  a 

religious  sect. 

•  To  which  of  these  meanings  does  Dr.  Hodgson  refer  in  the  quotation 
I  have  made  from  his  essay  ?  If  he  assigns  to  the  term  its  English  sense, 
I  reply  that  in  this  sense  no  lay  delegation  is  claimed  in  the  United 
States.  Therefore,  the  principle  which  he  has  enunciated  has  nothing 
to  do  with  the  question  in  controversy. 

If  he  employs  the   term  in   its  American  sense,  the  fallacy  of  his  ar- 
crument  is  transparent.     The  argument  virtually  assumes  that  the  distri- 
bution of  a  oiven  amount  of  ecclesiastical  power  among  certain  nidtvt- 
dnah  of  the'religious  class  of  our  citizens  is  a  legitimate  reason  why  a 
class    of  religionists,  as   such,   should   form    a  constituent  part  of  the 
crovernin.^  machinery  of  the  State.      Dr.  Hodgson   forgets  that  the  laity 
and  the   cler-y  are   simply  distinct   individuals   of  some  sectarian   kind 
of  the  reli-ious  class  in  the   Slate.     Else  what  becomes  of   the   non- 
reli-ionists"who,  according  to  this  argument,  would  form  no  part  of  the 
Sta^e'  As  well  might  the   Grand  Masters  of  the  Masonic  lodges  in  the 
United  States  affirm  that  any  principle  which  would  justiiy  the  investi- 
ture of  the  governed  members  of  their  order  with  a  share  in  the  supreme 
power  of  their  organization   is  an  equally  good   reason  for  introducing  a 
delegation  of  INIaster  Masons  in  the  councils  of  the  State  ;  for  the  distinc- 
tion'between  the  clergy  and  the  laity  is  no  more  a  State-created  distinc- 
tion than  is  the  distinction  between  a  Master  Mason  and  an  Apprentice 
Mason  a  State-created  distinction.      Any  principle   which   is   good  to 
support  the  argument   of  Dr.  Hodgson   is  quite   as   good  to  support  the 
incorporation  of  any  private  mechanical  or  other  association   with   the 
State  in  a  case  where   the  majority  of  its  members  claim  a  share  m  the 
supreme  power  of  the  organization  against  a  minority  who  aflirm  that  it 
is  as  reasonable  to  unite  the  said  association  with   the  State  as  to  accede 

the  justness  of  the  claim. 

-  I  would  have  no  minister  of  the  Gospel  in  Congress,"  Dr.  Hodgson 
says,  "  until  he  has  given  up  his  parchments  as  an  elder  in  the  church. 
Nor'would  I  allow  any  layman  to  unite  civil  and  ecclesiastical  power  in 
his  possession,  by  sitting  in  the  civil  legislature  and  in  the  supreme  coun- 
cils of  the  church." 

Here  the  English  and  the  American  sense  of  'Mayman"  are  so  con- 
founded  as  to  produce  a  fallacy  which  Dr.  Hodgson  may  clearly  see  it 
he  will  inform  us  how  a  man  can  unite  two  things  which  the  statute  law 


,j.-*-;'>wr>  -vnwirrf 


■-r:M':'XZSr'''T^^vr'^'''^ 


\ 

I 


50 

of  the  land  does  not  permit  him  to  unite.  Cannot  he  see  that,  as  a 
layman,  no  man  can  hokl  civil  otFice  in  our  land?  As  a  citizen,  a  man 
may  share  in  the  supreme  power  of  the  State;  and  as  a  hiyman,  he  may 
share  in  the  supreme  power  of  a  given  cliurcli.  To  sj)eak  of  tlie  civil 
power  which  lie  holds  as  lay  power  is  just  as  absurd  as  it  is  to  sj)eai<  of 
the  civil  power  which  a  Master  Mason  may  exercise  in  Congress  as  Ma- 
sonic [)0vver. 

''  I  liold  in  almost  equal  detestation,"    Dr.  Hodgson    further  remarks, 
*'a  lay-governed  Church,  and  a  [)riest-governed  State." 

Again,  I  ask:  To  which  of  the  two  senses  of  the  term  "lay"  must 
we  umlerstand  liim  to  refer?    To  the  English  or  to  the  American  sense? 
It  is  possible  for  Dr.  Hodgson  to  detest  more    things  tlian    one.      If  he 
refers  to  the  Englisli  sense,  his  illustration  has  no  applicability  to  the 
present  controversy.      If  he  refers  to  the  American  sense,  his  argument 
involves  a  twofold  absurdity,  as  far  as  it  is  designed  to  bear  on  the  ques- 
tion  which  he  has  undertaken  to  discuss.      In  the  first  place,  it  covertly 
assumes  that  the  government  which  the  laity  of  the   M.  E.  Church  pro- 
pose to  establish  is  an  exclusively  lay  government,  whereas  it  is  a  lay 
and  clerical  government  which  is  claimed.      Dr.  Hodgson  would  thus  be 
forced  to  include  in  his  detestation  a  clerical-governed  church,  inasmuch 
as  the  churcli,    in  the  case  assumed,  would  be  governed   as  much  by  the 
clei-o-y  as  the  laity.      In  the  second  place,  it  assumes  that  the  claim  of  a 
non-ruling  member  of   a  specific   religious  association   in  the   State  to 
have  a  share  in  the  supreme  governing   power  of  the  said  religious  as- 
sociation, and  the  claim  of  a  ruling  member  of  this  association   to  con- 
nect his  religion  directly  laith  the  State  through  distinct   representation 
in   our   State  and   national   councils,  are  claims   of    almost    equivalent 
value.      As  well  might  we  affirm  that  the  claim  of  a  non-ruling  Mason 
to  participate  in  the  supreme  governing  power  of  his  order,  and  the  claim 
of  a  ruling   Mason  to  conn(^ct   his  organization  directly  with   the  State, 
are  of  almost  equivalent  value. 

This  last  passage.  Dr.  Hodgson  has  been  kind  enough  to  explain,  for 
the  benefit  of  Mr.  Isaiah  Toy,  in  a  Pickwierkian  sense.  He  detests  the 
chair,  not  the  chairman.  He  wishes  us  to  understand  that  he  detests 
the  system  of  admitting  laymen  into  the  supreme  councils  of  the 
church;  not  that  he  detests  the  laymen.  But  has  he  never  heard  of  a 
certain  young  woman  who  kicked  her  lover's  dog  out  of  the  house,  and 
thus  caused  him  to  depart,  after  remarking  to  her  :  "  If  you  respect  me, 
you  should  respect  my  dog;  else  I  am  liable  to  share  your  kicks  for 
thoroughly  supporting  him  !"  When  I  affirm  that  Dr.  Hodgson  rebukes 
sin,  I  speak  quite  as  metonymically  as  he  affirms  that  he  s[)eaks  himself 
when  he  declares  that  he  refers  to  a  lay-governed  church  in  the  abstract. 


i 


X 


51 

not  in  the  concrete,  as  the  object  of  his  detestation.     Dr.  Hodgson  de- 
tests Catholicism.     A  Catholic  would  not  be  a  Catholic  unless  he  com- 
bined  within    himself   those   detestable   qualities   which,   in   their  tont 
ensemble,   constitute     Catholicism.      "  To     rebuke     Catholicism"     is   a 
metonymical    figure  of  speech.     Hence   we  must  rebuke  the  Catholic 
who    combines  within    himself   those   qualities   which,  abstracted,  are 
assumed  to  be  the  objects  of  detestation.     To  oppose  Catholicism,  we 
must  oppose  Catholics.      To  oppose  lay  delegation,  Dr.  Hodgson  must 
oppose  lay-delegationists.      As  laymen,  he  would  neither  oppose  nor  de- 
test  them.     But,  as  lay-delegationists,  he  must  both  oppose  and  detest 
them.      Why?      Because   they    approve  and    support   lay    delegation. 
In  plain  terms,  when  Dr.  Hodgson  affirms  that  he  detests  a  lay-governed 
church,  he  jdainly  affirms  that  to  the  extent  laymen  are  lay-delegationists, 
they  are  the  proper  objects  of  his  detestation. 

But,  according  to  Dr.  Hodgson's  argument,  our  P'ederal  Union  is  a 
priest-governed  State.  Why?  Because,  according  to  the  law  of  the 
land,  every  clergyman  who  is  a  citizen  has  as  much  voice  in  selecting  our 
ruler  as  any  other  man.  By  the  same  law,  every  clergyman,  ccEteris  pari- 
hns,  is  just  as  eligible  to  its  highest  offices  as  any  other  citizen.  If  Dr. 
Hod-'-son  affirms  that  no  one  is  admitted  into  our  national  councils  as  a 
clergyman,  I  re[)ly  that  no  one  is  admitted  into  those  councils  as  a  lay- 
man. Hence,  as  both  laymen  and  clergymen  have  equal  privileges 
before  the  law  relative  to  civil  honors,  it  is  logical  to  conclude,  agree- 
ably to  Dr.  Hodgson's  premises,  that  the  American  Union  is  a  priest-gov- 
erned  State,  inasmuch  as  the  power  which  the  clergy  have  in  the  State 
is  as  much  priest  power  as  the  power  which  the  laity  exercise  in  the 
State  is  lay  power,  and  inasmuch  as  Dr.  Hodgson  has  asserted  that  a 
church  which  is  partly  lay-governed  is  a  /ory-governed  church. 

In  Essay  No.  8,  Dr.  Hodgson  says  :  "  There  would  be  as  much  pro- 
priety  in  ministers  clamoring  for  distinct  representation,  by  ministers, 
in  the  several  de[)artments  of  civil  government,  as  there  is  in  this  de- 
mand of  laymen  for  a  distinct  representation,  by  laymen,  in  the  councils 

of  the  church." 

I  ask,  in  which  sense,  the  American  or  the  English,  are  we  to  under- 
stand  the  term  *' laymen?"  If  in  the  English  sense,  the  illustration,  as 
I  have  stated,  once  and  again,  has  no  relation  to  the  present  controversy. 
I  will  cheerfully  admit  that  it  is  just  as  reasonable  that  religionists  should  be 
distinctly  represented  by  religionists  in  the  councils  of  the  State  as  that 
civilians  should  be  distinctly  represented  by  civilians  in  the  councils  of 
the  Church.  But  that  is  not  the  question  we  are  discussing.  If  Dr. 
Hodgson  refers  to  the  American  sense,  the  argument  amounts  simply  to 
this:   It  is  just  as  reasonable  for  the  ruling  members  of  a  private  asso- 


«■■■■ 


Hi 


52 

ciation  to  be  distinctly  represented  in  tl.e  General  Government,  as  for  a 
non-ruling  member  of  lliat  association  to  be  distinctly  represented  in  the 
particular  government  of  that  specific  association.  The  laity  might, 
therefore,  apply  the  same  argument,  and  say:  It  is  just  as  reasonable 
that  we  should  l)e  distinctly  represented,  as  laymen,  in  the  General  Gov- 
ernment, as  that  ministers  should  be  distinctly  represented  in  the  su- 
preme councils  of  the  church  ;  and  thus  logically,  on  Dr.  Hodgson's  own 
premises,  prove  the  necessity  of  a  union  of  Church  and  State. 

Dr.  Hodgson's  argument  affords  another  illustration  of  reasoning  in  a 
circle.  Th^e  reader  will  observe  that  the  question  in  controversy  is 
strictly  one  of  disputed  classification.  The  whole  argument  de[)ends  on 
the  meaning  of  the  term  h?/man.  Dr.  Hodgson  can  show  the  claim 
of  the  ministry  to  be  distinctly  represented  in  the  councils  of  the  State, 
and  the  claim  of  the  laity  to  be  distinctly  represented  in  the  sui)renie 
councils  of  their  specific  church,  to  be  of  equivalent  value,  only  by 
assigning  to  the  term  ''lay"  a  nvnining  which  I  have  designated  its 
English  sense.  Hypothecating  his  conclusion  on  the  assumption  of 
the°existence  of  a  union  of  Church  and  State,  agreeably  to  this  employ- 
ment of  the  term,  he  thence  argues  that  a  lay  delegation  as  naturally 
involves  a  union  of  Church  and  State  as  a  distinct  representation  of 
ministers  in  the  councils  of  the  State.  This  is  a  self-evident  proposi- 
tion. Why?  Because,  when  presented  in  its  naked  simplicity,  it 
amounts  to  the  declaration  that  a  united  Ciiurch  and  State  are  a  united 
Church  and  State,  whether  the  union  be  produced  by  clergymen  or 
l)y  those  who  are  not  clergymen.  Thus,  Dr.  Hodgson  conveniently 
proves  that  a  lay  delegation  argues  in  favor  of  a  union  of  Church  and 
State,  by  assigning  to  the  term  /«?/  a  meaning  which  implies  tlie  exist- 
ence of  a  union  of  Church  and  State.  He  thus  covertly  assumes  the 
truth  of  his  proposition  as  the  basis  o^"  proving  the  said  proposition. 

If,  however,  the  term  "lay"  be  used  in  its  American  sense,  there  is 
no  analogy  between  the  two  claims.  To  grant  the  claims  of  the  clergy, 
would  be" to  unite  the  Church  and  the  State.  To  grant  the  claims  of 
the  laity  would  not  involve  the  union  of  Church  and  State;  else  the 
Church  and  State  are  already  united  in  all  Churches  in  the  United 
States    except    the    Roman    Catholic    and     the     Metliodist    Episcopal 

Church. 

The  fallacy  of  Dr.  Hodgson's  argument  may  also  be  clearly  seen  by 
recrardincT  it  from  another  point  of  view.  Il  is,  or  it  is  not,  legitimate 
to  infer  the  measure  of  power  the  ministry  should  enjoy  in  the  State, 
from  the  measure  of  power  possessed  by  the  laity  in  the  Church.  If  the 
negative  be  admitted,  Dr.  Hodgson's  argument  is  worthless.  If  the 
affirmative  be  claimed,   he  has  assumed  a  premise  of  a  very  compre- 


i 


53 


4^ 


hensive  character.  It  follows,  then,  that  if  the  laity  have  the  mone}^- 
[)Ower  of  the  Church,  the  clergy  ought  to  possess  the  money-power 
of  the  State.  The  argument  proves  quite  as  much  for  administrative 
power  as  for  legislative  power.  The  laity  fill  administrative  offices  in 
the  Church  ;  therefore  the  clergy  should  fill  administrative  offices  in  the 
State.  The  laity  are  stewards  and  trustees  in  the  Church  ;  therefore 
the  clergy  should  be  postmasters  and  sheriffs  in  the  State.  Tiie  Doctor 
aj^pears  to  have  forgotten  the  caution  which  Mr.  Macaulay  gives  relative 
to  the  danger  of  assuming  as  true  an  extensive  major  premise  which  may 
include  a  number  of  minor  premises  which  it  would  be  sitry  inconve- 
nient to  advance. 

Not  only  so,  but  Dr.  Ilodgson^s  argument  logically  involves  the  very 
thing  which  he  so  earnestly  deprecates.  By  forcibly  dragging  in  the 
State  as  a  party  to  the  question  in  discussion,  he  has  unconsciously  in- 
voked an  element  which  nullifies  his  whole  argument.  This  argument 
works  in  two  directions  :  If  the  measure  of  power  enjoyed  by  the  laity  in 
the  Church  is  the  measure  of  power  which  the  ministry  should  enjoy  in 
the  State,  it  follows  that  the  ministry  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church 
should  either  share  their  supreme  power  with  the  laity,  inasmuch  as  they 
have,  as  individual  citizens,  as  much  power  in  the  State  as  the  laity  have 
as  individual  citizens,  or  they  are  usurpers  of  political  power,  according 
to  the  same  principle  that  the  laity  are  usurpers  of  ecclesiastical 
power,  when  participating  with  the  ministry  in  the  supreme  functions 
of  their  church  government.  Hence,  on  precisely  the  same  hypothesis 
which  he  brings  forward  to  show  that  a  clerical  delegation  in  the  State, 
and  a  lay  delegation  in  the  Church,  are  claims  of  equivalent  value,  the 
State  may  chiim  a  share  in  the  power  of  the  Church  equal  to  that  whicli 
is  represented  by  the  aggregate  votes  of  the  ministers,  as  citizens,  in  the 
State,  inasmuch  as  this  claim  would  be  of  the  same  value  as  that  urged 
by  Dr.  Hodgson.  Hence,  to  disprove  the  claims  of  the  laity.  Dr.  Hodg- 
son makes  use  of  an  argument  which,  if  sound,  proves  that  to  the  ex- 
tent that  ministers  exercise  the  elective  franchise  in  the  State,  our 
noble  republic  is  a  priest-governed  State.  Dr.  Hodgson  may  handle 
his  logical  knife  in  whatever  way  he  pleases.  It  is  sure  to  cut  his 
fingers. 


55 


THE  BASIS  OF  SUFFRAGE. 


Mr.  BeliSle  -.^Dear  Sir. — As  the  conductor  of  a  public  journal,  you  have  neces- 
sarily devoted  inucli  attention  to  questions  of  a  political  character.  Accord iny^ly,  if 
you  will  permit  the  liberty  I  take,  I  would  respectfully  request  you  to  show  ine  why, 
other  things  being  equal,  a  person  of  African  descent,  born  in  this  country,  has  not 
as  valid  a  claim  to  the  privilege  of  the  elective  franchise  as  a  white  man.  I  make 
tliis  request  because,  after  prolonged  reflection,  I  have  been  unable  to  arrive  at  any 
reason  clearly  proving  that  a  white  man  ought  to  possess  the  elective  franchise 
which  does  not  prove,  at  the  same  time,  that  a  person  of  African  descent  ought  to 
possess  it.     An  exhaustive  answer  to  my  inquiry  would  much  oblige, 

Respectfully  yours, 

Oct.  20,  1858.  Publics. 

Remarks. — In  reply  to  the  questioQ  of  our  correspondent.  "  Plblius."  so 
respectfully  asked — "  Why,  other  things  being  equal,  a  person  of  African  de- 
scent, born  in  tliis  country,  has  not  as  valid  a  claim  to  the  privilege  of  the  elec- 
tive franchise  as  a  white  man?" — we  shall  go  back  to  first  principles 
of  the  organic  law.  And  we  presume  "  Publius  "  will  agree  with  us  in  the 
assertion  that  all  rights  of  a  political  or  legal  character  are  created  by  the 
fundamental  iiistrument  ufon  which  the  laws  of  a  country  are  based.  'I'his 
being  a  demonstrative  fact,  tiierc  can  be  no  valid  claim  for  usurping  a  i)rivi- 
lege  which  ^/la^  instrument  does  not  confer.  The  Preamble  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  reads  thus  : — 

We,  the  people  of  the  United  States,  in  order  to  form  a  more  perfect  union,  estab- 
lish justice,  insure  domestic  tranquillity,  provide  for  the  common  defence,  promote 
the  general  welfare,  and  secure  the  hlcssiuffs  of  liberty  to  ourselves  and  our  pos- 
terity, do  ordain  and  establish  this  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of  America. 

Here  we  have,  in  the  organic  charter  of  our  country,  an  absolute  declaration 
of  the  purposes  and  objects  which  led  to  the  union  of  the  States,  among  which 
was  that  for  "  securing  the  blessings  of  liberty  to  gursklves  and  our 
POSTERITY."  Now,  the  reasonable  inference  is,  that,  if  those  who  drew  up  that 
Constitution,  and  those  who  adopted  it,  were  white  men,  they  drew  it  up  and 
adopted  it  for  tiie  purpose  of  self-protection  by  ignoring  the  right  of  the  Afri- 
can race  to  the  franchises  of  government.  We  have  no  right  to  go  beyond 
their  action,  for  that  action  and  that  Constitution  are  still  the  organic  law  of 

(54) 


I 


the  land.  But,  if  our  correspondent  can  show  that  the  men  who  made  and 
adopted  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  were  African,  and  tue  are  their 
posterity,  then  is  the  scale  reversed,  and  we  will  acknowledge  that  they  have 
**  as  valid  a  claim  to  the  elective  franchise"  as  white  men.  We  will  go  fur- 
ther, and  say,  they  alone  have  the  right  to  its  exercise.  Until,  however,  Pur- 
Lius  can  demonstrate  to  us  that  a  white  man  is  the  offspring  of  a  Negro — 
or  that  the  white  ra(;e  is  the  progenitors  of  the  African,  we  must  content  our- 
selves with  the  action  of  our  constitution-makers,  and  admire  their  wisdom  in 
reference  to  the  disfranchisement  of  the  colored  race. 

^Ir.  Bklisle:  Dear  sir — I  thank  you  for  your  courteous  response 
to  my  inquiry.  That  it  is  unsatisfactory  is  due,  perhaps,  to  myself — 
not  to  you.  I  asked,  "  Why,  other  things  being  equal,  a  person  of  Afri- 
can descent,  born  in  this  country,  has  not  as  valid  a  claim  to  the  privi- 
lege of  the  elective  franchise  as  a  white  man  ?"  In  reply  to  this  question, 
you  affirm  that  "  all  rights  of  a  j)olitical  or  legal  character  are  created 
by  the  fundamental  instrument  on  which  the  laws  of  a  country  are  baaed.''' 
Pardon  me  for  deeming  this  proposition  somewhat  vague.  Colored  per- 
sons undoubtedly  have  civil  rights.  Hence,  it  is  only  necessary  to  show 
that  such  persons  have  civil  rights  to  prove,  according  to  your  own 
showing,  that  they  are  entitled  to  the  franchises  of  government,  inas- 
much as  these  rights  are  of  a  legal  character,  and  inasmuch  as  all  such 
rights  are,  according  to  your  own  assumption,  "created  by  the  funda- 
mental instrument  upon  which  the  laws  of  a  country  are  based." 

The  argument  may  be  thus  syllogistically  presented  : — 

1.  A- 11  rights  of  a  legal  character  are  created  by  the  fundamental  instrument  on 
which  the  laws  of  a  country  are  based  : 

Civil  rights  are  of  a  legal  character  : 

Therefore,  civil  rights  are  created  by  the  fundamental  instrument,  etc. 

2.  Whoever  possesses  civil   rights  possesses  rights  created  by  the  fundamental  in- 
strument on  which  the  laws  of  a  country  are  based  : 

Colored  persons  enjoy  civil  rights  : 

Therefore^  colored  persons  enjoy  rights  created  by  the  fundamental  instrument,  etc. 

If  this  reasoning  be  sound,  your  conclusion  that  there  can  be  "  no 
valid  claim  for  usurping  a  privilege  which  that  instrument  does  not  con- 
fer," is  inapplicable  to  the  case  in  point,  for  the  privilege,  thus  assumed 
to  be  usurped,  rests,  according  to  your  own  showing,  upon  a  legal  basis. 

Your  language  relative  to  "  usurpation"  seems  to  be  susceptible  of 
diverse  interpretations.  Do  you  mean  to  assert  that  the  fact  that  a 
given  organic  law  does  not  confer  a  privilege  claimed  is  adequate 
proof  that  the  claim  is  invalid,  and  therefore  should  not  be  conceded  ? 
Or  do  you  mean  to  affirm  that  no  claim  can  be  valid  which  usurps  any- 
6 


I 


56 

tiling^  Or  do  you  mean  to  affirm  that  it  is  usurpation  to  claim  anytliing 
whicli  tlie  organic  law  of  a  land  does  not  confer? 

1  accept,  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  either  or  all  of  these  alter- 
natives. Accordingly,  it  follows  that  our  forefathers,  when  they  declared 
tlieir  independence  of  Great  Britain,  usurped  the  privileges  they  claimed, 
because  tliey  claimed  what  the  organic  law  of  tlie  British  realm  did  not 
confer;  and,  hence,  they  liad  no  valid  claim  to  their  Independence. 

Your  reference  to  the  preamble  to  our  National  Constitution  would 
seem  to  imply  your  conviction  that  our  right  to  the  elective  franchise  is 
derivable  from  that  Constitution.  This  view  seems  to  me  to  be  clearly 
erroneous,  except  with  reference  to  aliens;  and  even  aliens  exercise  tlie 
privileges  conferred  on  them  by  Congress  mediately  through  forms  im- 
posed by  State,  in  contradistinction  to  Federal,  law.  Tlie  qualilications 
of  citizenship  are  prescribed  by  the  sovereign  [;Ower  of  the  several  Staters, 
not  by  the  United  States.  No  native  inhabitant  of  a  State  c;in  derive  his 
rio^ht  to  the  elective  franchise  from  the  Federal  ojovernment,  but  irom 
the  State  in  which  he  was  born  or  resides.  Hence,  the  only  law  which 
can  be  affirmed  to  be  organic  with  reference  to  his  claims  to  the  eh^c- 
tive  franchise  is  the  Constitution  of  said  State.  Accordingly,  if  any 
State  confers  the  elective  franchise  on  its  native-born  inhabitants  of 
African  descent,  and  invests  them  with  all  the  immunities  and  privileges 
which  its  white  inhabitants  enjoy,  no  arguments  drawn  from  the  assumed 
tact  that  white  persons  formed  and  adopttnl  the  Federal  Constitution  can 
be  pleaded  as  an  offset  to  the  validity  of  their  claim  to  the  elective  fnm- 
chise.  The  Federal  government  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  conditions 
of  their  citizenship.  Thus,  in  several  States  of  the  Union,  colored  per- 
sons habitually  exercise  tlie  elective  franchise,  and  vote  lor  represent- 
atives who  help  to  make  laws  for  our  Union. 

1  admit  that  one  of  the  leading  objects  which  led  to  the  Union  of  the 
States  was  "  to  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty  to  oirsklvks  and  oiii 
POSTERITY."  But  I  cannot  agree  with  you  *Mhat  the  reasonable  infer- 
ence from  this  language  is  that,  if  those  who  drew  up  the  Constitution,  and 
those  who  adopted  it,  were  white  men^  they  drew  it  up  and  adopted  it  tor 
the  purpose  of  self -protection^  by  ignoring  the  right  of  the  Atricjin  race 
to  the  franchises  of  government ;"  because  you  have  incorporattnl  in 
your  inference  an  assumption  that  white  men  solely  drew  u[)  and  adopted 
the  Constitution,  which  is  assuming  the  proposition  to  be  {)roved. 

But  granting,  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  what  I  will  not  grant  as 
the  fact  in  the  case,  that  white  men  alone  formed  and  ado[)ted  that  Con- 
stitution, the  inference  would  by  no  means  be  clear  that  they  formed  and 
adopted  it  tor  the  purpose  of  se//'-protection  by  ignoring  the  right  of  the 


i 


? 


1^ 


67 

African  race  to  the  franchises  of  government.  The  "  reasonableness" 
of  your  inference  is  hypothecated  on  the  assumption  that  the  liberties  of 
our  forefathers  and  their  descendants  were  regarded  as  insecure,  by  those 
who  drew  up  and  adopted  our  Federal  Constitution;  unless  the  rights  of 
the  African  race  to  the  franchises  of  government  were  ignored— an  as- 
sumption I  cannot  concede  without  substantial  proof.  As  well  might  we 
affirm  that,  because  those  who  drew  up  and  adopted  our  Federal  Consti- 
tution were  white  men,  they  drew  it  up  and  adopted  it  for  the  purpose  of 
se//-protection  by  ignoring  the  right  of  the  Indians  to  acquire  the  fran- 
chises of  government;  and  yet  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
lias  declared  that  there  is  no  constitutional  impediment  to  the  enfran- 
chisement of  the  Indians. 

Had  I  space,  I  would  assign  several  reasons  why  I  regard  your 
inference  as  eminently  unreasonable.  At  present  I  will  simply  state 
that  individuals  of  the  African  race  were  voting  members  of  several  of  the 
constituencies  represented  by  those  who  drew  up  the  Federal  Constitution. 
Hence,  the  assumption  that  white  men  had  the  right,  in  the  Federal 
Convention,  to  ignore  rights  which  rested  upon  precisely  the  same  basis 
whence  the  right  of  ignoring  claimed  by  you  can  alone  be  assumed  to  be 
deducible,  involves,  in  my  opinion,  a  clear  contradiction  in  terms. 

You  affirm  that  "  we  have  no  right  to  go  beyond  the  action"  of  those 
who  framed  the  Federal  Constitution.  Excuse  me  for  reminding  you 
that  you  have  done  the  very  thing  which  you  assert  I  have  no  right  to 
do.  Not  only  so,  but  your  affirmation  is  grounded  on  the  assumption 
that  the  "action"  referred  to  was  what  you  claim  it  to  be,  which  is 
begging  the  proposition  to  be  proved.  Prove  first  that  the  rights  of  the 
African  race  were  ignored  by  those  who  drew  up  and  adopted  the  Fed- 
eral Constitution,  and  then  it  will  be  time  to  inquire  whether  it  is  legiti- 
mate to  go  beyond  their  action. 

Y'our  statement  that  it  is  incumbent  on  me,  in  order  to  disprove  your 
assumption,  to  show  that  the  white  race  is  descended  from  the  African, 
or  the  African  from  the  white  race,  can  scarcely  be  considered  appli- 
cable to  the  question  under  discussion  ;  for,  even  granting  that  the  white 
race  never  has  conferred  the  elective  franchise  on  persons  of  the  Afri- 
can race,  it  is,  without  doubt,  logically  conceivable  that  they  might  have 
conferred  it  upon  them. 

Very  respectfully  yours, 
Nov.  6,  1858. 


PUBLIUS. 


Remarks.— The  extreme  prolixity  of  our  correspondent's  remarks  precludes 
us  from  replying  in  extenso.  In  fact,  it  needs  but  a  few  words  to  dissipate  the 
technical  points  upon  which  his  hypothesis  is  based.     The  question  submitted 


58 

for  us  to  answer  is:  "  Why,  otlier  things  beinf?  equal,  a  person  of  African  de- 
scent, born  in  this  country,  has  not  as  valid  a  claim  to  the  priviu'^ie  of  the 
elective  franchise  as  a  white  man  ?"  Our  response  was  and  is  because  the  or- 
ii'anic  law  of  the  lan(i(/oes  not  confer  that  validity  ui)on  the  colored  race,  but 
expressly  and  unequivocally  disfranchises  them.  This  is  clearly  and  incontro- 
vertibly  indicated  in  the  Preamble  to  our  National  Constitution,  and  we  as- 
serted then,  as  we  assert  now,  that  so  long  as  that  Constitution  remains  the 
fundamental  instrument  upon  which  the  laws  of  the  country  are  based,  we 
have  ?io  r/<y/i^  to  go  beyond  it.  PuBfJus  thinks  "this  proposition  somewhat 
vague,"  and  declares  that  "colored  persons  undoubtedly  have  civil  rightly 
No  one  ever  disputed  that.  But,  in  what  do  those  "civil  rights"  consist? 
Undoubtedly,  nothing  l>eynnd  those  which  the  laws  of  the  land  confer.  They 
have  the  "civil  right"  to  marry  among  themselves — to  receive  the  benefits  of 
our  schools — to  exercise  the  rights  of  conscience — to  accumulate  property— to 
buy  and  sell — to  engage  in  any  lawful  business.  These  are  "  civil  rights"  con- 
ferred on,  and  guaranteed  to  all — rights  which  were  given  to  them  by  the  ac- 
tion of  the  Convention  which  framed  our  National  Constitution.  But,  when 
it  comes  to  the  law-making  prerogative,  their  right  to  that  privilege  is  de- 
nied, and,  we  think,  very  properly.  To  this,  however,  our  correspondent  ob- 
jects, by  premising  a  syllogism  asserting,  that  "  individuals  of  the  African 
race  were  voting  members  of  several  of  the  constituencies  represented  by  those 
who  drew  up  the  Federal  Constitution."  This  assertion  is  erroneous,  and  we 
defy  Publics  to  cite  a  single  instance  where  negroes  voted  for  members  to 
that  Convention  —  for  he  knows  that  every  State  in  the  Union  at  that  time, 
except  one,  was  a  slaveholding  State,  and  the  colored  race  were  not  allowed 
to  vote.  I^robably  our  correspondent  has  based  his  untenable  assumptions 
upon  the  parenthetical  portion  of  his  question—"  other  things  being  ecpial" — 
as  applicable  to  the  African  race.  We  have  never  admitted  the  equality,  if  he 
applies  it  comparatively  to  the  white  man — for  there  is  just  as  wide  a  ditierence 
in  all  the  characteristics  of  nature  between  the  African  and  the  white  races 
as  there  is  between  daylight  and  darkness.  Our  forefathers  were  cognizant  of 
this  inferiority  when  they  constitutionally  ignored  their  right  to  the  elec- 
tive franchise — and  those  states  which  permit  negro  suffrage  by  virtue  of 
property  qualifications  have  done  so  in  direct  violation  of  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution. We  see  nothing  in  the  specialties  of  Publius's  syllogisms  to 
change  our  former  views,  and  we  mean  to  liold  him  strictly  to  his  original 
proposition — the  question  of  right. 

Mr.  Belisle  :  Dear  Sir — When  I  state  that  I  have  sent  you  but  a 
portion  of  what  I  have  written,  I  trust  you  will  believe  that  I  have 
not  wantonly  trespassed  on  the  columns  of  your  excellent  little  Journal. 
I  will  now  be  as  brief  as  my  time  and  my  skill  will  permit. 

1.  You  think  but  a  few  words  are  required  to  "dissi[)ate  the  technical 
points'*  upon  which  my  '^  hypothesis"  is  based.  I  answer,  that  I  have 
presented  no  hypothesis,  and  have  brought  forward  no  technical  points. 
You  took  the  lead  in  the  discussion  ;    I  followed  you  ;    and  all  the  argu- 


^ 


.> 


59 

ments  I  adduced,  and  all  the  terms  I  employed,  lie,  as   far  as  I  can  see, 
within  the  domain  of  general  reasoning. 

2.  Your  response  to  the  question  I  propounded  "  was  and  is,"  you  say, 
*'  because  the  organic  law  of  the  land  expressly  and  unequivocally  dis- 
franchises" colored  persons.  But  the  proof  of  this  affirmation  has  not 
been  fortbcoming.  Where  is  this  expression  to  be  found?  You  still  beg 
tlie  (juestion  in  controversy.  The  terms  "our"  and  *'  ourselves"  are  as- 
suredly as  predicable  of  members  of  the  African,  as  of  the  white  race. 
Accordingly,  to  show  that,  when  used  in  the  preamble  to  our  National 
Constitution,  their  application  is  specifically  restricted  to  the  white  race, 
you  are  required  to  go  beyond  that  instrument.  But  you  affirm  we 
have  no  right  to  go  beyond  it.  Hence,  if  we  have  no  right  to  go  be- 
yond it,  and  if  the  specific  restriction  you  claim  for  the  white  race  is 
not  named  in  it,  it  follows  that  the  said  specific  restriction  is  not  demon- 
strable, inasmuch  as  you  have  hopelessly  closed  up  all  the  avenues  through 
which  any  demonstration  could  be  attempted.  If  the  specific  restric- 
tion you  claim  is  contained  in  the  instrument,  produce  it,  and  the  ques- 
tion is  settled. 

3.  No  one,  you  say,  ever  disputed  the  fact  that  colored  persons  pos- 
sess civil  rights.  But  you  do  not  seem  to  perceive  that  the  admission 
of  this  fact  renders  your  postulate  worthless.  Unless  you  correct  your 
[)ostulate,  my  syllogisms  are  fatal  to  your  reasoning. 

4.  Civil  rights,  you  affirm,  were  given  to  colored  persons  "by  the  ac- 
tion of  the  Convention  which  framed  our  National  Constitution."  I 
would  be  much  obliged  to  you  if  you  would  s})ecifically  indicate  the  "ac- 
tion" by  which,  in  the  Federal  Convention,  civil,  as  distinguished  from 
other  rights,  were  given  colored  persons.  "  When  it  comes  to  the  laic- 
making  prerogative,"  you  say,  "their  right  to  that  privilege  is  denied." 
Please  give  me  the  specific  part  of  those  proceedings  where  that  right 
is  denied.  I  refer,  of  course,  to  free,  native-born  persons  of  African  de- 
scent ;  for  I  cannot  suppose  you  to  claim  that  the  civil  rights  you  speak 
of  were  conferred  on  the  slaves  of  the  Federal  Union. 

5.  You  deny  my  assertion  that  "  individuals  of  the  African  race  were 
voting  members  of  several  of  the  constituencies  represented  by  those 
who  drew  up  the  F'ederal  Constitution."  My  statement  rests  on  the 
authority  of  Mr.  Curtis,  late  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States.  "  At  the  time  of  the  ratification  of  the  Articles  of 
Confederation,"  says  Mr.  Curtis,  "  all  free,  native-born  inhabitants  of 
the  States  of  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  New  York,  New  Jersey, 
and  North  Carolina,  though  descended  from  African  slaves,  were  not 
only  citizens  of  those  States,  but  such   of  them  as  had  the   other  neces- 


60 

sary  qualifications  possessed  the  franchise  of  electors  on  ef/ftalferms 
with  other  citizens."  (P.  572,  Report  of  tlie  Decisions  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  Dred  Scott  case,  published  by  D. 
Appleton  &  Co.)  He  quotes  the  language  of  the  statutes  conferring  the 
privileire.  I  have  never  seen  any  refutation  of  his  statement.  If  such 
a  refutation  exists,  I  would  thank  you  for  directing  my  attention  to  it. 
In  your  assumption  that  my  statement  cannot  be  true  because  every 
State  in  the  Union,  excepting  one,  was  a  slave-holdiug  State,  I  can  see 
no  logical  connection  between  your  premise  and  your  conclusion.  No 
argument  is  pertinent  to  your  purpose  except  the  disproof  of  tlie  above 
statement,  resting,  as  it  does,  on  the  authority  of  one  of  tlie  most  learned 
constitutional  lawyers  in  the  United  States.  All  else  seems  to  me  mere 
speculative  assumption,  proving  nothing  for  your  argument,  and  notiiing 

against  mine. 

G.  I  have  either  obscurely  stated,  or  you  have  strangely  misconceived, 
the  purport  of  the  question  I  proposed.  If  I  were  to  say  that,  ot/)er 
things  being  equal,  men  exhale  more  carbonic  acid  than  women,  I  would 
assert  a  fact;  but  the  statement  would  not  imply  the  assumption  that 
men  and  women  are  equal;  for,  the  absolute  equality  of  the  sexes  once 
admitted,  it  would  be  incorrect  to  affirm  that  men  exhale  more  carbonic 
acid  than  women.  In  my  question,  I  do  not  assume  that  I  believe  in  the 
absolute  equality  of  tlie  two  races,  or  that  it  is  necessary  that  you  should 
believe  in  their  equality.  What  I  mean  is  this:  Granting,  either  as  the 
fact  in  the  case,  or,  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  that  a  native-born  per- 
son of  African  descent  possesses  such  (jualifications — namely,  that  the 
said  person  is  of  the  male  sex,  that  he  is  of  full  age,  that  he  is  not  a  crimi- 
nal, etc.  etc., — as  are  deemed  necessary  for  the  exercise  of  the  elective 
franchise  by  a  native-born  person  of  the  white  race,  what  rational  ground 
is  there  for  not  conceding  his  claim  to  the  elective  franchise  which  is 
not  conclusive  against  the  claim  of  a  white  man  to  the  same  privilege? 

But,  admitting,  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  that  I  do  assume  the 
African  to  be  equal  to  the  white  race,  I  cannot  see  in  what  respect  this 
assumption  would  render  untenable  any  argument  I  have  brought  for- 
ward. The  onus  prohandi  in  this  discussion  rests  on  you.  You  affirm 
that  our  National  Constitution  ignores  the  right  of  any  member  of  the 
African  race  to  the  franchises  of  government.  I  deny  the  assertion, 
and  call  for  tlie  proof.  Here  the  issue  is  clearly  joined.  It  is  >our 
duty  to  bring  forward  the  proof  of  your  proposition. 

7.  It  is  your  intention,  you  state,  to  hold  me  strictly  to  the  question 
of  right.  I  am  willing  to  abide  the  judgment  of  the  reader  whether  I 
have  shirked  any  question  legitimately  belonging    to  this  discussion. 


K 


61 

You  answer  my  question  by  laying  down  a  postulate.  If  your  postulate 
is  incorrect,  you  certainly  do  not  wish  to  hold  me  to  it.  If  it  is  cor- 
rect, I  have  syllogistically  shown  that  the  African  race  have  the  rights 
which  you  affirm  our  National  Constitution  ignores. 

Very  respectfully  yours, 
Nov.  20,  1858.  PuBLius. 

Remarks.— When    onr   corrospondent,    Pubt.tus,  asked    us   to   explain    to 
him  the  reason  "  why,  other  things  being  eciuah  a  person  of  African  descent, 
born  in  this  conntry*  has  not  as  valid  a  claim  to  the  privilege  of  the  elective 
franchise?"  we  supposed  he  would  confine  himself  to  the  question  propounded, 
liut.  instead,  the  reader  will  perceive  that  he  has  rambled  ever  the   entire 
field  of  syllocristieal  reasoning,  and  instituted  for  oitr  replication  a  dozen  ques- 
tions altogether  irrelevant  to  the  original  interrogatory.     The  whole  point  in 
dispute  is"ipon  the  validity  of  the  colored  man's  right  to  the  elective  fran- 
chise.    It  does  not  require  Justice  Curtis  or  any  other  liio:h  functionary  of  law 
to  decide  the  controversy,  and  we  cannot  see  why   Pubi.ius  should  select  an 
isolated  portion  of  the  Dred  Scott  decision  to  justify  his  side  of  the  issue,  when 
we  are  satisfied  he  detests  from  his  very  heart  the  whole  tenor  of  Curtis's  posi- 
tion!    We  based  our  answer  to  the  question  of  our  correspondent  upon  con- 
stitutional grounds,  and  alluded  to  the  Preamble  of  our  Federal   Constitution 
because  that  instrument  is  the  fundamental  basis  of  all  our  laws.     The  char- 
ter o(  our  national  liherties  and  elective  prerogatives  does  ?io^  and  never  did, 
recognize  the  African  race  as  citizens  of  the   United  States,  and,  therefore, 
does  not,  and  never  did,  authorize  their  right  to  the  elective  franchise.     This 
fact  has  been  again  and  again  decided  ;    for  persons  of  African  descent  have, 
over  and  over  again,  applied  to  the  proper  authorities  for  passports  to  foreign 
countries,  which  applications  have  as  often   been  refused,  because  of  the  non- 
citizenship  of    the  applicants.     Hence,  the  assertion   of   Judge    Curtis,   as 
quoted  by  Publics,  that  "  at  the  time  of  the  ratification  of  the  Articles  of  Con- 
federation,  all /ree,  native-born  inhabitants  of  the  States,"  etc.,  amounts  to 
nothing— because  we  affirmed  and  do  still  affirm  that  we  have  no  right  to  go 
heuond  the  organic  law  of  our  land  to  adduce  evidence  substantiating  the 
validity  of  their  claims.     At  the  time  of   the  ratification  of  the  Articles  of 
Confederation  the  negro  may  have  had  all  the  social,  moral,  civil,  and  legal 
rights  our  correspondent  claims  ;  but  the  ratification  of  those  Articles,  which 
v.^AS  previous  to  the  adoption  of  our  Constitution,  put  the  seal  of  disfranchise- 
meiit  upon  the  descendants  of  the  African  race,  the  moment  the  event  occurred. 
This  explains  the  language  found  in  the  Fourth  Article  of  that  Confederation, 
which  reads  : — 

"The  better  to  secure  and  perpetuate  mutual  friendship  and  intercourse  amon^ 
the  people  of  the  different  States  in  this  Union,  the  free  inhabitants  of  each  of  these 
States,  paupers,  vagabonds,  and  fugitives  from  justice  excepted,  shall  be  entitled  to 
all  privileges  and  immunities  of  free  citizens  in  the  several  States." 

Here  is  a  complete  repudiation  of  the  citizenship  of  colored  persons  by  the 
-Articles  of  the   Confederation"  themselves,   the   very  instant  they  were 


62 

adopted  and  became  the  organic  law  of  our  Federal  Union.    And,  as  if  to  leave 
710  doubt  or  misconception  on  the  matter.  Article  Ninth  further  declares  that 
the  National  Congress,  under  those  Articles,  shall  "agree  upon  the  number  of 
land  forces,  and  to  make  reipiisitions  from  each  Stato  for  its  (piota,  in  propor- 
tion to  the  number  of  ivhite  inhabifanfs  in  such  .State."     Now.  us  the  de- 
scendants of  the  African  race  had  never  participated  in  creating  this  country 
a  "free  and  independent  nation,"  and  being  of  iiiferiov  blood,  and  incapaci- 
tated by  nature  for  the  rational  enjoyment  of   that  kind  of  freedom  recpiired 
by  the  superior  descendants  of  the  Caucasian  race,  our  constitution-makers  re- 
fused to  give  them  the  ri>jhts  of  sutlVage.     Had  they  been  considered  cifizeus, 
they  would  have  been  subjected  to  military  duty  as  ivh/fe  men.      If  /Ary  were 
recognized  as  citizens,  the  "  Articles  of  Confederation,"  as  well  as  our  Federal 
Constitution,and  the  Constitutions  of  the  several  States,  allow  them  a  privilege 
which  is  not  given  us,  by  exempting  them//7>m  military  duty  and  draft.     \\i}v(i 
is  incontrovertible  evidence  that  they  never  were,  in  a  national  sense,  reco*"-. 
nized  as  citizens  of   the  United  States,  and   their  incompetency  to   become 
citizens,   so   far   as   constitutional    legalities   are  concerned,    has    prevented 
them  from  exercising  rights  of  elective  franchise  in  all  the  States,  except  in  a 
few  instances,  where  they  are  permitted  to  vote  on  property  (lualitications 
against  the  authority  of  the  General  Government.     Nearly  all  the  State  Con- 
stitutions confine  the  elective  prerogatives  to  ichite  citizens;  tho.se  which  do 
not  employ  the  word  icJiite  generalize  the  expression   by  using  the  term  citi- 
zens or  inliahitauts,  with   the  implied  understanding  that  descendants  of  the 
African  race  are  not  citizens,  because  of  their  constitutional  disqualifications. 
AV'e  have  thus  presented  to  PrBUus   indisputable  authority  showing  why  the 
colored  race  have  *'  not  as  valid  a  claim   to  the  privilege   of  the  elective  fran- 
chise as  the  white  man  ;"  and,  if  he  is  unable  to  "see  in  what  respect   this  as- 
sumption renders   untenable"  any  of  his  arguments,  it  is   no   fault  of  ours. 
We  are  not  responsible  for  his  obtuseness,  and  we  do  not  take  upon  ourselves 
tlie  onus  probandi  of  what  our  correspondent  a.s.serts.     He  asked  us  to  answer 
a  certain  (piestion-we  have  done  so.     We  have  no  room  to  follow  him  in  all  ' 
his  syllogisms,  synecdoches,  postulates,  theorisms,  liypothetical  syncretisms,  ai.d 
other  abstractions,  and  trust  he  will,  in  future,  cotifine  his  remarks  to  the  mat- 
ter in  (piestion. 

Mr.  Bklisle:  Dear  Sir— If  victory  belonrrs  to  bim  who  most  do<r. 
matically  alHrms,  I  siiall  leave  you  an  nricontested  field.  I  nm  now  fully 
convinced  that  you  cannot,  or  that  you  do  not  wish,  to  answer  the  inter- 
rogatory I  propounded.  You  liave  not  even  attempted  to  refute  more 
than  one  or  two  of  the  arguments  I  have  brought  forward  in  this  discus- 
sion ;  and  the  sole  mode  of  refutation  you  liave  adopted,  where  you  have 

made  the  attempt,  has  been  your  unfailing  resource tiie  petitio  prin- 

cipii.  My  .syllogisms  have  not  even  been  assailed,  much  less  overthrown. 
To  say  that  these  syllogisms  are  not  pertinent  to  the  (ptestion  at  issue  is 
equivah  nt  to  affirming  that  the  postulate  they  were  designed  to  meet  is  not 


\ 


V 


-1  •  J^ 


1      A 


63 

pertinent  to  the  question  under  discussion.  According  to  your  mode  of 
reasoning,  if  the  iteration  of  a  proposition  is  not  sufficient  for  its  proof, 
its  reiteration  must  establish  its  proof  beyond  all  controversy.  Now,  as 
I  am  unable  to  consider  assertion  and  argument  terms  of  equivalent 
meaning,  I  shall  close  this  discussion  by  examining,  as  briefly  as  I  can, 
your  rejoinder  to  my  last  communication,  and  thus  give  you  whatever 
benefit  you  may  derive  from  the  last  word. 

1.  You  affirm  that,  instead  of  confining  myself  to  the  question  I  pro- 
pounded, I  have  ''  rambled  over  the  entire  field  of  syllogistical  reason- 
ing, and  instituted  for  your  replication  a  dozen  questions  altogether  irrel- 
evant to  the  original  interrogatory."  I  emphatically  deny  that  I  have 
asked  one  irrelevant  question.  You  lay  down  a  {)roposition.  I  ask  for 
the  proof.  You  consider  my  question  irrelevant.  What  am  I  to  infer? 
Tiiat  its  irrelevancy  consists  in  your  inability  or  determination  not  to 
answer  it. 

2.  You  .say  "  the  whole  [)oint  in  dispute  is  upon  the  validity  of  the 
colored  man's  rigid  to  the  elective  franchise."  Very  well ;  to  prove 
tiiat  be  had  not  this  right,  you  assumed  a  postulate.  I  replied  by  Jid- 
dueing  two  syllogisms,  based  on  your  own  premises,  to  show  that  the 
colored  man  has  the  right  which  you  deny;  yet  you  neither  refuted  my 
syllogisms  nor  abandoned  your  postulate.  What  am  I  to  infer?  That 
you  are  unable  or  unwilling  to  maintain  your  own  ground. 

3.  "  It  does  not,"  you  state,  "require  Justice  Curtis,  or  any  other 
liigh  functionary  of  law,  to  decide  the  controversy."  This  seems  to  me 
like  a  dodge  to  avoid  being  knocked  down.  I  adduced  a  statement  of 
Judge  Curtis  in  support  of  a  certain  fact,  wliicii  you  denied.  If  the  fact 
is  as  Justice  Curtis  asserts,  I  undertook  to  show  that  it  is  a  contradiction 
in  terms  to  affirm  that  those  who  drew  up  the  Federal  Constitution  had 
the  right  to  ignore  rights  which  rested  upon  precisely  the  same  basis 
whence  the  right  of  ignoring  claimed  by  you  can  alone  be  assumed  to  be 
deducible.  You  have  made  no  attempt  to  disprove  the  fact  to  be  what 
Justice  Curtis  asserts,  nor  to  meet  the  argument  1  based  upon  it,  ex- 
cept by  ringing  the  changes  upon  the  proposition  that  *'the  charter  of 
our  national  liberties  and  elective  prerogatives  does  not^  and  never  did^ 
recognize  the  African  race  as  citizens  of  the  United  States."  How,  I 
ask,  is  it  the  charter  of  our  national  liberties,  in  contradistinction  to 
that  of  the  liberties  of  colored  persons,  if,  as  I  have  said,  colored  persons 
were  voting  members  of  several  of  the  constituencies  represented  by 
those  who  framed  it?  If  you  accept  Justice  Curtis's  fact,  this  inquiry 
is  overwhelming;    if  you  do  not  accept  it,  please  refute  his  statement. 

4.  To  escape  the  difficulty  which  besets  you,  you  now  assert  that  the 
fact  that  colored  persons  are  not  citizens  of  the  United  States  has  been 


64 

again  aiul  again  decided^  inasniucli  as  they  have  repeatedly  applied  for, 
and  been  refused,  passports  to  foreign  countries.  I  knew  that,  before  I 
commenced  this  discussion.  I  had  read  the  decision  of  tiie  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  Dred  Scott  case  before  I  had  ever 
seen  the  "  Camden  Journal."  One  of  the  reasons  why  I  propounded 
the  inquiry  which  forms  the  basis  of  the  present  discussion  was  the  ut- 
ter inconclusiveness,  to  my  mind,  of  the  arguments  on  which  that  discus- 
sion rests.  If  you  had  stated,  when  I  asked  that  ((uestion,  that  a  de- 
cision adverse  to  the  claim  of  a  person  of  African  descent  to  the  elective 
franchise  had  already  been  pronounced  by  high  authority,  :ind  that  you 
heartily  concurred  in  that  opinion  and  had  no  wish  to  argue  the  ques- 
tions involved  in  it,  the  discussion  would  not  have  commenced.  But, 
according  to  your  own  admission,  it  does  not  require  "any  high  func- 
tionary of  law  to  decide  the  controversy  between  us  ;"  therefore,  I  ask 
you  to  show  me  the  constitutional  warrant  for  the  assumption  that,  be- 
cause a  {)erson  is  of  African  descent,  he  is  ipso  facto  not  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  and  is  therefore  not  entitled  to  a  passport  to  a  foreign 
country.  I  deny  that  there  is  such  a  warrant;  and  I  challenge  you  to 
adduce  any. 

;">.  The  "assertion  of  Justice  Curtis,"  you  state,  "  amounts  to  no- 
thing, because  we  have  affirmed,  and  still  atlirm,  that  we  /i(fre  no  rff/ht 
to  go  hpyand  the  onjanic  law  of  our  land  to  adduce  evidence  substan- 
tiating the  validity  of  their  claims.^'  This  is  decidedly  cool.  Justice 
Curtis  su[)ports  my  assertion,  and  disproves  yours.  If  his  authority  is 
sound,  colored  persons  have  the  rights  which  you  deny.  But  it  amounts 
to  nothing,  forsooth,  because  we  have  no  right  to  go  beyond  the  Consti- 
tution to  establish  the  validity  of  their  claim  to  the  elective  franchise! 
Again  I  ask — as  I  have  before  vainly  a^ked — vvhy,  if  we  cannot  go  be- 
yond that  instrument,  do  you  not  show  where,  in  that  instrument, 
the  claim  of  the  white  race  to  the  elective  franchise  is  specifically  ad- 
mitted, and  that  of  colored  persons  specifically  denied  ?  No  exclusive 
restriction  of  the  elective  franchise  to  the  white  race  is  found  in  the  or- 
ganic law  of  our  land.  If  such  restrictive  clause  exists,  be  kind  enough 
to  point  it  out.  If  it  does  not  exist,  why  call  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  the  charter  of  our  national  libei-ties  any  more  than  the 
charter  of  the  national  liberties  of  the  colored  man?  Can  you  not  an- 
swer that  question  ? 

G.  "  At  the  time  of  the  ratification  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation," 
you  say,  "  the  negro  nuiy  have  had  all  the  rijzhts  our  correspomlent 
claims;  but  the  ratification  of  those  Articles,  which  was  previous  to  the 
adoption  of  our  Constitution,  put  the  seal  of  disfranchisement  u[)on  the 
descendants  of  the  African  race  the  moment  the  event  occurred."      IIovv 


', 


^ 


65 

the  ratification  of  an  Article  conveying  certain  privileges  and  franchises 
is  the  re[)udiation  of  the  privileges  it  conveys,  is,  I  confess,  quite  beyond 
my  comprehension  ;  and  it  will  be  unkind  of  you  to  permit  me  to  go  un- 
enlightened. 

The  Fourth  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation  you  regard  as  a  "  com- 
plete repudiation  of  the  citizenship  of  colored  persons  by  the  Articles 
of  the  Confederation  themselves,  the  very  instant  they  were  adopted, 
and  became  the  law  of  our  Federal  Union."  This  Article  you  quote  as 
follows  : — 

"  The  better  to  secure  and  perpetuate  mutual  friendship  and  inter- 
course among  the  people  of  the  different  States  in  this  Union,  the  free 
inhabitants  of  each  of  these  States,  paupers,  vagabonds^  and  fugitives 
from  justice  excepted,  shall  be  entitled  to  all  privileges  and  immunities 
of  free  citizens  in  the  several  States." 

Where^  I  ask,  is  the  re})udiation  ?  Colored  persons  are  not  named  in 
this  Article.  The  clause  sim[)ly  S[\ys,  free  inhabitants,  not  free  white 
inhabitants.  Is  the  African  the  only  race  which  furnishes  vagabonds 
to  the  community  ?  It  is  humiliating  to  be  compelled  to  answer  such 
bald,  puerile,  unsupported  assertions  when  every  reader  of  American 
history  knows  that  this  very  Article  was  under  consideration  by  the  Con- 
tinental Congress  on  the  25th  of  June,  1778,  at  which  time  the  dele- 
gates from  South  Carolina  moved  to  amend  it  by  inserting  after  the 
word  "free,"  and  before  the  word  "  inhabitants,"  the  word  "  white,"  so 
that  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  general  citizenship  would  be  se- 
cured only  to  white  persons.  Two  States  voted  for  the  amendment ; 
eight  i^tixlts  against  it;  and  the  vote  of  one  State  was  divided.  To 
show  that  the  citizenship  of  colored  persons  was  clearly  repudiated,  you 
quote  from  the  Ninth  of  the  Articles  of  the  Confederation,  which  re- 
quires the  National  Congress  "to  agree  upon  the  number  of  land  forces, 
and  to  make  retpiisitions  from  each  State  for  its  quota,  in  pro[)ortion  to 
the  number  of  white  inhabitants  in  such  State."  Your  conclusion  from 
this  Article  is  utterly  worthless  against  the  emphatic  and  unequivo- 
cal interpretation  given  to  the  Fourth  Article  by  the  members  of  the 
Continental  Congress  themselves.  But  your  argument  proves  entirely 
too  much.  If  colored  persons  were  disfranchised  because  the  Conti- 
nental forces  were  to  be  levied  in  proportion  to  the  white  inhabitants 
in  each  State,  women  and  children  were  entitled  to  the  elective  franchise 
for  the  same  reason. 

7.  Again  you  say,  "  Our  Constitution-makers  refused  to  give  the  de- 
scendants of  the  African  race  the  rights  of  suffiage."  In  the  name  of 
all  that  is  manly  and  honorable  in  dialectical  warfare,  please  give  us 
the  chapter  or  clause  in  which  that  refusal  is  recorded. 


66 

You  state  that  the  exemption  from  military  duty  and  draft  of  col 
ored  persons  is  incontrovertible  proof  that  they  were  never  recognized,  in 
a  national  sense,  as  citizens  of  the  United  States.  Wliat  is  a  citizen  of 
a  State,  or  of  the  United  States  ?  If  the  possession  of  the  elective  fran- 
chise is  equivalent  to  citizenship,  then  colored  |)ersons,  in  five  of  tlie 
States  under  the  old  Confederation,  had  that  privih^g<'.  The  assertion 
tliat  they  were  never  citizens  because  they  were  exempted  from  mili- 
tary duty  is  not  only  contradicted  by  the  fact  that  their  citizenship  is 
clearly  established  by  the  most  umiuestionable  of  tests,  nanndy,  the 
possession  of  the  elective  franchise,  but  it  amounts  to  the  assumption 
that  the  exem{)tion  of  one  class  of  persons  in  the  community  from 
duties  devolving  on  others  is  per  se  equivalent  to  their  disfranchise- 
ment; in  which — [)ardon  my  obtuseness — lean  see  no  connection  be- 
tween the  premise  and  the  conclusion. 

The  remainder  of  your  rejoinder  is  merely  naked,  unsup[)orted  asser- 
tion, to  which  the  term  argument  cannot  be  applied  even  by  way  of 
courtesy. 

Your  reverence  for  the  petitio  prhiclpii  is  quite  oriental.  ^'You 
liave  presented  me,"  you  say,  "with  indis{)Utable  authority  showing  wiiy 
the  colored  race  have  not  as  valid  a  claim  to  the  elective  franchise  as 
the  white  man."  How  did  you  show  it?  By  atlirming  tiiat  tiic  organic 
law  of  our  land  expressly  denies  their  claim.  I  ask  where  ?  Tliis  ques- 
tion you  consider  irrelevant,  and  have  not  condescended  to  answer  it. 
You  say  that  I  have  not  confined  myself  to  the  question  in  dispute,  but 
you  have  scrupulously  failed  to  show  in  what  respect  I  have  evaded  it. 

Hence,  I  am  autliorized  in  concluding  that  the  itidispulahle  authority 
you  refer  to  is  your  own  statement.  Witli  you  the  statement  of  a  propo- 
sition seems  to  be  the  proof  of  it.  If  the  assertion  of  a  proposition 
will  not  produce  conviction,  you  reassert  it;  and  if  the  reassertion  of  it 
is  unsuccessful,  you  charge  an  op[)onent  with  obtuseness.  ^sow,  this  may 
be  a  very  convenient  mode  of  argumentation  with  you  ;  but  you  must 
excuse  me  for  regarding  it  as  puerile  to  those  who  really  wish  to  dis- 
cuss a  question  fairly  and  manfully. 

And  now,  with  my  best  wishes  for  your  health  and  prosperity,  I  leave 
the  discussion  with  you,  and  with  the  reader  who  has  been  so  kind  as 
to  accompany  us. 

Very  truly  yours, 

PuiiLIUS. 

Remarks. — The  magnanimity  of  our  esteemed  correspondent,  Purmus,  is 
exceedingly  commendable.  He  has  satisfied  himsdf  Wv^ii  all  the  arguments 
we  have  adduced  to  prove  his  original  question  are  not  snflicient  for  the  pur- 
pose, and  declares  them  of  uo  account.     We  certainly  thought  we  had  given 


• 


I 


1 


67 

him  pretty  strong  and  sound  reasons,  but  it  is,  we  must  confess,  hard  work  to 
convince  a  man  against  his  will.     When  he  asks  ns  the  question,  '*  Why.  other 
things  being  equal,  a  person  of  African  descent,  born  in  this  country,  has  not 
as  valid  a  claim  to  the  privilege  of  the  elective  franchise  as  a  while  man  ?" 
we  declare  that  it  was  because  his  right  to  the  elective  prerogative  was  not 
deducible  from  any  organic  law  in  reference  thereto.     In  justification  of  this 
position,  we  cited  the  preamble  to  our  Federal  Constitution,  where  it  is  dis- 
tinctly and  unequivocally  declared  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  sanc- 
tioned the  Constitution  as  framed,  for  the  purpose  of  providing  "  for  ihe  common 
defence,"  and  of  securing  "the  blessings  of  liberty  to  ourselves  and  our  pos- 
terity:'    We  showed  that,  in  the  convention  which  created  that  Constitution, 
there  was  not  a  solitary  "  person  of  African  descent,"  consequently  neither  they, 
nor  their  descendants,  who  could  have,  under  any  possible  construction  of  the 
sentence,  been  included  within  the  meaning  of  the  term  to  "secure  the  bless- 
ings of  liberty  to  ourselves  and  our  posterity:'     We  further  showed  that  the 
African  race  were  not  the  offspring  of  the  white  race— that  we  are  not  ^/« en- 
children,  nor  their  progenitors.     And  having  shown  this  y^ry  plainly,  the  in- 
ference was  irresistible,  that  the  delegates  very  wisely  ^■^?iomZ  the  citizenship 
of  the  African  race,  though  "  born  in  this  country;"  therefore,  their  "claim 
to  the  privilege  of  the  elective  franchise"  was  denied  from  the  commencement 
of  our  Federal  Union.     Hence,  having  no  claim— e\en  that  of  citizenship- 
there  can  be  no  validity  of  claim.     To  this  our  correspondent  excepts,  assert- 
ing that  such  logic  is  not  pertinent  to  the  issue.     But,  notwithstanding  his 
varied  researches  in  law  matters  and  legal  decisions,  his  views  are  directly  an- 
tagonistic to  those  of  Judge  MacLean,  who  gave  the  first  constitutional  de- 
cision respecting  the  Fugitive  Slave  Act  of  1850,  in  the  case  of  Harvey  Mil- 
ler vs.  George  W.  Querry,  and  other  high  judicial  authority.     We  prefer  to 
go  to  the  fountain  head  for  decisive  opinions;  and,  as  we  find  the  organic  law 
of  the  land  on  our  side  of  the  question,  we  have  chosen  to  invoke  its  aid  in 
answering  the  question  of  our  correspondent,  rather  than  institute  answers  to  the 
irrelevant  interrogatories  thrust  at  us,  which  grew  out  of  technical  assump- 
tions on  his  part.     We  close  the  controversy,  therefore,  by  asserting  that— as 
the  Negro  has  no  citizenship,  he  is  7iof  legally  entitled  to  vote,  and  therefore 
has  no  "  valid  claim  to  the  elective  franchise:' 

1858. 


68 


69 


BROOKS  AS  A  LEXICOGRAPHER. 


To  give  a  new  word  to  our  language  is  occasionally  a  proof  of  more 
than  ordinary  intellectual  power.  When  it  denotes  an  idea  so  distinctly 
novel  that  no  existing  word  adequately  represents  it,  such  contribution  is 
unquestionably  a  valuable  addition  to  our  intellectual  stock.  True,  it  is 
necessary  to  distinguish  between  two  important  classes  of  such  words: 
namely,  those  which  represent  new  ideas  solely  evolved  from  profound 
thinking;  and  those  which  happily  express  what  otherwise  would  re- 
quire detailed  periphrasis.  Those  who  construct,  or  those  who  suggest 
the  use  of,  either  class  of  words  are,  in  a  measure,  entitled  to  the 
thanks  of  mankind. 

In  the  category  of  those  who  have  unintentionally  rendered  such 
service  to  humanity,  we  have  no  hesitation  in  giving  a  cons[)icuous  place 
to  Preston  8.  Brooks.  It  is  true  that,  by  darkening  the  canvas  of 
that  line  historical  picture  in  which  posterity  shall  at  once  behold  the 
glory  and  the  shame  of  our  noble  country,  he  has  brought  out  in  im- 
mortal beauty  the  figure  of  the  gentle,  the  learned,  and  the  eloquent 
Sumner.  It  is  true  that,  like  him  who  received  immortality  sinq)ly 
because  of  the  wondrous  magniticence  of  the  P^phesian  Temple,  his 
celebrity  will  be  due  to  the  JovE-like  proportions  of  the  living  temple 
he  sought  to  dishonor.  These  are  advantages  restricted  to  himself,  and 
to  that  magnanimous  constituency  which  he  has  so  faithfully  reflected. 
But  the  advantages  we  speak  of  are  those  which  he  has  rendered  to 
civilized  mankind. 

Preston  S.  Brooks  has  added  a  word  to  our  language ;  and  for  this 
he  deserves  our  thanks.  He  has  not,  it  is  true,  given  us  such  a  word  as 
could  be  evolved  only  from  patient  and  earnest  reflection;  for  such 
thinking  exists  only  in  refined  and  cultivated  society.  Besides,  his  act 
was  the  most  emphatic  of  protests  against  mental  culture.  Tiie  hatred 
which  the  Japanese  exhibits  towards  the  civilization  of  Western  Europe 
is  genial  sentimentality  when  compared  with  his  ineradicable  disgust 
for  all  that  widens  the  range  of  intellectual  progress.  Now,  whether  the 
sense  of  all  verbs  is  derived  from  that  of  nouns  is  a  question  we  leave  to 


9 


philosophical  grammarians.  But  that  the  sense  of  the  verb  to  Brooks 
is  derived  from  no  other  source  than  from  Preston  S.  Brooks,  of 
South  Carolina,  we  shall,  against  all  odds,  be  prepared  to  maintain  till 
our  dying  day.  The  only  objection  to  this  conclusion  worth  a  moment's 
consideration  is  that  so  important  a  verb  can  be  derived  from  so  insig- 
nificant a  noun.  But  this  objection  is  more  specious  than  sound.  A 
worm  is  none  the  less  a  worm,  though  it  founders  the  noblest  vessel  that 
cleaves  the  mighty  deep.  A  rat  is  none  the  less  a  rat,  though  he  gnaws 
the  most  valuable  parchment  that  ever  recorded  a  patent  of  nobility.  To 
argue  the  non-existence  of  a  ship  or  of  a  patent  of  nobility  because  of 
the  vilenessof  the  instruments  to  which  their  destruction  is  due,  is  ecpiiv- 
alent  to  arguing  that  the  P^ounder  of  our  religion  is  not  the  Saviour  of  men 
because  he  was  betrayed  by  Judas.  The  objection  is  therefore  dismissed 
with  contempt. 

Now,  the  vast  circumlocution  which  the  verb  to  Brooks  will  enable  us 
to  economize  is  wonderful.  To  acquire  the  ability  to  express,  by  one 
word,  all  the  disagreeable  qualities  which  we  can  affirm  of  one  act,  is  an 
augmentation  of  our  stock  of  knowledge  which  a  grateful  man  will  only 
be  too  ready  to  admit.  Hereafter,  when  we  wish  to  assert  that  a  <T^iven 
person,  in  a  sneaking,  stealthy  manner,  stepped  up  behind  an  innocent, 
unsuspecting,  pre-occupied  human  creature,  and  beat  him  till  he  was 
senseless,  we  need  only  say  that  he  Brooksed  him,  and  our  meaning  is 
at  once  expressed.  If  we  see  a  friend  overcome  in  argument  by  the 
iron  logic  of  an  opponent,  and  we  wish  to  extricate  him  from  toils  through 
whicii  a  rational  man  only  knows  how  to  work  his  way,  we  need  only  say, 
"  Brooks  liim!''  and  our  friend  will  know  what  is  expected  of  him  with- 
out a  useless  multiplicity  of  words.  The  advantages  attending  this  mode 
of  overcoming  mental  inequalities  cannot  be  gainsaid,  for  it  tends  un- 
doubtedly to  e({ualize  brains  that  would  otherwise  remain  in  interminable 
antagonism.  Every  one  knows  the  meaning  of  Burking-,  no  word  in 
our  language  is  itsecjuivalent.  The  word  Brooksiny  will  hereafter  prove 
equally  indispensable.     We  now  submit  our  definition. 

To  Brooks,  a  verb  transitive  (a  word  derived  from  Preston  S. 
Brooks,  of  South  Carolina,  who  stealthily  entered  the  Senate  Chamber 
of  the  United  States,  and  assaulted  with  a  bludgeon  Charles  Sumner, 
and  beat  him  until  he  was  senseless)  ;  to  assail  free  speech  by  means  of 
the  bludgeon;  stealthily  to  creep  up  behind  an  unarmed  man,  and  beat 
him  till  he  is  senseless;  to  assail  an  opponent  in  a  brutal,  ruffianly,  and 
cowardly  manner;  to  overcome,  by  brute  force,  one  whose  arguments 
you  cannot  refute,  whose  facts  you  cannot  controvert ;  to  attack  an  inno- 
cent [)erson  in  an  unusually  mean  and  dastardly  way. 


'4 
i 


TO 

This  word  may  not  at  once  find  its  way  into  tlie  standard  dictionaries 
of  our  language.  Nor  did  the  word  Burking.  But  the  necessities  of 
composition  are  inexorable,  and  a  word  that  so  felicitously  condenses  the 
meaning  of  a  paragraph  cannot  legitimately  escape  that  universal  use 
which  no  genuine  lexicographer  will  dare  to  disregard. 


I 


\ 


i 


A  FORGOTTEN  SPECIFICATION. 


Mr.  Hosmer: — 

On  the  com{)laint  of  Rev.  T.  J.  Quigley,  your  readers  are  aware,  Rev. 
J.  D.  Long  is  to  be  tried  at  the  forthcoming  session  of  the  Philadelphia 
Annual  Conference  for  unchristian  and  unministerial  conduct.  The  fol- 
lowing is  the  enumeration  of  the  specifications: — 

1.  Misrepresenting  the  Philadeli)hia  Annual  Conference. 

2.  Misrepresenting  the  people  of   Maryland  and  Delaware. 

3.  ISIisrepresenting  the  preachers  who  have  labored  in  Maryland  and 
Delaware. 

4.  ISIisrepresenting  the  members  of  the  Church. 
ii.  Misrepresenting  the  colored  people. 

To  these  specifications  we  suggest  the  addition  of  the  following  : — 
r>.  iNIisrepresenting  the  Dogs  of  Maryland  and  Delaware, 

The  complement  of  specifications  would  thus  seem  to  be  complete; 
and  we  therefore  respectfully  commend  it  to  the  attention  of  the  Rev. 
Mr.  Quigley.  A  dog,  it  is  admitted,  is  but  a  dog;  yet,  like  all  sentient 
beings,  he  has  a  claim  to  some  consideration  on  the  part  of  mankind. 
To  belie  him  is  to  lessen  his  chances  for  protection  and  support.  In 
proof  of  this  observation,  we  appeal  to  the  well-known  proverb:  "  Give 
a  dog  a  bad  name,  and  hang  him." 

The  dog  has  noble  characteristics  ;  and  to  weaken  our  respect  for 
these  by  disparaging  statements  concerning  his  actions  and  habits  is 
to  do  him  injustice  ;  and  no  true  Christian  would  do  injustice  to  the 
meanest  of  God's  creatures. 

Fiat  justitia,  ruat  ccelum.  He  has  physical  courage,  and  mankind 
holds  this  quality  in  deservedly  high  estimation.  He  has  not  moral 
courage,  it  is  true,  for  that  is  predicable  of  rational  beings  alone  ;  but  he 
is  not  thence  to  be  depreciated,  for  multitudinous  bipeds  lack  the  same 
quality.  If  Providence  has  withheld  certain  attributes  from  him,  it  has, 
in  its  compensative  provisions,  furnished  him  with  others  which  wc  do  not 
possess  at  all,  or  possess  only  in  a  very  limited  degree.    The  dog  is  never  a 


72 

flunkey  or  n  toady.  lie  never  fawns  at  the  footstool  of  power,  for  he  is 
equally  obedient  to  the  master  and  the  slave;  and  herein  the  canine  has 
an  advantage  over  the  human  race,  which  too  often 

"  Crooks  the  pliant  hinges  of  the  knee  that  thrift  may  follow  fawning." 

The  very  worst  thing  you  can  say  of  him  is,  that  the  royal  road  to  his 
affections  lies  through  liis  belly. 
But  what  saitli  Peter  Pindar? — 

"  The  royal  road  to  human  hearts,  you'll  find, 
Is  through  the  guts,  or  I  mistake  mankind." 

He  is,  it  is  true,  satisfied  with  liis  condition,  and  never  indicates  liis 
dissatisfaction  with  the  evils  tluit  surround  him.  But  if  this  self-com- 
placency reveals  an  ignoble  disposition  we  might,  if  we  should  look 
sharply,  perceive  slight  traces  of  such  a  disposition  in  a  race  of  ani- 
mals of  far  higher  grade. 

Again:  a  noble  dog,  like  all  noble  animals,  never  vexes  and  oppresses 
a  poor,  sick,  weakly  member  of  his  race.  Oh,  no!  He  seeks  a  foe  wor- 
thy of  his  prowess.  A  noble  tnanj  a  fortiori^  never  oppresses  a  feeble 
brother — a  truism  which  might  seem  trite,  were  it  not  so  frequently 
overlooked.  For  the  quality  we  have  mentioned,  some  dogs  will  bear 
favorable  comparison  with  some  members  of  our  own  race. 

For  these  reasons,  we  conceive  it  to  be  our  duty  to  stand  up  for  our 
canine  friends  against  all  undiscerning  disparagement;  and  we  further- 
more conceive  it  to  be  our  unquestioned  right  to  insist  that  any  one  who 
stands  forward,  self-commissioned,  to  describe  the  boundaries  beyond 
which  it  shall  hereafter  be  considered  unchristian  and  unministerial  to 
express  opinions  on  given  subjects,  shall  not  be  oblivious  of  the  claims 
to  consideration  and  respect  of  any  creature,  however  insignificant, 
whose  status  will  be  directly  or  indirectly  affected  by  opinions  which, 
with  equal  practicability,  may  be  subjected  to  the  same  salutary  censor- 
ship. 

To  do  otherwise,  would  be  a  violation  of  the  Golden  Rule.  Lest  the 
motive  last  assigned  for  the  discharge  of  a  clear  and  unec^ui vocal  duty 
might  seem  to  Mr.  Quigley  too  exacting — inasmuch  it  has  proved  sig- 
nally inefficacious  when  aj)pealed  to  in  behalf  of  creatures  far  worthier  of 
his  notice,  we  hasten  to  place  the  duty  on  practical  grounds  :  When  ^Ir. 
Long  was  in  Maryland  his  canine  inhabitants  were  among  his  constitu- 
ents. All  is  changed.  This  constituency  is  now  represented  by  Mr. 
Quigley ;  and  to  be  untrue  to  it  would  prove  him  to  be  a  faithless  repre- 
sentative of  its  interests.  These  interests  have  been  assailed.  The  fact 
cannot  be  gainsaid.     Shall  we  furnish  the  proof? 

**  There  is  as  much  diflerence,"  says  Mr.  Long,   "  between   a  genuine 


,. 


\ 


^  ^ 


4 


X 


73 

negro  dog,  and  a  gentleman's  dog,  as  there  is  between  an  oyster-cart 
horse,  and  an  Arabian  charger."  "  His  tail  is  cut  midway,  and  his  ears 
are  cropped."  AYhen  the  master's  spaniel  approaches  him,  he  "skulks 
to  one  side."  "  If  the  spaniel  attacks  him  he  makes  no  resistance  ;  he 
falls  flat  on  the  ground,  turns  on  his  back,  curves  his  cut  tail  between 
his  legs,  and  appeals  to  the  magnanimity  of  his  master's  dog,  and  says 
by  actions,  Oh,  don't !    I  am  but  a  poor  slave  of  a  slave  !" 

Now  this  specious  and  sophistical  depreciation  of  the  cliaracter  of  the 
dog  may  be  the  first  link  in  a  chain  of  events  big  with  disaster  to  many 
of  his  race.  It  may  be  the  means  of  withholding  from  him  many  op[)or- 
tunities  which  he  might  otherwise  have  enjoyed  of  rising,  agreeably  to 
his  due  position,  in  a  scale  of  canine  precedence.  It  may  be  the 
means  of  depressing  his  energies  to  a  point  below  even  their  present 
humble  development. 

1.  The  affirmation  that  a  dog,  when  thus  attacked  by  his  master's 
spaniel,  will  assume  a  dorsal  position  while  his  tail  will  describe  the  arc 
of  a  circle  around  his  abdomen,  is  clearly  inadmissible,  for  the  sutfi- 
cient  reason  that  it  would  indicate  a  degree  of  humility  equal  to  the 
mental  prostration  of  many  members  of  a  higher  race  not  a  thousand 
miles  from  his  habitat ;  and  that  is  inconceivable.  The  statement  can- 
not, therefore,  be  regarded  as  trustworthy. 

"  His  tail  is  cut  midway  ;  and  his  ears  are  cropped."  The  first  clause 
of  this  description  reveals  sufficient  faultiness  of  observation  to  justify  us 
in  casting  discredit  on  the  assertion.  Mr.  Long  does  not  state  whether 
the  tail  is  cut  in  its  transverse,  or  in  its  longitudinal  axis.  This  is  a 
determinable  question,  and,  as  we  are  not  bound  to  accept  any  statement 
liable  to  two  different  interpretations,  we  may  be  excused  for  hold- 
ing suh  judice  our  opinions  on  the  matter  until  further  developments 
are  made.     At  all  events,  the  dog  has  the  benefit  of  the  doubt. 

2.  Moreover,  the  assertion  that  the  tails  of  the  nearo's  do^rs  are  cut  at 
all  ought  to  rest  on  unequivocal  induction.  Mr.  Long  has  not  seen  all 
the  dogs  of  all  the  slaves  in  Maryland  and  Delaware.  No  statistics 
reveal  to  us  their  exact  number;  and  when  w^e  bear  in  mind  how  many 
dogs  are  conceived  and  born,  mature  and  die,  in  the  interval  which  sep- 
arates one  decennial  period  from  another,  nothing  but  the  faintest  ap- 
proximation to  a  knowledge  of  the  real  facts  in  the  case  is  presumable  ; 
yet  there  is  no  qualification  in  Mr.  Long's  language.  He  makes  no  ex- 
ception to  the  rule  ;  and  the  reliability  of  his  testimony  on  the  subject 
may  hence  well  be  doubted. 

3.  The  dog,  says  Mr.  Long,  seems  to  say  by  his  actions,  "  Oh,  don't !" 
Seems  tp  whom  ?  Why,  to  Mr.  Long.  Tiiis  seeming  is  suspicious. 
Darkened  and    jaundiced  by  the  murky  atmosphere   around  him,  his 


74 


perceptions  must  have  been  indistinct ;  or,  at  all  events,  liis  impressions 
must  have  been  tinged  by  the  hue  of  surrounding  conditions.  Mr. 
Quigley  would  have  regarded  the  matter  with  different  eyes. 

It  is  mean,  by  gratuitous  implications  and  retlections,  to  restrict  a 
poor  dog's  range  of  enjoyments,  as  would  undoubtedly  be  the  case,  were 
Ins  normal  status  among  his  race  inferrable  from  such  representations  of 
his  conduct — which  rei)resentations,  as  we  have  shown,  rest  upon  the 
flimsiest  of  grounds. 

If  every  bad  as  well  as  every  good  word  we  utter  acts  and  reacts,  for 
all  that  we  know  to  the  contrary,  to  all  eternity,  it  is  demonstrable  that 
the  consequences  of  such  misrepresentation  can  never  be  adecpiately  ap- 
preciated. 

To  this  description  of  the  negro  dog's  condition  may  be  due,  in  the 
mind  of  anotiier  man,  a  grave  misconception  ;  and  from  such  miscon- 
ception may  follow  the  dog's  consignment  to  a  position  which  debars 
him  from  the  immunities  of  a  dog  who,  because  he  belongs  to  the  slave's 
master,  is  never  to  be  presumed  so  far  to  forget  his  dignity  as  uncon- 
sciously to  form  across  his  umbilical  region,  by  means  of  his  caudal  a{)- 
pendage,  the  segment  of  a  circle.  Whatever  mentality  such  auspicious 
circumstances  might  have  produced  would,  through  this  misconce[)tion, 
lie  hopelessly  in  abeyance.  But  this  is  not  all.  Th(»  manifestation  of 
this  sup[)Osed  mentality  would  create  ideas  in  our  own  minds;  unmani- 
fested,  the  ideas  would  be  uncreated  ;  i'ryo,  these  ideas  must  be  regarded 
as  hopelessly  lost.  The  gravity  of  tiie  case  is  still  further  augmented  by 
the  fact  that  the  ideas  thus  created  by  the  dog's  culture  would  suggest  to 
our  mind  other  ideas,  which  in  turn  would  suggest  still  others,  and  thus 
mijiht  have  orijiinated  trains  of  tiiiiiking  which  our  imaiiination,  in  its 
loftiest  flight,  would  fruitlessly  attempt  to  circumscribe.  To  think  that 
by  thoughtless  disparagement  of  one  member  of  the  brute  creation,  so 
much  thinking  should  forever  remain  undeveloped  I    What  a  conception  ! 

A  dog,  if  he  is  but  a  dog,  is  entitled  to  justice.  That  justice,  as  we 
have  shown,  ^Ir.  Lonu:  has  not  accorded  to  him.  If  he  that  would  steal 
a  lamb  would  steal  a  sheep,  it  follows  that  he  that  would  misrepresent  a 
dog  would,  a  fortiori^  misrepresent  a  man.  Now  to  (lef«^nd  men  from 
misrepresentation  is  to  carry  coals  to  New  Castle;  for  they  can  defend 
themselves.  It  is  the  part  of  true  magnamiuity  to  speak  for  those  who 
cannot  speak  for  themselves.  We  trust  that  Mr.  Quigh'y,  after  giving 
the  subject  the  consideration  due  to  his  own  reputation,  and  to  the 
gravity  of  the  occasion,  will  not  fail  to  appreciate  the  exigency  which 
requires  him  to  hurry  up  the  charge. 

Mastiff. 

PiiiLADKLi'iHA.  March  19,  1858. 


^. :  -i 


i 


AN  AIM  IN   LIFE. 


A  stp:adfast  purpose  to  be,  or  to  do  anything  is  usually  so  sure  an 
indication  that  we  shall  accomjdish  what  we  seek,  that,  the  purpose  once 
formed,  our  success  may  be  considered  already  more  than  half  attained. 
Everything  really  worthy  the  attention  of  mankind  has  its  price;  and 
the  price  of  eminent  distinction  in  any  department  either  of  active  or 
intellectual  life  is  a  constant  devotion  to  the  pursuit  of  our  choice.  But 
a  wise  man  is  careful  to  select  that  field  which  will  yield  him  the  most 
abundant  fruit.  "It  is  an  uncontrolled  truth,"  says  Dean  Swift,  "that 
no  man  ever  made  an  ill  figure  in  the  world  who  understood  his  own 
talents,  nor  a  good  one  who  mistook  them."  Had  Sir  Isaac  Newton 
cultivated  poetry  with  as  much  assiduity  as  he  cultivated  the  sciences, 
and  had  Milton  neglected  poesy  for  the  mathematics,  the  probability  is 
that  the  world  would  luive  never  seen  either  the  "  Principia"  or  the 
"  Paradise  Lost."  So  conscious  was  either  where  his  strength  lay  that 
we  have  not  the  smallest  doubt  that  each  foresaw  his  immortality  with  a 
prescience  almost  akin  to  inspiration. 

Hence,  whether  our  talents  be  one  or  ten,  we  shall  leave  our  mark  on 
the  society  in  which  we  live  just  in  proportion  as  they  are  patiently  cul- 
tivated and  skilfully  directed.  The  reader  will  pardon  the  triteness  of 
this  observation,  if  he  will  recall  to  mind  how  numerous  are  the  in- 
stances which  suggest  its  statement.  We  are  frequently  pointed,  with 
a  feeling  of  contempt,  to  the  eclat  which  surrounds  the  name  of  a  per- 
son of  mean  intellect.  Yet  it  not  unfrequently  happens  that  the  very 
eclat  which  provokes  our  contempt  has  resulted  from  a  degree  of  concen- 
tration of  mind  which  it  would  have  been  well  for  us  to  imitate.  Talent 
may  have  been  given  with  a  sparing  hand  ;  but  how  careful  and  assid- 
uous its  culture  !  In  such  cases,  the  one  idea  is  ever  uppermost  in  the 
mind.  It  often  absorbs  every  other.  And  a  very  wise  man  may  quite 
unconsciously  pay  a  heavy  tribute  to  rear  the  cunningly  w^rought  fabric ; 
thoujjh  he  is  of  course  in  blissful  ignorance  that  he  does  so. 

A  man  with  one  talent  may  attain  a  goal  which  will  elude  the  eager 
grasp  of  a  man  with  ten  talents.     Like  the  tortoise  in  the  fable,  he  goes 


76 


77 


straight  forward  to  his  object.  The  other  stops  to  sleep  by  tlie  way, 
and  wakes  to  find  his  competitor  the  winner.  But  let  us  never  aim  at 
anything  which  is  beneath  the  dignity  of  a  wise  man's  mark.  We  may 
expend  as  much  physical  energy  in  chasing  the  gossamer  that  floats  along 
the  meadow  as  in  reaping  a  field  of  grain.  Yet,  without  labor,  no  really 
useful  purposes  or  solid  enjoyments  are  attainable.  The  true  pliilosophj- 
of  lite  consists  in  so  directing  the  application  of  our  pliysical  and  intel- 
lectual resources  that  we  may,  with  the  least  expenditure  of"  material, 
realize  the  amplest  gain.  To  do  this  consciously  and  intelligently  is  to 
have  what  we  call  an  aim  in  life.  And  the  aim  will  be  a  good  or  a  bad 
one  according  as  our  motives  are  disinterested  and  {)ure,  or  dishonest 
and  selfish ;  according  as  our  guiding  impulse  is  cunning,  or  tliat  which 
seeks  the  greatest  good  of  the  greatest  number. 

To  have  an  aim  in  life,  reader,  is  your  duty,  because  thereby  you  can 
most  eft^iciently  discharge  the  obligations  you  owe  to  your  Father  in 
Heaven,  and  to  your  fellow-man.  Recollect,  that  good  as  well  as  bad  habits 
may  be  acquired.  A  dull  subject  will  be  rendered  attractive  where  the 
attention  is  continued  and  earnest,  not  spasmodic  and  dilatory.  To 
give  this  attention,  much  less  labor  is  required  than  the  uninitiated  sup- 
pose. Even  the  fatigue  which  it  produces  is  overshadowed  by  the  ad- 
vantages which  we  very  soon  feel  that  it  affords.  The  horizon  soon 
begins  to  clear,  and  a  serene  and  lofty  pleasure  ushers  in  with  the  dawn. 
Labor  then  becomes  pastime.  We  feel  that  we  are  be<nnnin(]r  to  live 
a  new  life,  and  yearn  for  a  more  invigorating  atmosphere. 

When  we  think  of  the  hours  wasted  by  so  many  of  our  young  friends, 
we  feel  a  pang  of  regret  which  words  cannot  dt.'scribe.  They  appear  to 
forget  that  the  intellectual  man  yields  to  none  in  his  keen  relish  for 
really  salutary  social  enjoyments.  Yet  how  hard  it  is  for  them  to  de- 
vote one  poor  hour  to  study  !  as  though  the  time  thus  spent  were  so 
much  abstracted  from  the  aggregate  of  pleasures  which  life  affords. 
To  be  a  diligent  student,  to  give  your  heart  and  mind  to  the  ac(juisi- 
tion  of  useful  knowledge,  it  is  no  more  necessary  that  you  should  be  a 
recluse  than  it  is  necessary  that,  to  be  a  religious  man,  you  should  be 
morose  and  unapproachable.  Instead  of  diminishing,  it  will  augment 
the  pleasures  of  intercourse  with  your  fellow-men.  And  a  systematic 
devotion  to  intellectual  pursuits  is  by  no  means  incompatible  with  the 
amplest  leisure.  The  most  intellectual  man,  the  deepest  thinker  whom 
we  have  the  honor  of  knowing  has  an  abundance  of  time  at  his  com- 
mand which  excited  our  astonishment  until  we  reflected  that  repose 
quickens  and  intensifies  a  mind  which  is  unwaveringly  concentrated  on 
a  given  object.  A  mind  fortified  by  years  of  patient  culture  unbends, 
like  the  unstrung  bow,  only  to  augment  its  efficiency. 


1 


*      /     ^ 


-^ 


Our  readers,  we  trust,  will  pardon  this  grave  homily,  for  it  is  offered 
with  an  earnest  purpose  and  a  true  heart.  That  you  may  realize  for 
yourselves  how  great  a  gain  may  result  from  a  little  labor,  we  propose 
the  following  innocent  experiment :  We  will  suppose  that  you  have  little 
or  no  taste  for  intellectual  pursuits.  How,  then,  shall  you  acquire  this 
taste,  assuming  the  acquisition  to  be  useful?  With  what  department  of 
knowledge  would  you  wish  to  be  acquainted  ?  Let  us  suppose  that  it 
is  Grammar.  Now  take  Cardell's  English  Grammar,  and  read  it  care- 
fully for  half  an  hour.  At  the  expiration  of  that  time,  put  down  the 
book.  If  you  do  not  understand  it,  you  have  at  least  done  half  an 
hour's  thinking.  Take  it  up  the  next  day,  or  evening,  and  read  it  for 
half  an  hour  ;  then  put  it  down.     The  day  following,  continue  the  study 

mark,  only  for   half  an   hour.      Repeat   the  study  the   next   day — the 

next— and  the  next:  for  a  week— a  month  ;  for  three  months.     At  the 
end  of  that  time  you  will  have  done  nearly  fifty  hours  of  thinking. 

What  will  be  the  result  ?  Compare  your  stock  of  ideas  on  P:nglish 
grammar  at  the  commencement  with  your  stock  of  ideas  at  the  close  of 
the  three  months,  and  you  will  see  at  once  that  the  acquisition  has  been 
marvellous.  Labor  will  soon  become  a  pleasure.  Take  history,  take 
the  mathematics;  the  result  will  be  the  same,  for  thinking  in  all  cases 
is  the  same,  how  different  soever  may  be  the  objects  to  which  it  is 
applied. 

Let  our  young  friends  make  this  experiment.  It  will  do  them  no 
harm.  It  will  not  detract  aught  from  their  enjoyments;  and  \i  may 
open  to  them  sources  of  usefulness  and  happiness  where,  as  in  Milton's 
^'divine  philosophy,"  no  "crude  surfeit  reigns." 


i 


PROGRESS. 


Extremes  occasionally  meet.  The  PiiiLADELrniA  Ciikistian 
Advocate,  and  the  New  York  Ciikistian  Advocate  and  Joukxal, 
occupy  theoretically  different  positions  relative  to  ecclesiastical  progress. 
Practically,  however,  the  two  journals  are  beginning  to  ap[)roxiniate. 
And  every  thinker  knows  that  theory  and  })ractice  are  inseparably 
blended.  *'It  is  hard,"  said  the  great  Apostle  to  the  Gentiles,  *'  to  kick 
against  the  pricks."  This  figure  merely  symbolizes  the  absurdity,  as 
well  as  difficulty,  of  resisting  those  })rinci[)les  whose  progress  is  an  un- 
avoidable sequence  of  their  existence.  *'  It  is  in  vain,"  said  Pascal,  in 
writing  to  the  Jesuits,  "  that  you  have  obtained  a  decree  from  Rome 
condemning  Galileo's  doctrine  concerning  the  motion  of  the  earth. 
That  decree  will  not  suffice  to  prove  that  the  earth  does  not  move  ;  and 
if  constant  observation  proves  the  fact  of  its  motion,  all  the  men  in  the 
world  cannot  hinder  its  revolution,  nor  help  themselves  from  turning 
round  with  it."  The  application  of  this  fine  observation  of  the  amiable 
and  witty  Port  Royalist  is  obvious.  It  is  quite  easy  to  set  our  face  against 
the  current  of  the  times.  It  is  not  so  easy  to  prevent  ourselves  from 
moving  along  with  the  current  against  which  we  set  our  face,  for  the  sim- 
ple reason  that  we  constitute  an  integral  part  of  the  stream  whose  pro- 
gress we  0{)[)0se.  Hence,  whether  we  stubbornly  resist,  or  wisely  aid, 
the  advancing  element,  the  result  is  to  a  great  extent  the  same;  for, 
headforemost  or  feetforemost,  down  the  tide  we  go,  and  tmist  go  ;  some 
at  a  slower,  some  at  a  faster  rate  than  others,  according  as  we  seek  the 
channel,  or  lazily  float  in  shallow  water.  We  do  not  believe  that  a  hu- 
man being  has  ever  lived  who  has  escaped  the  influence  of  the  circum- 
stances by  which  he  has  been  surrounded.  The  true  test  of  progress, 
however,  is  not  always  measurable  by  the  degree  we  have  advanced  in 
a  given  direction,  but  by  the  degree  in  which  our  eye  is  concentrated  in 
a  given  direction.  Wickliffe  was  a  step  in  advance  of  the  Languedo- 
cian  reformers  ;  but  the  eyes  of  those  reformers  were  fixed  in  the  true 
direction.  Luther  was  in  advance  of  Wickliffe ;  yet  the  gaze  of  the 
great  English  reformer  was  directed  toward  the  shining  mark.     If  the 


i^ 


< 


79 

face  of  a  Cliristian  is  Zion-ward,  he  moves  toward  Zion.  Where  the 
lieart  is  unfalteringly  and  trustingly  fixed  on  the  prize  of  the  noblest  of 
callings,  we  verily  believe  that  even  its  errors  tend  to  their  own  correc- 
tion. 

Tli(^  bearing  of  these  remarks  the  reader  will  easily  see  if  he  will 
carefully  scan  the  production  of  "  Alethinos"  on  our  fourth  jiage.  The 
appearance  of  this  article  in  the  Christian  Advocate  and  Journal 
does  honor  to  the  head  and  heart  of  its  venerable  editor.  It  shows 
that,  in  his  advanced  years,  his  heart  beats  with  genuine  republican 
feeling.  Politically,  his  eye  looks  forward  ;  ecclesiastically,  it  looks 
backward.  In  tlie  present  case,  his  heart,  as  though  it  were  on  a  pivot, 
lias  veen^l  round,  and  given  the  ecclesiastical  elements  ji  truly  repub- 
lican <lin'ction.  Wlien  we  bear  in  mind  the  fact  that  Dr.  Bond  has 
been  for  the  last  thii-tv-five  years  the  most  influential  lavman  in  the  M.  E. 
church  ;  tliat  to  him  have  been  confided,  hy  the  itinerancy  themselves^ 
the  care  of  their  interests  in  the  hour  of  prosperity,  and  the  defence  of 
these  interests  in  the  hour  of  danger;  that  the  learning,  the  talent,  and 
the  tact  of  this  ecclesiastical  "child"  have  been  wielded  with  such 
efiV'ct  that  lie  may  be  justly  styled  the  Champion  of  the  Itinerancy;  that  the 
uplift(Hl  lash  of  his  satire  and  ridicule  has  made  even  the  divinely  jip- 
pointed  ministers  of  our  church  to  tremble  in  their  shoes  ; — and  when  we 
also  bear  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  same  ecclesiastical  "  child,"  who,  in  a 
trying  emergency,  was  retained  as  counsel  hy  the  itinerancy,  to  do  the 
thinking  of  the  itinerancy, ybr  tJie  benefit  of  the  itinerancy,  and  who, 
though  a  child  when  considered  in  relation  to  the  enactment  of  Metho- 
dist Episcopal  law,  is  every  inch  a  man  when,  we  view  him  in  relation 
to  the  defence  of  a  system  which  makes  a  child  of  him  governmentally, 
now  steps  forward  to  publish  so  extraordinary  an  article  as  that  of 
"Alethinos,"  we  confess  to  a  feeling  of  profound  gratitude  for  so 
striking  an  illustration  of  the  axiom  that  the  world  does  move.  The 
circumstance  suggests  this  significant  fact — that,  had  not  the  editor  of 
our  New  York  contemporary  been  a  layman,  the  article  in  question  would 
never  have  appeared  in  its  columns.  Another  proof,  by  the  way,  of  the 
wisdom  of  the  plan  which  secures  the  efiective  co-operation  of  the  laity 
in  all  the  branches  of  ecclesiastical  government,  legislative,  judicial,  and 
administrative. 

AVe  defy  any  layman  or  clergyman  to  show  us  so  radical  an  article  in 
any  INIethodist  journal  ever  printed  in  these  United  States  or  elsewhere. 
It  hits  all  that  Dr.  Bond  has  written  on  the  subject  of  lay  delegation 
for  the  last  thirty-five  years  in  the  very  "apple  of  the  eye."  It  strikes 
the  theory  which  has  been  dragging  its  slow  length  along  in  the  com- 
munications of  Dr.  Hodgson  right  between  "wind  and  water."  It 
8 


80 

convicts  W.  H.  B.  of  fulsome  laudation  and  arrogant  adulation  of  the 
papal  princi{)le.  It  shifts  the  question  disputed  by  Dr.  Hodgson  and 
our  esteemed  friend  W.  II.  B.  to  a  point  far  behind  that  which  has 
been  the  subject  of  so  much  noisy  and  pompoun  declamation  on  their 
part.  Neither  Dr.  Hodgson  nor  W.  II.  B.  has  forgotten  the  difficulty 
with  which  the  advocates  of  the  papal  principle  encountered  the  un- 
answerable query  of  Chillingworth !  How,  granting  the  claim  of  a 
0  1  rch  to  be  infallible,  shall  we  infallibly  Itiorv  it  to  be  infallible? 
A  question  analogous  to  this,  but  one  which  both  Dr.  Hodgson  and 
W.  II.  B.  have,  with  praiseworthy  caution,  most  pertinaciously  avoided, 
is:  How,  granting  the  fact  that  the  apostles,  and  their  fellow-ministers, 
exclusive  of  laymen,  were  invested  by  Christ  with  supreme  ecclesiastical 
power,  does  Dr.  Hodgson  prove  the  transfer  of  the  power  which  the 
a[)OStles  and  their  fellow-ministers  possessed,  to  himself,  and  other  cler- 
gymen, as  contradistinguished  from  laymen?  In  other  words,  will  either 
Dr.  Hodgson  or  W.  H.  B.  answer  the  cpiery  propounded  some  time  since 
by  ''A  Retired  Thinker:"  What  is  the  characteristic  of  a  "divinely" 
appointed  teacher? 

We  trust  our  readers  will  carefully  peruse  the  article  of  "  Alethinos." 
It  is  based  on  the  Protestant  principle — a  principle  as  indestructible  as 
the  constitution  of  the  human  mind.  A  little  thinking  will  do  them  no 
harm.  And  if  they  practice  it  as  consistent  Protestant  Christians  ought 
to  practice  it,  they  will,  we  humbly  hope,  finally  arrive  at  the  conclu- 
sion that  they  can  do  their  own  ecclesiastical  thinking  quite  as  well  as 
their  own  political  thinking. 


i 


5* 


VERBAL  CRITICISM. 


Until  within  a  few  weeks  we  had  believed  that  moderate  skill  in 
verbal  criticism  was  a  respectable  attainment,  and  that  the  exhaustive 
analysis  of  some  single  terms  was  among  the  most  difficult  problems 
that  the  mind  could  propose  to  itself.  We  are  now  taught  otherwise  by 
an  authority  that  it  niight  seem  presumptuous  to  disregard.  In  a  notice 
of  Vulgarisms  and  Other  Errors  of  Speech,  by  Mr.  Richard  Meade 
Bache,  lately  published  by  Claxton,  Remsen  &  Ilaffelfinger,  of  this  city, 
the  literary  critic  of  the  Nation  says : — 

"Tliis  book  is  open  to  the  objections  which  may  be  brought  against  most 
books  that  treat  of  errors  of  speech.  It  is  sound  enougli  whenever  the  par- 
ticular error  it  is  dealing  with  is  a  perfectly  obvious  one  ;  but  when  the  point 
discussed  is  really  difficult,  we  find  a  failure  in  knowledge  and  acumen.  Of 
old  it  was  known  as  a  trick  of  the  race  of  commentators  to  avoid  the  shaky  places 
in  tlieir  path,  and  to  build  vast  bridges  across  tracts  where,  without  any  of 
their  help,  we  all  could  have  passed  dry-shod,  or  which  we  all  could  have 
avoided.  Especially  is  this  likely  to  be  true  of  verhal  commentators,  who  so 
often  are  such  because  they  are  men  ungifted  with  the  powers  of  mind,  and 
incapable  of  attaining  the  degree  of  information  requisite  to  the  handling  of 
topics  more  weighty  and  universally  interesting.  Yet,  as  language  is  nothing 
but  as  it  is  the  instrument  and  expression  of  thought,  it  is  plain  that  an 
unlearned  or  feeble-minded  man  must  be  but  a  bad  critic  of  words." 

As  an  antidote  to  this  specious  depreciation  of  verbal  criticism,  we 
commend  to  the  reader  the  sententious  utterance  of  Lord  Bacon,  in 
the  Advancement  of  Learning:  <*  Although  we  think  we  govern  our 
words,  and  prescribe  it  well — loquendum  ut  vulgus,  sentiendum  nt 
sapientes,  yet  certain  it  is  that  words,  as  a  Tartar's  bow,  do  shoot  back 
upon  the  understanding  of  the  wisest,  and  mightily  entangle  and  per- 
vert the  judgment." 

We  think  that  the  Nation  should  furnish  an  approximate  explanation 
of  the  proposition  that  the  incapacity  to  attain  the  degree  of  information 
requisite  to  the  handling  of  weightier  topics  is  the  reason  that  men 
often  become  verbal  commentators.  Weightier  than  what?  The  critic 
does  not  tell  us.     The  antecedent  is  "verbal  commentators."     Were  we 


I\S 


82 

not  restrained  by  tlie  fear  of  placing  ourselvcvs  liopelessly  in  tln^  ninl 
of  the  mentally  ungifted,  we  should  say  that  the  antecedent  which  he 
meant  to  refer  to  was  verbal  topics,  or  words;  and  lhj\t  the  use  of  the 
comparative  "  more  weighty"  implies  that  words  are  u  lueighty  toj)ic 
of  study.  The  critic  furnishes  no  scale  of  precedence  whereby  the  rela- 
tive intellectual  [)0wer  requisite  to  handle  given  (piestions  is  deducible. 
The  assumption  that  a  verbal  commentator  is  feeble-minded  is  a  pefifio 
prhicipii. 

"Of  old,"  says  the  critic,  "it  w;is  known  as  a  trick  of  the  race  of 
commentators  ro  avoid  the  shaky  places  in  their  i)atli,  and  to  buihl  vast 
bridges  across  tracts  where,  witiiout  any  of  their  h(dj),  we  all  couhl  have 
passed  diy-shod,  or  which  we  all  could  have  avoided."  (irantcd  \\)v  the 
sake  of  tlie  argument  :  th('  pei-petual  manifestation  of  the  trick  to  avoid 
shaky  places  woidd  seem  to  be  an  iii'esistible  consequence,  because  he 
who  should  seek  to  detect  them,  and  to  place  us  dry-sho-l  across  them, 
must  become  ipso  facto  one  of  the  race  of  commentatoi's,  with  whom, 
says  the  critic,  it  is  a  trick  to  avoid  the  shaky  places,  liut  docs  it 
follow  that,  because  the  commentator  is  unabh'  to  put  us  across  shakv 
places  dry-shod,  we  who  are  not  commentators  understand  all  that  he 
may  wish  to  communicate  to  us  concerning  places  that  are  not  hoj)elessly 
shaky?  The  assumption  that  it  does  involves,  to  our  mind,  be'-^'nu*'-  the 
(;ritic's  pardon,  a  non  disfrihntio  medii.  If,  before  reading  their  com- 
mentaries, we  are  all  assumed  to  be  able  to  acquire,  "  without  any  of 
their  help,"  all  that  the  commentators  wish  to  impart  to  us,  wiiat  lunc- 
tion  do  knowledge  and  acumen,  rather  than  ignorance  and  dulness, 
subserve  in  verbal  criticism?  for  all  is  a  generic  term,  which  includes 
the  feeble-miiuled  as  well  as  the  wise. 

^'  Kspecfallf/,''  says   the   critic,    "is   this  likely  to  be  true   of  verbal 

commentators."     What  is  especially  likely  to  be  true?   Namely,  this 

to  avoid  the  shaky  places  in  their  [)ath.  Why?  Because  verbjd  com- 
mentators often  are  such  from  the  fact  that  they  are  men  ungifted  with 
the  powers  of  mind  to  handle  "weightier  topics."  But  the  critic  has 
just  told  us  that  we  all,  gifted  and  ungifted,  could,  "  without  any  of  their 
help,"  do  all  that  the  race  of  commentators  could  do.  Were  we  re- 
plying to  a  critic  less  astute  than  he  of  the  Nation,  we  would  take  the 
liberty  of  suggesting  that  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  special  i)r©- 
clivity  of  the  mentally  ungifted  to  do  what  all  of  us,  wise  or  unwise, 
are  assumed  to  do  without  limitation  as  to  degree,  is  a  contradiction  in 
terms. 

Says  the  critic::  "  Fe^  as  language  is  nothing  hnt  ((s  it  is  the  ex- 
pression of  thought,  it  is  [)lain  that  an  unlearned  or  feeble-minded  man 
must  be  bnt  a  bad  critic  of  words."     The  italicising  is  ours.     What 


o 


/y 


•A 


83 

relation  does  the  word  "yet"  bear  to  the  preceding  proposition  or 
propositions?  Coleridge  tells  us  that  a  close  reasoner  may  be  known  by 
the  pertinent  use  of  his  connectives. 

Unless  we  sadly  fail  to  understand  our  critical  friend,  his  reasonino- 
runs  thus  :  All  commentators  avoid  shaky  places  ;  we  all  ex  necessitate 
avoid  shaky  j)laces;  but  the  verbal  critic  es{)ecially  avoids  them,  because 
he  is  often  a  comparatively  feeble-minded  member  of  the  "  race  of  com- 
mentators ;"  nevertheless,  we  all,  gifted  or  ungifted,  are  equally  prone  to 
avoid  them ;  still,  a  "  feeble-minded"  man  must  be  a  bad  critic  of  words 
because  language  is  an  instrument  of  thought.  This  ratiocination,  we 
have  no  doubt,  is  very  profound  to  tliose  who  depreciate  verbal  criti- 
cism;  but  we  are  among  those  who  claim  to  have  some  respect  for  a 
knowledge  of  words,  and  therefore  would   commend  to  our   critic  the 

counsel  which  John   Stuart  Mill  gives  to  the  young  metaphysician 

namely,  to  "  be  always  sure  what  he  means  by  his  particles.  A  large 
portion  of  all  that  confuses  metaphysical  thought  comes  from  a  vague 
use  of  those  small  words."  It  was  in  relation  to  Locke's  examination 
of  these  small  words  that  Home  Tooke  quotes  the  jjregnant  illustration 
of  Dean  Swift:  "When  the  water  is  clear,  you  will  easily  see  to  the 
bottom." 

But  the  reasoning  of  our  critic  is  quite  as  original  as  it  is  profound  : 
Language  is  nothing  but  the  instrument  of  thought,  therefore  a  feeble- 
minded man  must  be  a  bad  critic  of  words  :  a  man  is  unijifted  with  the 
powers  of  mind  to  handle  "  weightier  topics  ;"  therefore,  he  is  a  verbal 
commentator,  /.  e.,  a  critic  of  words.  Accordingly,  he  must  be  a  good 
critic  of  words  who  uses  words  which  do  not  express  thought,  and  he 
must  be  a  bad  verbal  critic  who  uses  words  which  express  thought. 
AVe  are  thus  constrained  to  reverse  the  memorable  dictum  of  Ilobbes 
that  "  words  are  the  counters  of  wise  men,  and  the  money  of  fools,"  and 
say  that  "  words  are  the  money  of  wise  men,  and  the  counters  of 
fools."  Now,  this  is  distasteful  mental  pabulum,  and  were  it  offered  to 
us  by  anybody  less  gifted  than  he  who  wields  the  literary  sceptre  of  the 
Nation,  we  should  feel  utterly  disinclined  to  bolt  it! 

1868. 


VERBAL  CRITICISM. 


The  Bad  English  of  Mr.  George  ^\ .  Moon  is  devoted  to  tlie  exposure 
of  grammatical  errors  assumed  to  l)e  contained  in  Lindley  Murray's 
Grammar^  as  well  as  in  a  series  of  Jirticles  contributed  to  The  Nation  by 
Hon.  George  P.  Marsli,  and  in  IVIr.  Edward  S.  Gould's  Good  English. 
It  indicates  considerable  acuteness,  and  shows  us  what  a  plentiful  crop 
of  errors  awaits  the  gathering  of  a  patient  reaper  in  the  field  of  verbal 
criticism. 

In  a  notice  of  this  work,  Tlie  Nation  says  : — 

*'No  literary  business  ranks  lower  than  this  verbal  criticism." 

The  reader  will  please  bear  in  mind  that  the  Essays  of  ^Nlr.  ]Marsh, 
which  were  entitled  "  Notes  on  the  New  P^dition  of  AVcbster's  Dic- 
tionary," consisted,  in  tlie  language  of  their  author,  ''of  a  series  of 
miscellaneous  observations  on  tlie  character,  composition,  and  sources 
of  the  Eufrlish  lan«»;uase  ;"  and  that  tiiey  were  introduced  bv  the  editor 
to  the  readers  of  The  Nation  as  follows  : — 

"  We  believe  they  will  be  found  the  most  valuable  and  entertaining  criticism 
which  that  work  has  yet  elicited,  and  we  commend  them  especially  for  perusal 
and  preservation  to  the  scholars  and  the  whole  corps  of  instructors  of  the 
country." 

He  will  thus  be  enabled  to  estimate  at  their  full  value  the  consistency 
and  delicate  grace  with  which  such  depreciation  comes  from  su(d»  a 
source.  Wiien  Mr.  Marsh  assumes  the  office  of  critic,  verbiil  criticism 
becomes  res[)ectable.  The  essential  insignificance  of  verbal  criticism 
becomes  apparent  only  when  the  critic  is  criticised. 

Words  are  inseparable  from  literary  business,  and  literary  business  is 
well  or  ill  performed  according  to  the  degree  in  which  it  embodies  or 
fails  to  embody  their  correct  use.  Other  things  being  equal,  a  person  who 
writes  correctly  will  write  with  more  grace  and  elegance  than  one  who 
writes  incorrectly.  There  may  be  correctness  without  elegance  of  diction  ; 
but  there  cannot  be  elegance  of  diction  without  correctness.  Accord- 
84 


» 


^ 


^ 


85 


ingly,  any  skilful  attempt  to  point  out  the  quicksands  which  beset  the 
pathway  of  the  most  wary  of  writers  deserves  the  warm  thanks  of 
everv  one  who  seeks  to  attain  accuracy  in  the  use  of  language. 

"Verbal  criticism,"  says  The  Nation,  "should  be  practised  as  quietly  and 
unpretentiously  as  possible,  as  if  the  critic  fully  realized  how  much  more  im- 
portant things  tliere  were  to  be  attended  to." 

It  follows,  we  presume,  that  the  right  to  be  noisy  and  pretentious  is 
affirmable  of  those  only  who  are  interested  in  subjects  which  rank  higher 
than  verbal  criticism  in  a  scale  of  precedency  known  only  to  the  literary 
editor  of  The  Nation.  Until  this  scale  is  furnished  us,  that  we  may 
test  its  rationality,  we  shall  be  constrained  to  graduate  our  noise  and 
pretentiousness  in  accordance  with  our  conceptions  of  the  importance 
which  any  literary  business  we  undertake  has  relatively  to  that  of  any 
literary  business  we  might  undertake. 

This  de{)reciation  of  verbal  criticism  scarcely  deserves  to  be  designated 
as  sophistical,  for  the  term  sophistication  is  applied  to  that  which  has 
the  form,  even  though  it  lacks  the  substance,  of  sound  reasoning.  A 
morl)id  antipathy  to  venture  beyond  the  precincts  of  mere  affirmation  is 
not  unfrequently  a  characteristic  of  intellectual  feebleness;  and  assu- 
redly no  motive  less  potent  than  the  fear  of  being  regarded  as  noisy  and 
pretentious  could  have  tempted  us  to  swerve  from  the  duty  of  making 
a  signal  jipplication  of  so  })lain  a  proposition. 

Having  thus  happily  shown  verbal  criticism  to  be  unworthy  of  the 
attention  of  any  man  who  claims  to  have  a  moderate  degree  of  intellec- 
tuality, our  friend  unconsciously  nullifies  what  he  has  said  by  becoming 
liimself  a  verbal  critic  ;  for  how  can  any  man,  who  does  not  verbally 
criticise,  be  affirmed  to  be  able  to  declare  the  style  of  a  work  on  verbal 
criticism  to  be  correct?  What  is  style  but  the  form  of  a  collocation  of 
words  relative  to  that  of  another  collocation  of  words?  Accordingly, 
to  be  a  iudge  of  style,  a  person  must  be  familiar  with  words  in  their 
individual  meanings,  and  in  their  relations  one  to  another.  This  fami- 
liarity the  editor  of  The  Nation  assumes  to  have,  for  he  pronounces 
the  style  of  Mr.  Moon  to  be  very  correct.  But  the  functions  of  a 
verbal  judge  ill  become  him.  Why  the  qualifiying  term  "very?" 
That  which  is  susceptible  of  correction  is  not  correct.  This  truism 
seems  too  patent  to  require  comment.  If  our  friend  means  to  say  tliat 
Mr.  Moon,  in  his  Bad  English,  does  not,  in  any  instance,  err  against 
his  own  dicta,  or  against  the  principles  of  sound  verbal  criticism,  he 
shall  not  be  our  guide,  how  quiet  and  unpretentious  soever  he  may 
choose  to  be. 


86 

Mr.  Moon  tells  us  (p.  26)  that  redundancy  of  language  is  ungramma- 
tical.      It'  that  is  so,  the  first  sentence  of  his  work  is  unorramniatical : 

"Of  all  the  tasks  of  our  school-days,  perhaps  none  was  more  repugnant  to 
any  of  us  than  the  study  of  grammar." 

The  italicised  word  is  superfluous,  as  the  editor  of  T/w  Xafion  niiixlit 
easily  have  seen,  if  he  had  inverted  the  order  of  the  words  in  the  sen- 
tence, thus  : — 

"Perhaps  none  of  the  tasks  of  our  school-days,"  etc. 

In  the  following  sentences,  all  the  italicised  words  are  redundant  : 

"An  error,  the  e.iact  reverse  of  tliat  just  referred  to,"  etc.  (p.  34.) 

"Sucli  errors  are  more  'instructive  than  any  numl)pr  of  examples  of  good 
English  could  possiUt/  be.'  "  [This  is  very  bad.  Cuulcl  denotes  possibility  ver- 
balized.]   (p.  4.) 

"  These  are,  certainly,  remarkable  errors  for  an  author  to  commit  when  uc- 
tualhj  writing  on  the  improprieties  of  tlie  English  language."      (p.  20.) 

''^oi\nv\g'm  connection  with  Mr.  iMarsh's  Notes  so  much  surprises  me  as  his 
misuse  of  words."     (p.  107.) 

Mr.  Moon  speaks  of  the  "living  thoughts  of  the  author's  /^<//;(/.'* 
(p.  f)!.)      Of  what,  pray,  except  th<3  mind,  is  thought  [)redical)le  ? 

Mr.  Moon  condemns  the  following  sentence  as  ungrammatical  because 
"  are"  is  omitted  before  "  any  rules  and  exam[)les  :" — 

"A  proper  selection  of  faulty  composition  is  more  instructive  than  any  rules 
and  examples"  ! 

I>ut  a  conclusive  refutation  of  his  assumption  we  give  in  his  own 
words  : — 

"When  we  find  any  ellipsis  in  a  writer's  sentence,  it  behooves  us  not  to  be 
dogmatical  in  our  assertions  [to  what  but  'assertions'  does  the  word  '  dog- 
matical' apply  ?]  as  to  what  words  he  has  omitted  ;  nor  ought  we  to  accuse 
him  of  inaccuracy  because  his  sentence,  according  to  our  Jii/i)i(/  up  of  it,  is  un- 
granmiatical,  when  there  is  another  way  of  filling  it  up;  and  [when  ?]  accor- 
ding to  tliat  filling  up  [of  it  ?]  the  language  will  be  found  to  be  correct." 
(p.  223.) 

The   italics  are   his  own.      A  more  significant   illustration   of  contra- 
dictory teaching  is  rarely  seen. 

That  a  writer's  words  should  express  his  meaning  is,  without  doubt, 
the  supreme  law  of  composition.  Within  a  paragraph  or  two  of  that  in 
wiiich  the  assumed  error  from  Lindley  Murray  is  pointed  out,  there 
occurs  the  following  sentence  : 

"If  the  reader  will  carefully  examine  this  passage,  he  will  see  that  the 
nominative  to  tlie  verb,  'have  ever  been,'  is  in  the  singular  number;  and  there- 
fore the  verb  should  have  been  in  the  singular."     (p.  5.) 


- 


L 


I 


87 

Here  the  omission  of  the  word  that  before  "therefore"  gives  to  the 
sentence  a  meaning  which  the  author  did  not  intend.  The  affirmation 
is  that  the  verb  is  required  to  be  in  the  singular  because  the  reader  will 
see  that  the  nominative  to  the  verb  is  in  the  singular  number;  whereas  the 
truth  of  the  proposition  is  not  dependent  on  any  such  contingency. 
The  propositions  meant  to  be  affirmed  are,  that  the  nominative  to  the 
verb  is  singular,  and  that,  because  of  that  circumstance — namely,  that 
the  nominative  is  in  the  singular — the  verb  should  be  in  the  singular. 

The  following  sentence,  as  well  as  the  one  which  we  have  just  criti- 
cised, might  be  selected  as  a  favorable  text  to  illustrate  radical  fauliiness 
in  the  construction  of  a  sentence,  and  to  test  the  skill  of  a  youthful 
writer  in  composition  : — 

"So  faulty  is  the  construction  of  this  sentence,  that,  besides  the  'and  which' 
error  in  it,  the  relative  adverb  'therefore,'  that  follows  those  words,  has  really 
not  any  antecedent  that  is  grammatically  connected  with  it."     (p.  22.) 

What  are  the  grammatical  relations  of  the  clause  "besides  the  'and 
which'  error?"  Mr.  Moon  j?ieans  to  say  that  the  sentence  from  Lindley 
Murray  is  faulty  in  two  respects  :  First,  because  it  contains  the  "  and 
ivhich''  error.  Secondly,  because  the  relative  adverb  which  follows  these 
words  has  no  antecedent  which  is  grammatically  connected  with  it.  But 
mark  what  he  sai/s  :  The  relative  adverb  "therefore"  has  really  not  any 
antecedent  which  is  grammatically  connected  with  it  besides  [in  addition 
to]  the  "and  which"  error  in  the  sentence! 

What  is  the  antecedent  of  tlie  word  this,  in  the  following  sentence? 

"They  omit  the  pronoun  in  sentences  where  its  presence  is  really  necessary 
to  the  grammatical  arrangement  of  the  words.  This  has  been  done  by  Lindley 
Murray,  on  page  305.     He  there  says,"  etc.     (p.  24.) 

This  what?  How  much  better  it  is  to  say:  "An  instance  of  its 
omission  occurs  in  the  work  of  Lindley  Murray,  who,  on  page  305,  says," 
etc. 

The  following  sentence  is  very  faulty: — 

"  The  word  consonant  ...  is  a  noun  or  name  of  certain  letters  of  the  alpha- 
bet."    (p.  98.) 

Why  not  say:  "The  word  consonant  is  a  noun,  and  the  name  of 
certain  letters  of  the  alphabet"  ? 

The  omission  we  have  indicated  renders  the  followinof  sentence  un- 
grammjitical  : — 

"From  the  consideration  of  Lindley  Murray's  errors  in  the  use  of  verbs,  let 
us  now  turn  to  [that  of  ?J  liis  errors  in  the  use  of  adverbs."     (p.  11.) 


88 


Mr.  Moon  says  : — 


li 


It  is  evident  that  all    Lindley    Murray's   study  .   .   .  did   not  teach   hhn  to 
speak  accurately."     (p.  30.) 

If  the  commission  of  several  verbal  errors  is  correctly  assumed  to 
render  nugatory  tlie  authority  of  a  given  grammarian,  assuredly  the 
Bad  Engllsli  of  Mr.  IMoon  must  be  pronounced  a  grammatical  failure. 

But  we  cannot  imitate  the  equanimity  of  our  author  when  speakiufr  of 
Mr.  E.  S.  Gould  :— 

''When  a  would-be  critic  of  my  language  is  unable  to  see  the  faults  in  his 
own,  I  smile  at  the  expression  of  his  benevolent  intentions  ;  an.l,  while  thanking 
him  very  cordially  for  his  proffered  services,  decline  to  place  myself  under  his 
tuition."     (p.  07.) 

Despite  the  grammatical  {)eccability  of  Mi-.  Moon,  we  confess  our  in- 
debtedness to  him—an  indebtedness  whicli,  had  his  modesty  and  rev- 
erence borne  any  just  [)roportion  to  his  acumen,  would,  without  doubt, 
have  been  much  augmented. 

Unlike  The  Nation,  we  welcome  such  volumes  a:,  that  of  Bad  EihjUsIi. 
We  regard  tiieir  increase  in  the  light  in  which  a  ^n-eat  philosopher  re- 
garded the  multiplication  of  books  in  general :  "  There  seemeth  to  be  a 
superfluity  of  books  :  but  shall  no  more  books  be  made?  Ay,  make 
GOOD  HOOKS,  which,  like  the  rod  of  Moses,  siuill  devour  the  serpents  of 
the  enchanters." 

1869. 


MACAULAY. 


Ix    an  article  in     the  London    Quarterly    Review  for  April,    18G8 
entitled  *'  Lord  Macaulay  and  his  School,"  the  writer  says  : — 

"  The  judgment  of  foreign  nations  may  be  accepted  as  a  tolerably  fair  sample 
of  tlie  judgment  of  posterity.  Already,  both  on  the  Continent  and  in  the 
United    States,  Lord  Macaulay  is   almost  always   quoted  with  qualification  or 


reserve. 


7> 


Kven  conceding  the  correctness  of  this  dictum,  one  of  the  illustrations 
brought  forward  in  its  su})port  we  consider  as  inadmissible.  In  a  literary 
sense,  the  American  people  can  scarcely  be  regarded  with  truth  as  a 
foreign  nation  in  relation  to  the  countrymen  of  Macaulay.  Given  an 
equal  degree  of  mental  power,  culture,  industry,  and  impartiality,  the 
iud'zments  of  Americans  and  Enjilishmen  concernino;  the  ultimate  intel- 
lectual  standing  of  each  other  seem  to  us  to  be  substantially  of  equal  weight. 
In  the  recognition  of  this  fact  lies,  we  think,  the  sting  of  the  rebuke 
which  Macaulay  administered,  many  years  ago,  to  certain  English 
tourists  of  Tory  proclivities  : — 

*' Mr.  Southey,"  he  says,  "never  speaks  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
with  that  pitiful  affectation  of  contempt  by  which  some  members  of  his  party 
have  done  more  than  wars  or  tariffs  can  do  to  excite  mutual  enmity  between  two 
communities  formed  for  mutual  friendship.  Great  as  the  faults  of  his  mind  are, 
paltry  spite  like  this  has  no  place  in  it.  Indeed,  it  is  scarcely  conceivable  that 
a  man  of  his  sensibility  and  his  imagination  should  look  without  pleasure  and 
national  pride  on  the  vigorous  and  splendid  youth  of  a  great  people,  whose 
veins  are  filled  with  our  blood,  whose  minds  are  nourished  with  our  literature, 
and  on  whom  is  entailed  the  rich  inheritance  of  our  civilization,  our  freedom, 
and  our  glory." 

So  utterly  out  of  proportion  is  the  literary  nutriment  we  return  the 
mother  country  in  exchange  for  what  we  get,  that  it  is  difficult  to  see 
what  specific  value,  other  things  being  equal,  there  is  in  the  "  quali- 
fication" or  *'  reserve"  with  which  an  American,  in  contradistinction  to 
an  P^nglishman,  quotes  an  author  whose  reputation  looms  so  grandly  above 
that  of  common  autliors,  that  an   English  writer  of  zeal,  learning,  and 


90 


91 


skill  is  interested  in  fixing  his  rank  in  the  judgment  of  posterity.  Hence, 
in  a  case  in  which  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  the  assumed  qualification  or 
reserve  may  be  due  to  the  circumstance  that  the  merits  of  an  author 
may  transcend,  as  well  as  be  below,  our  standard  of  general  excellence, 
we  regard  with  some  suspicion  this  implied  compliment  to  our  perspi- 
cacity.      This  suspicion    is  not   weakened    by  the  fact   that    the  most 

eflfective  assaults  on  the  reputation   of  INIacaulay  have   been    made not 

by  continental  writers,  not  by  Ameri(;ans — but  by  Englishmen.  The 
reason  is  obvious.  Englishmen  have  in  greater  abundance,  and  have 
readier  access  to,  the  materials  by  which  certain  statements  of  the  essayist 
and  historian  can  be  verified  or  impugned.  Tlie  qualifi<;ation  or  reserve 
with  which  Macaulay  is  cpioted  in  America  will,  in  all  likelihood,  be 
augmented  or  lessened  in  (h'gree  precisely  in  the  proportion  in  which 
his  assumi)tions,  inferences,  and  statements  are  effectively  sup[)orted  or 
assailed.  The  im[)uting  of  critical  sagacity  and  judgment  to  our  coun- 
trymen in  matters  of  this  kind  merely  amounts,  when  analyzed,  to  a 
compliment,  reflectively,  on  our  English  friends  themselves. 

The  value  of  the    Continental   estimate  of  an   English  author   is,  we 
think,  scarcely  less  liable  to  be   overstated.     Germany,  rather   than  na- 
tions foreign  to   it,  seems    to  us   to   have  fixed   the  generally  recognized 
position  of  Goethe  in  the  scale  of  intellectual  eminence.      What  capable 
Englishman  or  American  would  accept  as  adequate  the  most  imj)artial 
French  estimate  of  the  genius  of  John  Milton?    Even  Ciiateaubriand 
could  not  translate  the  first   few  lines  of  ''l*aradise  Lest"   without  per- 
petrating a  grave  error.     Accordingly,  in   those  departments  of  litera- 
ture in  which  form,  rather  than  matter,  is  transcendently  [)rominent,  the 
judgment  of  an  educated  countryman,  rather  than  that   of  an    educated 
foreigner,  is  likely  to  have  final  value.     It  was  as  an  artist-writer  that 
Macaulay  won  his  fame  ;    as  a  master  of  composition  his  reputation,  we 
think,  will  reach  a  distant  posterity  ;  and  that  Englishmen  and  Americans 
are  quite  as  well  fitted  as  foreigners  to  judge  of  wliat  constitutes  genuine 
skill  in  construction  we  shall  believe  until  we  have  further  evidence  to 
the  contrary  than  has  yet  been  furnished  us. 

To  be  overpraised  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  serious  embarrassments  of 
intellectual  distinction.  Yet  there  are  generally  a  few  who  are  not  even 
momentarily  confused  by  the  halo  with  which  a  crowd  of  undiscerning 
disciples  invest  an  author  of  eminence.  Many  years  before  the  Hisforl/ 
of  J^Jur/Zand appeiimd,  Sir  James  Mackintosh  ha<I  atlectionately  ciiidden 
Macaulay  forgiving  *'  too  much  countenance  to  the  abuse  and  confusion 
of  language  exemplified  in  the  well-known    line  of  ro[)e~ 

*  Modes  of  self-love  the  Passions  we  may  call ;'  " 


b 


>    ^ 


and  tenderly  admonished  him  to  "  holdfast  to  simplicity,  which  survives 
ail  the  fashions  of  deviation  from  it,  and  which  a  man  of  genius  so 
fertile  has  few  temptations  to  forsake."  Nevertheless,  Sir  James  re- 
garded his  young  friend  as  "a  writer  of  consummate  ability,"  as  one 
who,  at  an  early  age,  had  "  mastered  every  species  of  composition." 

AVhen  the  reputation  of  Macaulay  had  fairly  bloomed,  Edgar  A.  Poe 
said  of  him  : — 


( I  T 


The  few  wl)o  regard  Macaulay  as  a  terse,  forcible,  and  logical  writer,  full  of 
thought,  and  abounding  in  original  views,  often  sagacious,  and  never  otherwise 
tlian  admirably  expressed  — appear  to  us  precisely  in  the  right.  The  many  who 
look  upon  him  as  not  only  all  this,  but  as  a  comprehensive  and  profound  thinker, 
little  prone  to  error,  err  essentially  themselves." 

Here  praise  is  thoughtfully  qualified  by  judges  of  recognized  compe- 
tenc(\ 

But  it  is  tlie  fate  of  genius  to  be  underrated  as  well  as  overpraised  ; 
and  the  very  intensity  and  multiplicity  of  the  efforts  wliich  have  been 
made,  in  high  quarters,  to  becloud  the  fame  of  Macaulay  are  inveisely 
the  most  significant  of  all  proofs  of  the  unassailable  basis  on  which  it 
rests.  Capable  men  seldom  have  ji  burning  desire  to  cast  tlu;  horoscope 
of  mediocrity.  Eliminate  from  his  reputation,  if  you  will,  whatever  is 
due  to  the  inaccuracies  and  erroneous  inferences  which  the  reviewer 
has  assumed  to  exist  in  his  "  History"  and  '•  Essays,"  and  there  is 
scarcely  a  perceptible  diminution  in  value  of  the  splendid  residue.  What 
remains  is  Macaulay.  There  may  be  many  persons  who,  sinnrly  or  in 
combination,  might  have  gathered  the  facts  in  his  *' History;"  but  who, 
besides  him,  could  have  marshalled  them  in  so  magnificent  an  array? 
The  entire  train  of  his  reasoning  in  the  introductory  paragraphs  to  his 
Essay  on  Ranke's  History  of  the  Popes  seems  to  us  to  be  demonstrably 
fallacious.  Yet  the  manner  in  which  the  two  general  propositions  con- 
tained in  these  paragraphs  are  set  forth  is,  we  think,  justly  commended 
by  Toe  "as  a  model  for  the  logician  and  the  student  of  belles  lettres.'" 

"  Macaulay  could  never  be  made  to  understand,"  says  the  reviewer,  "that 
there  are  whole  classes  of  subjects  on  which  certainty  is  unattainable." 

We  believe,  on  the  conti-ary,  that  no  writer  of  equal  ability  in  modern 
times  has,  on  the  whole,  more  resolutely  devoted  himself  to  those  sub- 
jects with  respect  to  which  certainty  is  approximately  attainable.  He 
did  not  scruple,  says  J.  Stuart  Mill,  to  pronounce  impossible  the  generali- 
zation of  ^'the  modes  of  investigating  truth  and  estimating  evidence,  by 
which  so  many  important  and  recondite  laws  of  nature  have,  in  the 
various  sciences,  been  aggregated  to  the  stock  of  human  knowledge" — 
a  task  which,  we  think,  Mr.  Mill  is  conceded  fairly  to  have  accomplished. 


92 


Thus,  in  relation  to  one  of  the  most  elaborate  and  important  fields  of 
investigation,  Macaulay  denied  certainty  to  be  attainable  where  com- 
parative certainty  has  been  attained. 

The  reviewer  has  endeavored,  with  apparent  self-gratulation,  to  imi- 
tate what  he  is  pleased  to  regard  as  the  trick  of  Macaulay's  style.  The 
attempt  suggests  an  illustration  from  a  line  verbal  ci'itic,  who  regarded 
Macaulay  as  the  most  accurate  stylist  of  the  age. 

"  Painting  their  faces  to  look  like  Macaulay,"  says  Poe,  "  some  of  our  critics 
manage  to  resemble  him,  at  leiigtli,  as  a  Massaccian  does  a  Kalfaellian  virgin; 
and,  except  that  the  former  is  feebler  and  thinner  tlian  the  other — suggesting 
the  idea  of  its  being  the  ghost  of  the  other — not  one  connoisseur  iti  ten  can  per- 
ceive any  difference.  But  then,  unhappily,  even  the  street  lazzaroni  can  feel  the 
distinction.^^ 

Feeble  efforts  to  imitate  the  lively,  staccato  movement  of  the  essayist 
have  often  been  made;  but  how  many,  besides  iMacaulay,  iiave  acquired 
the  "  trick"  of  such  writing  as  tliis  : — 

"  A  mightier  poet,  tried  at  once  b^'pain,  danger,  poverty,  obloquy,  and  blind- 
ness, meditated,  undisturbed  by  the  obscene  tumult  wliich  raged  all  around  him, 
a  song  so  sublime  and  so  lioly  that  it  would  not  have  misbecome  the  lips  of 
those  ethereal  Virtues  whom  he  saw,  with  that  inner  eye  wliich  no  calamity 
could  darken,  Hinging  down  on  the  jasper  pavement  their  crowns  of  amaranth 
and  gold"  ? 

In  opulence,  variety,  and  charm  of  illustration,  Macaulay  moves  in  a 
sphere  all  his  own.  To  him  who  seeks  intellectual  recreation  tliere  is  a 
fervid,  healthy,  robust  energy  in  his  style  tluit  is  fascination  itself.  So 
marvellous  is  his  skill  in  composition,  that  we  venture  to  say  that  there 
are  few  good  judges  of  style  who  have  not  paused,  in  the  j)erusal  of  one 
of  his  finest  passages,  to  examine  critically  the  mere  mechanism  of  his 
sentences.  His  eye,  ''  in  a  fine  frenzy  rolling,"  seems  to  sweep  the  orbit 
of  ancient  and  modern  literature.  His  culture  vastly  enriches  his 
genius;  and  his  genius  gives  intense  life  and  glow  to  everything  he 
touches.  Not  only  did  he  know  liow  to  say  a  thing  ;  but  he  eminently  had 
something  to  say.  Yet,  so  deftly  does  he  combine  the  tact  of  the  rhe- 
torician and  the  dexterity  of  the  logician,  that  his  diction  scarcely  bates 
one  jot  of  elegance  in  passages  conspicuous  for  argumentative  skill. 

18G9. 


^ 


U 


IN  MEMORIAM. 


It  is  with  feelings  of  profound  sadness  that  we  chronicle  the  loss  of  our 
dear  and  honored  friend,  Tillinghast  King  Collins.  AVe  knew  him 
in  the  full  fiush  of  health  and  vigor,  and  we  witnessed  the  closing  years 
of  his  life,  uhen,  sustained  by  the  recollection  of  duties  well  performed, 
and  consoled  by  an  earnest  and  unquestioning  faith  in  the  Redeemer  of 
mankind,  he 

"  drew  the  draper}^  of  his  couch  about  him. 
And  lay  down  to  pleasant  dreams." 

As  a  shock  of  corn  fully  ripe,  he  was  gathered  to  the  great  granary 
of  his  Fatiier. 

It  is  spiritually  healthful  to  linger  at  the  shrine  of  the  good  and  the 
true — of  those  who  have  unmurmuringly  "borne  the  burden"  in  the 
"  heat  of  the  day" — of  those  who,  amid  great  tribulation,  have  been 
"  weighed  in  the  balance,"  and  not  been  "  found  wanting." 

Left,  at  an  early  age,  with  a  widowed  mother,  and  a  younger  brother 
and  sister,  to  encounter  the  great  battle  of  life,  he  went  forth  to  the  con- 
test with  a  precocious  understanding  of  the  circumstances  which  sur- 
rounded him,  and  a  joyous  consciousness  of  the  ultimate  realization  of 
his  desire.  In  the  darkest  hour  of  his  struojgles  he  never  for  a  moment 
lost  his  bounding  energy  ;  never  for  a  moment  did  he  *'  bate  one  jot  of 
heart  or  hope  ;"  never  for  a  moment  did  he  fail  to  show  a  calm  and  sunny 
temper.  When  success  had  crowned  his  efforts,  his  honors  were  quietly 
and  meekly  borne.  Even  the  conspicuous  reverses  which  occasionally 
marked  his  career  were  due  to  the  abnormal  development  of  a  frank  and 
generous  nature.  He  always  looked  on  the  bright  side  of  life  ;  and  when 
he  did  a  favor  his  kindly  manner  of  doing  it  enhanced  immeasurably  the 
value  of  the  act. 

T.  K.  Collins  was  born  in  this  city  on  the  14th  of  October,  1802. 
His  great-grandfather  on  his  father's  side  emigrated  from  Ireland  to 
Rhode  Island   during   colonial   times.      His   great-grandfather  on    his 


i    "i 


94 

mother's  side  was  a  Welslinian,  a  lawyer  by  profession,  wlio  resided 
on  an  island  in  the  Delaware  Kiver.  His  father  was  n  sailor,  and  a 
native  of  Cranston,  R.  I.      1 1  is  mother  was  born  near  Trenton,  N.  J. 

When  thirteen  years  old  he  entered  the  wareroom  of  ^Nlathew  Carey, 
whose  history  during  a  hii'ge  part  of  his  life  is  the  history  of  Pliiladel- 
phia.  Shortly  afterwards,  he  was  received  into  the  printing-otrice  of 
James  Maxwell,  at  tliat  period  proprietor  of  oih^  of  the  largest  establish- 
ments in  tliis  city.     From  this  office  he  graduated  a  thorough  printer 

of  rare  skill,  energy,  and  fertility  of  invention. 

From  Philadelphia  he  removed  to  AVashington,  and  was  employed  by 
Peter  Force,  and  successively  by  Duff  Green  and  Gales  c<:  Scalon,  all 
Avell-known  printers  and  i)ublishers.  Returning  to  l*liila<l"lphin,  he 
entered  the  ])rinting.()(Iice  of  James  Kay,  the  eminent  law  bookseller, 
who  had  the  higliest  appreciation  of  his  capacity  and  energy.  Ib^  then 
became  foreman  for  Lawrence  Johnson,  the  celebrated  ty[)e-f )under, 
and  was   again  employed  by  James  Kay. 

In  1833,  in  conjunction  with  Robert  Wright,  he  esta})lished  a  prin- 
ting-office  in  Prune  street,  with  l)ut  one  hand-press.  In  183."),  a  new 
copartnership  w;is  formed  witli  his  brothf^r,  I^iiimi'  G.  Collins.  Tiie 
new  house  became  distinguished  for  energy,  skill,  and  enterprise,  an<l  at 
once  took  rank  at  the  very  head  of  the  typographic  art. 

The  junior  partner,  P.  G.  Collins,  a  print<M-  of  great  ca[)acity  and 
general  knowledge,  died  in  1851.  The  business  was  thenceforward  con- 
ducted by  the  senior  partner. 

In  1858,  Mr.  Collins  became  disabled  by  paralysis;  but  he  was  still 
competent  to  afford  efficient  co-operation  in  the  management  of  his  im- 
mense establishment  until  the  year  1865,  when  the  helm  he  had 
managed  with  so  consummate  an  ability  for  many  years  had  to  be  in- 
trusted to  others.  p]ven  from  this  period  until  within  a  few  days  of  his 
decease  his  counsel  and  judgment  were  of  value. 

While  in  Washington  he  connected  himself  with  the  Methodist  Epis- 
copal Church,  of  which  to  the  close  of  his  life  he  was  uninterruptedly  a 
faithfidand  distinguished  member.  lie  was  for  many  years  a  Director 
of  the  Public  Scliools  of  Philadelphia,  in  which  position  his  strict  at- 
tention  to  his  duties  and  his  affable  manners  won  him  many  friends. 

The  social  qualities  of  our  departed  friend  were  of  rare  excellence. 
His  memory  was  a  vast  storehouse  of  anecdote,  story,  and  a[)t  (piotation,  of 
which  his  command  seemed  to  be  absolutely  without  limit.  His  i)layful 
wit  and  readiness  at  rei)artee  rendered  him  one  of  the  most  companiona- 
ble of  men.  He  had  a  big,  brave  heart,  which  beat  steadily  in  unison 
with  whatever  was   frank,  manly,  straightforward,  and    honorable;    and 


f 


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96 

he  had  as  sunny  and  as  beaming  a  countenance  as  ever  lighted  up  a  human 
frame.  Kindness  and  benevolence  were  at  his  fingers'  ends.  One  of  the 
most  pleasing  features  in  his  character  was  his  courtesy  in  his  business 
relations — a  courtesy  so  magnetic  as  to  transform,  within  an  exceedingly 
short  period,  a  casual  customer  into  a  stanch  and  enduring  friend. 

His  intellect  was  far  al)ove  the  average  order.  Had  he  received  a 
thorough  intellectual  training  in  early  life,  tliere  is  no  profession  in 
which  he  could  not  have  attained  high  distinction.  Greater  skill  than 
he  possessed  in  untying  a  knotty  point  in  his  business  it  seems  quite  im- 
possible to  conceive.  The  breadth  and  generosity  of  his  nature  may  be 
inferred  from  the  fact  that  he  had  no  business  secrets.  He  imparted  to 
any  one  who  sought  his  advice  the  rare  stores  of  technical  information 
he  possessed. 

1870. 


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